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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A CRITICAL APPROACH TOWARD CEVDET PASHA’S UNDERSTANDING OF 
REFORM: GRANDVIZIERS, SULTANS, AND SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TEZAKİR AND MARUZAT 
 
 
 
BETÜL SANCAK 
 
HISTORY M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
 
Keywords: Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the Tanzimat era, Partiality 
 
 
This thesis aims to reassess the reliability of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s Tezakir and Maruzat 
as the substantial primary sources of the Tanzimat period and go beyond the understand-
ing of the ‘incontestability’ of Cevdet Pasha’s writings. Being originally from the ilmiye 
class, Cevdet Pasha was one of the most prominent statesmen of the Tanzimat era and 
actively involved in the implementation of numerous reforms. Therefore, while his ac-
counts are dealt with, it is important to figure out the expectations, purposes, and perspec-
tives that formed the basis of Cevdet's narration in order to evaluate to what extent 
Cevdet’s accounts are objective and reliable. In this study, first, Cevdet’s subjective atti-
tude toward the five grand viziers —Reşid, Fuad, Âli, Mahmud Nedim, and Midhat Pa-
shas— of the era is examined. Second, Cevdet’s notion of the sultanate is considered and 
his attitude toward the two sultans of the Tanzimat era—Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz— 
and their reigns is analyzed. Third, Cevdet’s state-centered view while describing and 
interpreting the oppositional movements of the people of different strata and diverse re-
gions of the empire is illustrated. Fourth, Cevdet's manner toward İstanbul society, in 
which he spent most of his life, and societies of Bosnia and the Çukurova region, to where 
he was sent as a state official are considered. Lastly, the Ottoman political thought is 
briefly mentioned in order to understand the roots of Cevdet’s traditional and conserva-
tive outlook on rulership.  
 v 
ÖZET 
 
 
 
CEVDET PAŞA’NIN REFORM ANLAYIŞINA ELEŞTİREL BİR BAKIŞ: TEZAKİR 
VE MARUZAT BAĞLAMINDA SADRAZAMLAR, PADİŞAHLAR VE TOPLUM 
 
 
 
BETÜL SANCAK 
 
TARİH YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tanzimat Dönemi, Tarafgirlik 
 
 
Bu tez Tanzimat döneminin önemli birincil kaynakları arasında olan Ahmed Cevdet 
Paşa’nın Tezakir ve Maruzat’ının güvenilirliğinin yeniden değerlendirilmesini ve Cevdet 
Paşa’nın eserlerinin sorgulanamazlığı anlayışının ötesine geçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Aslen ilmiye sınıfından olan Cevdet Paşa, Tanzimat döneminin en önde gelen devlet 
adamlarından biriydi ve dönemin birçok reform hareketinin uygulanmasında aktif olarak 
rol aldı. Bu yüzden, eserleri ele alınırken Cevdet Paşa’nın anlatımının temelinde ne tür 
beklenti, amaç ve bakış açısının yattığını ortaya çıkarmak, Cevdet’in yorumlarının ne de-
receye kadar objektif ve güvenilir olduğunu değerlendirmek açısından önemlidir. Bu 
çalışmada, öncelikle Cevdet’in dönemin beş sadrazamına—Reşid, Fuad, Âli, Mahmud 
Nedim ve Midhat Paşa— karşı takındığı subjektif tavır incelendi. İkinci olarak, Cevdet’in 
saltanat kavramı göz önünde bulunduruldu ve Tanzimat döneminin iki padişahı—Abdül-
mecid ve Abdülaziz— ve dönemlerine karşı tavrı incelendi. Üçüncü olarak, Cevdet’in 
imparatorluğun çeşitli bölgelerindeki farklı sınıflardan insanların muhalefet hareketlerini 
tasvir ederken ve değerlendirirken devlet merkezli bakış açısı gösterildi. Dördüncü 
olarak, Cevdet’in hayatının çoğunu içinde yaşadığı İstanbul toplumuna ve devlet memuru 
olarak gönderildiği Bosna ve Çukurova bölgelerinin halklarına karşı tavrı ele alındı. Son 
olarak, Cevdet’in iktidar konusundaki geleneksel ve muhafazakar bakış açısının köken-
lerinin anlaşılabilmesi için Osmanlı siyasi düşüncesine kısaca değinildi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The Tanzimat period (1839-1876), which signified an era of comprehensive institutional 
reforms and modernization of the Ottoman Empire, has been the subject of many works 
since the time of the promulgation of the edict in 1839. The significance of Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha (1822-1895) originates from the fact that he was actively involved in the imple-
mentation of numerous reforms, and recorded the events in such a way that many of the 
details in his works cannot be found in any other source. Being originally from the ilmiye 
class, he was one of the most prominent statesmen of the era. As a leading figure, he 
directly experienced and played a crucial role in the ongoing events (Baysun 1986, XIV). 
 
When Cevdet served as official chronicler, he took notes of his observations and experi-
ences. His work Tezakir-i Cevdet (“Memoranda of Cevdet”) consists of the texts that 
Cevdet compiled from these notes to send to his successor Ahmet Lütfi Effendi. Although 
Cevdet never intended it, these were later published under the same name. The first parts 
of Tezakir were published in the volumes 44-47 of Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni Mecmuası 
(Journal of Ottoman History Committee) under the name of “Vak‘anüvis Cevdet Paşa’nın 
Evrakı” (Chronicler Cevdet Pasha’s Documents) in 1917. A full publication of Tezakir in 
Latin alphabet was prepared by Cavid Baysun as four volumes. In 1953, the first volume 
(tezkire no. 1-12), in 1960, the second volume (tezkire no. 13-20), in 1963, the third vol-
ume (tezkire no. 21-39), and in 1967, the last volume (tezkire no. 40) were published by 
Turkish Historical Society. Respectively in 1986 and 1991, the second and the third edi-
tions of the same four volumes were published by Turkish Historical Society (Halaçoğlu 
and Aydın 1993, 448; Aykut 2018, 207). 
 
Additionally, Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) ordered Cevdet to write reports about the 
situation during the reign of his father Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861) and his uncle 
Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), as he needed to have reliable information about the previous 
 2 
periods. These reports constitute the text called Maruzat (“Representations”). For the first 
time in 1924-1925, Maruzat was published serially by Ahmed Refik Altınay in different 
volumes (XIV-XVI) of Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası (Journal of Turkish History 
Committee) (Halaçoğlu 1980, XIII). Yusuf Halaçoğlu transcribed Maruzat into Latin al-
phabet and published as a book in 1980.1 These two complementary sources are consid-
ered among the most substantial primary sources of the Tanzimat period in Ottoman his-
tory.  
 
In this thesis, Cevdet’s approach toward the Tanzimat era will be taken into consideration 
through his accounts in Tezakir and Maruzat. However, studying the primary sources of 
a historical personality like that of Cevdet has its own complications.  Being a sophisti-
cated statesman, a leading character, and a prolific author of his time, his writings, inev-
itably, confine the reader his own view of the time. On the other hand, except for a few 
recent studies, most of the literature about Cevdet has failed to go beyond rephrasing 
Cevdet while considering his accounts and has tended to treat his works as objective 
sources that are incontestable. Therefore, before mentioning the aim and significance of 
this study, it is important to take look at the literature on Cevdet. 
 
 
A Review of the Literature on Cevdet  
 
 
As Ercüment Kuran (1986) states, after the death of Cevdet Pasha, events in the Ottoman 
Empire developed contrary to Cevdet’s views (p. 12). Cevdet was in favor of the absolute 
monarchy and concerned about the protection of the dignity of the “sultanate,” and of the 
continuity of the empire. He was against a constitutional regime and opposed it when the 
first arrangements began during the Abdülhamid II’s period (Hanioğlu, 2004, 390). De-
spite the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876, the parliament was closed by 
Abdülhamid II in 1878 after sitting only fifty times (Hanioğlu 1995, 30). However, to-
gether with Young Turk revolution in 1908, constitutional monarchy was founded. After 
twelve years, the Ottoman Empire officially ended when the sultanate was abolished in 
1922 and Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. 
                                               
1 See: (Maruzat 1980). 
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Cevdet was a pro-Tanzimat statesman and devoted his life to contributing to the imple-
mentation of Tanzimat reforms in the administrative, judiciary, intellectual, and educa-
tional spheres. However, in 1860s, the Tanzimat reforms began to be criticized by the 
first relatively liberal intellectuals of the time, such as Ziya Pasha, Namık Kemal, Ali 
Suavi etc., who were favoring a constitutional regime (Georgeon 1996, 97). After the 
Young Turk revolution in 1908, Unionist authors began to condemn the era vigorously. 
For instance, Ziya Gökalp claimed that the Tanzimat made a ruinous mistake by imitating 
the cultural values of the European nations (Parla 1985, 30). In line with Unionists, intel-
lectuals of the early periods of the Turkish Republic severely criticized the Tanzimat era. 
For example, Yusuf Akçura believed that the Tanzimat period caused political, socio-
cultural, and economic fiasco (Georgeon 1996, 98). 
  
Therefore, in such an environment, aside from his prominence as a historiographer, 
Cevdet’s identity did not attract much attention immediately after his death. Other than 
his daughter Fatma Aliye’s book about her father’s life2 there was almost no literature on 
Cevdet Pasha until the 1940’s. However, this circumstance began to change after the 
1940’s, as the Tanzimat era and its actors began to be reevaluated. 
 
In 1945, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Cevdet’s death, the folklorist M. 
Şakir Ülkütaşır published a monograph3 about Cevdet’s life, personality, and works. In 
the same year, the Faculty of Law of Istanbul University decided to publish a book about 
Cevdet, for which Ebül’ulâ Mardin prepared a monograph, Medeni Hukuk Cephesinden 
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (Ahmed Cevdet Pasha from the Aspect of Civil Law),4 about Cevdet’s 
life, personality, views, and contributions to the development of Islamic and Ottoman 
law. 
 
According to Christoph Neumann (2000), this was bad timing for a rehabilitation, since 
from that period onwards debates about Cevdet focused on either his “progressivism” or 
“reactionism.” For conservatives and right-wing intellectuals, the discovery of Cevdet as 
                                               
2 See: (Fatma Aliye 1994). 
3 See: (Ülkütaşır 1945). 
4 See: (Mardin 1996). 
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a progressive but also faithful statesman began (p. 10). For instance, Ümit Meriç’s doc-
toral thesis, which was defended in 1975 and then published as a book under the name of 
Cevdet Paşa’nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü (Cevdet Pasha’s View of Society and State)5, 
is overwhelmed by this flaw. She presents Cevdet as one of the defenders of Islam of the 
late Ottoman period and claims that “Cevdet Pasha is muslim and the Ottoman” (Meriç 
1979, 11) without questioning what “muslim” and “the Ottoman” are if they are repre-
sented by a person in history. This kind of approach toward Cevdet has led not only Meriç 
but other conservatives to pick their arguments according to how they wanted to present 
Cevdet. 
 
As Ortaylı (1986) indicates, there has been a tendency to evaluate the scholars of the 
nineteenth century in a partisan manner. Radical conservatives embraced Cevdet without 
a critical examination of whether he fits their categorization or not (p.73) Ortaylı (1986) 
chooses to question the repeated conventionality and pan-Islamism of Cevdet by looking 
at the reactions of the reactionaries of Cevdet’s time towards Cevdet himself. Contrary to 
what is commonly claimed by Islamists, Ortaylı states that Cevdet was not the pioneer of 
the Islamist side of his time, since his interpretations and actions were noticeably contrary 
to the views of the existing nineteenth century ulema (p. 76-77). 
 
Although Cevdet became a symbol for conservatives and fell victim to political polariza-
tion during these years (Neumann 2000, 10), academically more reliable studies were 
conducted and seminars were held about Cevdet in the following decades. In the new 
edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam that was prepared under the patronage of the Inter-
national Union of Academies, Cevdet is described as “a curious mixture of the progres-
sive and the conservative,” in both his conduct and works. According to the article, on 
the one hand he was a progressive, since he continually promoted the greater enlighten-
ment of Ottoman society and dispraised zealotry and self-seeking in the ruling class; on 
the other hand, his standpoint was in essence shaped by his early madrasah education 
(Bowen 1986, 286). 
 
The Center for Historical Research in Istanbul University’s Faculty of Letters organized 
a seminar with a title “Ahmed Cevdet Paşa Semineri” (Seminar on Ahmed Cevdet Pasha) 
                                               
5 See: (Meriç 1979). 
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in 1985. These papers were published under the same title6 a year later. The seminar ad-
dressed different aspects and features of Cevdet Pasha. Ten years later, in 1995, a sym-
posium was held by the Turkiye Diyanet Foundation in reference to the hundredth year 
of Cevdet’s death. This was a large scaled symposium that took three days with the par-
ticipation of almost forty academics and scholars. Cevdet Pasha was considered from 
different aspects as a scholar, statesman, linguist, author, and legist. In 1997, the Turkiye 
Diyanet Foundation press published the symposium’s papers together with their discus-
sions.7 
 
A thoroughly analytical work on Cevdet was realized by Christoph Neumann as his PhD 
project, completed in 1992. After a revision, this project was translated into Turkish and 
published under the name of Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı 
(History as Vehicle, Tanzimat as Goal: The Political Significance of Cevdet’s History)8 
in 2000. In this work, Neumann critically and carefully analyzes the twelve volumes of 
the Tarih-i Cevdet, which took Cevdet Pasha almost thirty years to complete. Since it was 
such a long writing process, there were critical changes in the way Cevdet produced his 
work. Neumann, first analyzes the historical background of the work, paying attention to 
the textual inconsistencies and looking at its long writing process with a critical eye, since 
all those years saw changes not only in Cevdet Pasha’s life but also in the way the text 
was constituted. Therefore, Neumann makes textual comparisons between different ver-
sions of some parts of Tarih-i Cevdet. Then, he tries to demonstrate how Cevdet describes 
and interprets the historical events. The importance of Neumann’s work comes from its 
wide range of research and its critical view that is lacking in most published or un-
published dissertations and studies on Cevdet. Neumann looks at Cevdet from a revision-
ist perspective that questions the accepted idea that being an early modernist history 
writer, Cevdet was different from the classical chroniclers. 
 
In 2018, the first three of the twelve volumes of Tarih-i Cevdet was transcribed into Latin 
alphabet by Mehmet İpşirli, Şevki Nezihi Aykut, and Abdülkadir Özcan as a project of 
Turkish Historical Society. For this project, Şevki Nezihi Aykut prepared an introductory 
                                               
6 See: (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa Semineri 1986). 
7 See: (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Vefatının Yüzüncü Yılına Armağan 1997). 
8 See: (Neumann 2000). 
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volume about Cevdet under the name of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa; Hayatı, Eserleri, Tarihçiliği 
Hakkında Yapılan Araştırma ve İncelemeler (Ahmed Cevdet Pasha; Researches and Ex-
aminations About His Life, Works, and Historiography).9 As the name suggests, this vol-
ume is a comprehensive study about Cevdet’s life, works, and historian identity as well 
as the studies conducted on him such as doctoral theses, books, and articles. 
 
Finally, there are various master’s and doctoral theses, and published books written on 
Cevdet and his works in different fields of study. His Al-Majalla was studied by scholars 
in the field of Islamic Law. His Tarih, Tezakir, and Maruzat have been the focus of works 
conducted in the fields of history and political science. For instance, in her master’s thesis, 
titled “The Reformist Horizons of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: The Notions of Civilization 
(Medeniyet), Progress (Terakki), and Solidarity (Asabiyet),”10 Hatice Sezer examined 
Cevdet’s reformist horizon by looking at his understanding of the three notions; civiliza-
tion, progress, and solidarity. In his master’s thesis under the name of “Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha and Change: A Three-Tiered Approach,” İsmail Noyan discussed Cevdet within 
the context of his conservatist attitude toward change.11 
 
 
The Goal of the Study 
 
 
Many secondary sources write about how “neutral” (Halaçoğlu 1997, 247) or “critical” 
(Doğan 1997, 229; Kuran 1986, 7; Şimşirgil and Ekinci 2008, 34) Cevdet’s works are. 
This thesis contests this understanding and argues that in historiography, Cevdet consti-
tutes a paradigm that is quite tough to move beyond. He was a sophisticated statesman 
and was of crucial significance for the recording of the history of his era, but he had his 
own agenda while composing his works. This is exactly why his works need a study that 
examines the expectations, purposes, and perspectives that form the basis of Cevdet’s 
narration. This is essential for the reassessment of the reliability of his accounts. 
 
                                               
9 See: (Aykut 2018). 
10 See: (Sezer 2015). 
11 See: (Noyan 2018). 
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Cevdet was one of the main figureheads of the late Tanzimat period and worked for three 
sultans; Abdülmecid, Abdülaziz, and Abdülhamid II. He was primarily a bureaucratic 
man who produced many of his works as a side job. As Neumann (2009) rightly points 
out, in the center of Cevdet’s thoughts there was not a program for making the empire 
“more Islamic.” Rather, his political outlook and views revolved around "the state” (p. 
85). Thus, he did not hesitate to suggest the amendment of various government practices, 
no matter their Islamic origin, if they were not beneficial for the necessities of the time 
(Karpat 2001, 189). His perspective was shaped by a pragmatic statist view with a con-
cern for reinforcing the power and continuity of the empire (Neumann 2009, 87). 
 
Furthermore, he firmly believed in the absolutist sultanate as a principal characteristic of 
the Ottoman government. For this reason, he was against a constitutional regime and was 
a supporter of reform and legislation under “the aegis of a sultanic enlightened despotism” 
(Findley 1980, 225). Consequently, he had a strong belief in the “obedience to those 
charged with authority” (Ulü’l emre itaat) and never approved of any opposition by “the 
subjects” to the state or the sultan. In other words, he had a traditional and conservative 
political outlook centered on the state. 
 
While dealing with Cevdet’s accounts, the common pitfall is to disregard Cevdet’s pos-
sible agenda that underlies his reports. However, when the above-mentioned statist and 
conservative monarchist stance of Cevdet is considered, the need for a critical approach 
toward Cevdet’s accounts becomes obvious. Moreover, when Maruzat and Tezakir are 
taken into consideration, they should be evaluated as retrospective interpretations, since 
although Cevdet witnessed the period in which the events he described and interpreted 
took place, he wrote both sources decades later. 
 
As mentioned, the addressees of both sources were specific people. It is apparent that 
Cevdet reconsidered the events of his time in Tezakir according to his personal views, 
and prepared his successor Lütfi Effendi in line with this outlook. For example, he tries 
to justify or excuse the acts of the statesmen to whom he was attached, even if he criticizes 
them softly. On the other hand, he does not hesitate to use harsh expressions when talking 
about people with whom he had personal disputes. It is also obvious that Cevdet chooses 
his expressions in Maruzat accordingly and tries not to arouse the sultan’s suspicions. 
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As can be seen in the points above, for academically credible studies there are essential 
points to be aware of when dealing with Cevdet’s works, such as his partiality and state-
centered view. The aim of this thesis is to reveal these points and go beyond the under-
standing of the “incontestability” of Cevdet’s writings in order to fill the gap of approach-
ing Cevdet from a critical perspective. It is quite important to ask to what extent Cevdet’s 
accounts are objective and reliable. In other words, this thesis is a modest attempt to re-
assess the dependability of Tezakir and Maruzat as primary sources of the Tanzimat pe-
riod. What needs to be stressed is that the goal is not to underestimate and diminish the 
significance of Cevdet’s accounts, but in fact, to raise an awareness about what needs to 
be paid attention to when using these primary sources to increase the reliability of the 
studies conducted about Cevdet Pasha. 
 
 
Outline of the Study 
 
 
In Tezakir and Maruzat, Cevdet gives details about the prominent Tanzimat grand viziers 
with whom he had close ties owing to his active involvement in political affairs through 
various governmental duties and ministerial posts. The first chapter of the thesis aims to 
deal with Cevdet’s attitudes toward the five most mentioned grand viziers—Reşid, Fuad, 
Âli, Mahmud Nedim, and Midhat Pashas—to be able to reveal the subjectivity of 
Cevdet’s accounts, because there is an obvious difference in Cevdet’s attitudes toward 
each of these grand viziers. The chapter intends to highlight those differences that arose 
from Cevdet’s personal relationship with them.  
 
In the second chapter, Cevdet’s attitude toward two sultans—Abdülmecid and 
Abdülaziz—and the palace and economy of the Tanzimat era is considered. For this, the 
focus is first on Cevdet’s notion of “sultanate” to understand his concern about protecting 
the dignity of sultans and avoiding direct criticisms against them. Secondly, the main 
themes that Cevdet focuses on, such as the “prodigality” of the palace ladies or the case 
of the dethronement of Abdülaziz, and Cevdet’s possible agenda for putting emphasis on 
these themes during the reigns of each sultan, are examined. Lastly, Cevdet’s concerns 
about the situation of the economy and the palace are analyzed, and his different attitudes 
toward the two sultans when it comes to these issues are taken into consideration. 
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In the third chapter, Cevdet’s accounts of the reactions to the reform measures of the 
Tanzimat era are tackled to reveal his state-centered perspective. Cevdet had a conserva-
tive and traditional political outlook, and never approved of any opposition against the 
sultan or state, since he saw common people as unreliable subjects whose opinions were 
not legitimate to be voiced. Because the era of reforms brought about rapid changes in 
almost every sphere of social life, these led to reactions from people of different strata of 
society. The objective of this chapter is to analyze Cevdet’s statist manner toward these 
reactions. In this sense, the reactions of Muslims and non-Muslims to the Reform Edict 
of 1856, the Mecca Rebellion of 1855, the Kuleli incident of 1859, and the Syrian upris-
ings of 1860, are considered. 
 
In the fourth chapter, Cevdet’s attitude toward the society of the Tanzimat era is analyzed. 
Cevdet spent most of his life in İstanbul, and most of is his accounts are about the society 
of İstanbul, which was going through a process of reformation. Thus, first Cevdet’s ac-
counts of İstanbul society, which only focus on the Westernization of life-style and the 
increase in “prodigality,” is taken into account. Then, his accounts of the society of Bos-
nia and Çukurova are dealt with. Cevdet was sent to these regions as a state official and 
came into contact with different strata of local people. The chapter illustrates how Cevdet 
viewed these societies from a statist perspective to fulfill the demands of the central gov-
ernment.  
 
In the last chapter, Cevdet’s traditional and conservative understanding of the “rulership” 
is briefly analyzed by examining the Ottoman political thought from the beginning of the 
formation of the state. It is seen that as a nineteenth century statesman, Cevdet represents 
an interesting case by adopting much older rulership and being a member of the authori-
tarian Sublime Porte at the same time. Cevdet attaches a special importance to the notion 
of the “sultanate” in Tezakir and Maruzat, since according to him, the monarch’s dignity 
and the absolutist place in the government should never be harmed. Additionally, in the 
chapter, Cevdet’s emphasis on the “caliphate” as an element for legitimization of the Ot-
toman sultan is taken into account. As the last point, contemporary counter positions to 
Cevdet’s authoritarian understanding is analyzed by looking at the Young Ottomans.
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1. A CRITICAL APPROACH TOWARD CEVDET PASHA’S ACCOUNTS 
OF THE PROMINENT TANZIMAT GRAND VIZIERS 
 
 
 
After the death of Mahmud II in 1839, the Ottoman Empire’s character underwent a rad-
ical change, since the initiative had passed from the Palace to the Sublime Porte. The state 
entered into a new political period in which none of the sultans were able to dominate 
reform policy until Abdülhamid’s succession in 1876 (Ahmad 1993, 28). The leading 
branch of officialdom became the civil bureaucracy and the Porte performed as the real 
center of the government. This period is called the Tanzimat, which literally means “re-
forms” and “reorganizations” and has been described as a time of “extreme political im-
balance” and of “reform par excellence” (Findley 1980, 13). 
 
In this period, it became ordinary practice for a foreign minister to continue to serve as 
grand vizier, and revolving through both positions the triad of Reşid (1800-58), Fuad 
(1815-69), and Âli (1815-71) Pashas had the greatest influence on this epoch. Along with 
their colleagues, they formed a group of elites who served as minister or provincial gov-
ernor interchangeably (Findley 2008, 13). In other words, it was a period that can be 
referred to as the time of bureaucratic dictatorship and the happy days of the Sublime 
Porte (Hanioğlu 2006, 153). 
 
Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, as a leading and influential character, directly experienced the on-
going events of the period (Baysun 1986, XIV) to the extent that “there seems to be no 
assembly activity which he did not attend” (Neumann 2000, 156). Therefore, his accounts 
in Tezakir and Maruzat about the era and the personalities of his time are inarguably 
significant when it comes to dealing with the period as a whole. Both of the sources give 
the sense that the reader is peeping into the government mechanism of the late Ottoman 
Empire in a way that no archival report can. 
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At this point, the question of this chapter emerges: Were all the writings of Cevdet Pasha 
objective or had he been influenced by his personal experiences and relationships while, 
intentionally or unintentionally, transmitting these pieces of invaluable information to 
future generations? As Baysun (2011) rightly points out, considering that Cevdet Pasha 
was often the only witness to the events he describes, it is possible to doubt the veracity 
of Tezakir and Maruzat at some points (p. 230). Nevertheless, one common pitfall, par-
ticularly in studies conducted in Turkish academia, is to regard Cevdet Pasha’s accounts 
as if they are unquestionable.  
 
Hence, in this chapter, Cevdet Pasha’s treatment of the prominent grand viziers of the era 
who played the chief role in shaping the period will be tackled with a critical approach in 
order to contextualize Cevdet Pasha’s accounts by considering the possible reasons or 
psychology behind them. While seeking a critical approach, the aim is not to decrease 
Cevdet Pasha’s value or minimize the importance of his accounts, but to draw attention 
to the fact that Cevdet Pasha was a human being who was affected by his own experiences 
and feelings. Since the scope of this study is limited, only five of the most commonly 
mentioned grand viziers — Reşid, Fuad, Âli, Mahmud Nedim, and Midhat Pashas — will 
be taken into account. 
 
 
1.1 Cevdet’s Hero: Reşid Pasha 
 
 
If we consider the first step in the career of young Cevdet to be his move to İstanbul from 
his hometown Lofça (the present-day Lovec in Bulgaria), the second would be his ac-
quaintance with Reşid Pasha (Tezakir IV, 21). Cevdet’s daughter Fatma Aliye (1994) 
states that young Cevdet’s first encounter with Reşid Pasha was during Reşid Pasha’s 
first grand vizierate in 1846. When Reşid Pasha became the grand vizier, he demanded 
an open-minded scholar from the shaykh al-Islam to obtain information on the shari’a 
related arrangements he had designed, whereupon Ahmed Cevdet was sent to him (pp. 
48-49).  
 
At that time, Cevdet was 24 years old (Tezakir IV, 19). He had no relatives in İstanbul, 
to which he had come seven years previously for the purpose of education, and there was 
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no one to support and guide him. He tried to educate and cultivate himself regardless of 
the economic difficulties he experienced. Furthermore, he did not go to his hometown 
during Ramadan and eids but took lessons from every possible scholar (Tezakir IV, 16-
17).12 He received a decent education (Tezakir IV, 17), was a graduate of a madrasah, 
and had the potential to one day become a high ranking ulema. 
 
The encounter with Reşid Pasha allowed young Cevdet to begin a new career path. He 
was freed from economic troubles thanks to Reşid Pasha and spent his days in the Pasha’s 
home. As he describes it, he reached “a period full of happiness and enjoyment” (Tezakir 
IV, 21). Transferring from the madrasah to a political environment he began to prome-
nade along the Bosphorus together with Reşid Pasha and his statesmen companions. In 
particular, Âli and Fuad Pashas’ friendship became like a school for him, since he gained 
a vast amount of knowledge on political issues and began to learn French (Tezakir IV, 
20-21). Leading up to his historical role, it was this encounter with Reşid Pasha that 
changed and shaped the whole flow of his life. By this means, he had opportunities to 
develop and prove himself. Indeed, being well informed on Western thought and systems 
as a result of this environment was the determinant factor for all his works (Aydın 1986, 
22). 
 
Considering Reşid Pasha’s large role in young Cevdet’s life, it is clear that the Pasha 
becomes the most prominent person in Cevdet’s life, more than anyone else, including 
his own father (Tezakir II, 40-41). When closely examining their relationship and the way 
that Cevdet mentions Reşid Pasha, it is clear that their acquaintance formed an affinity 
between the two insomuch that Cevdet Pasha became a member of Reşid Pasha’s house-
hold and his confidant (Tezakir II, 63). Cevdet felt a strong attachment to him, and was 
grateful to him throughout his life (Neumann 2000, 18). Therefore, Cevdet’s accounts of 
Reşid Pasha differ conspicuously from his accounts of others in both works. Although 
there are a few criticisms, Cevdet writes of Reşid Pasha in a strikingly positive way, es-
pecially when compared to the other pashas of the Tanzimat era. 
 
                                               
12 In the last volume of Tezakir, Tezkire no. 40, Cevdet Pasha describes educational life in İstanbul, the general cir-
cumstance of the madrasahs, and his situation as a student in detail. See: (Tezakir IV, 16-17). 
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Cevdet avoids negative statements about Reşid Pasha. Using more delicate expressions 
such as “generous, humane, pure in heart, having a superior character, and appreciative” 
(Tezakir I, 17), he eulogizes Reşid Pasha and displays a sensitivity in his approach at 
different points. Particularly, in the part of Tezakir where Mahmud Nedim and Reşid Pa-
shas are addressed in the same paragraph, the contrast in Cevdet’s approach reveals itself 
quite plainly. While he severely criticizes Nedim Pasha, he seems to favor the latter (Te-
zakir I, 16-17). The same circumstance appears when Cevdet mentions Reşid and Âlî 
Pashas together. While Cevdet exalts Reşid Pasha for his efforts to train many people for 
the sake of the state, in the same line he disparages Âlî Pasha while referring to a rumor 
that he had prevented the training of new people (Maruzat, 1).13 
 
Especially in Maruzat, which was presented to the Sultan, Cevdet Pasha avoids negative 
statements and assessments with respect to Reşid Pasha. However, his attitude in Tezakir 
is more forthcoming, which is why assessment of Reşid Pasha seems sincerer in Tezakir. 
In Maruzat, criticisms can be found only at two points, which relate to Reşid Pasha’s 
“extravagance.” In one of these points, Cevdet argues that “Reşid Pasha was competing 
with Fethi Pasha to make expenses easier for women of the palace for whom the Sultan 
shows strong affection, even if the treasury was not able to compensate their costs” (Ma-
ruzat, 10). 
 
In the other point the criticism is an interesting one in the sense that although he states 
that “Reşid Pasha consumed exceeding amount of money,” Cevdet cannot help exhibiting 
a defensive attitude right after this criticism by highlighting that “Reşid Pasha did not 
burden the treasury with debt but only spent what was available” (Maruzat, 239).14 How-
ever, in Tezakir he records the addition of more than two hundred thousand purses of gold 
debt to the Privy Purse (Hazine-i Hassa) during Reşid Pasha’s grand vizierate, which 
consequently tainted the magnitude of the Pasha’s dignity (Tezakir II, 30-31).15 
                                               
13 "Reşid Paşa devlete pek çok âdemler yetişdirdi. Âlî Paşa ise “âdem yetişdirmek şöyle dursun yetişecek âdemlerin 
yollarını uruyor” deyü beyne’n-nâs mat’ûn idi” (Maruzat, 1). 
14 “Reşid Paşa, hükm-i zamâna ittibâ’ ile bir dereceye kadar alafrangaya i’tibâr etmekle devlete pek çok para sarf 
etdirmiş idi. Lâkin mevcûddan yiyüp, Hazîneyi borç altına komamış idi” (Maruzat, 239). 
15 “… bu sadâretinde Hazîne-i hassa’nın düyununa iki yüz bin keseden ziyâde zam ve ilâve vuku’ buldu. Bu cihetlerle 
Reşid Paşa haylice lisâna geldi. Elhâsıl Reşid Paşa bu devlette kat kat haysiyyet kazanmış iken her sadâretten infisâlinde 
bir kabuğu soyularak azamet-i şânına hayliden hayli nakîse geldi” (Tezakir II, 30-31). 
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Cevdet plainly expresses his admiration for Reşid Pasha by asserting that “there was no 
greater man than him in this age” (Tezakir I, 14), and shows veneration by stating that 
“he trained many people to serve the state” (Maruzat, 17) and “led the state to begin a 
new era with the proclamation of the Tanzimat edict” (Maruzat, 256). He was also the 
one who “constituted the method of diplomacy in the Ottoman State” (Tezakir I, 7) and 
who “broke new ground for recording every written document” (Tezakir IV, 58, 75) in 
the archives and for “paving the way for simple and eloquent prose” (Tezakir IV, 21). 
 
On the other hand, in Tezakir Cevdet does not ignore Reşid Pasha’s foibles and wrong-
doings. For instance, he acknowledges that Reşid Pasha’s compassion toward his son Ali 
Galip became his weak point, which prevented Reşid Pasha from acting as attentively as 
his status in the administration required. He was also obsequious to the women of the 
palace and the black eunuchs in order to make his son son-in-law of the Sultan (Tezakir 
I, 10). He did whatever his son wished such as appointing or dismissing people according 
to Ali Galip’s will (Tezakir II, 70). As Cevdet writes, “Reşid Pasha made many sacrifices 
for the sake of making his son the son-in-law of the palace.” Due to his son’s incapability 
(Tezakir II, 22), this sacrifice did not result in anything beneficial for either Reşid or Ali 
Galip. In fact, it worked in quite the opposite way by creating “disturbance and harm” 
(Tezakir II, 71). 
 
Furthermore, Cevdet asserts that Reşid Pasha was a high-income earner. Like other grand 
viziers, he made money apart from his salary from both commissions and delegations. 
Additionally, “he occasionally received abundant presents from the Sultan” (Tezakir I, 
19) and possessed a tremendous amount of wealth. Through this revenue, “he too had a 
desire to invest in real estate property” (Tezakir I, 10). That is to say, he revealed a weak-
ness for goods and properties, which gave rise to the objections and reactions of the pub-
lic, creating unfavorable results for him (Tezakir I, 20). 
 
Cevdet also does not hesitate to record Abdülmecid’s deprecating thoughts about Reşid 
Pasha. After the death of Reşid Pasha, Abdülmecid visited the Sublime Porte, and in the 
presence of the committee, the Sultan pointed at Foreign Minister Ali Galip Pasha, who 
was then the Sultan’s son-in-law, and said, “we formerly appointed him (Ali Galip Pasha) 
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the minister of the the Privy Purse. He showed me Fatıma Sultan’s16 notebook with a 
record of thirty thousand purses of debt. At the time, I was afraid of his father’s (Reşid 
Pasha) nastiness. His father went to the devil and we got rid of him, but he will become 
more seditious than his father” (Tezakir II, 55). In another instance, when Abdülmecid 
once was talking about Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha he said, “like Reşid Pasha, 
does this man want me to use force against him?” (Tezakir II, 67). 
 
Despite these few criticisms, Cevdet’s manner as a whole is conspicuously favorable to-
wards Reşid Pasha. As mentioned in the very beginning of this section, Cevdet came from 
a province to the capital where he had no one to support him. Meeting Reşid Pasha and 
entering his service became a turning point for Cevdet’s life (Baysun 2011, 216). By 
having the opportunity to get involved in Reşid Pasha’s private realm and receiving his 
patronage, Cevdet became aware of the hidden side of state affairs (Baysun 1986, XIV), 
had the chance to develop and prove himself, and was actively involved in the state ad-
ministration in ways that would not otherwise have been possible. Therefore, Cevdet’s 
positive accounts about Reşid Pasha in Tezakir and Maruzat can be read as a sign of how 
Cevdet’s strong “attachment” (Tanpınar 1988, 165) and “loyalty” to Reşid Pasha (Ortaylı 
1983, 174) affected his attitude. 
 
 
1.2 Cevdet’s Close Friend: Fuad Pasha 
 
 
Cevdet also had a close relationship with Fuad Pasha. Fatma Aliye asserts that, “it was 
not possible for my father to disregard the companionship of Fuad Effendi. My father 
loved him so much and they used to live just like they were brothers” (Fatma Aliye 1994, 
108). When Cevdet was newly transferred from the madrasah environment to the political 
one, he spent his time in Fuad Pasha’s seaside residence as well as Reşid Pasha’s resi-
dence. As Cevdet records, these were nice times for him and he was surrounded by con-
stant pleasure (Tezakir IV, 21). Therefore, Cevdet’s favorable attitude toward Fuad Pasha 
is apparent throughout the sources. But still, although not harshly, Cevdet directs criti-
cisms against Fuad Pasha at some points. 
                                               
16 Abdülmecid’s daughter and Ali Galip Pasha’s wife.  
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Cevdet states that Fuad Pasha was “tolerant” (deryâ-dil) (Maruzat, 50, 175; Tezakir II, 
263; Tezakir III, 198) and “one of a kind” (zât-ı bî-mu’adil) (Tezakir III, 198). He also 
adds, “I had full confidence in Fuad Pasha and would implement his oral orders without 
any hesitation” (Tezakir II, 267). “His attachment to me and good thoughts about me were 
indisputable” (Tezakir III, 198). “When Fuad Pasha came to the post of the grand vizier-
ate, he consulted with me about significant issues just like Reşid Pasha did” (Tezakir IV, 
82). 
 
Apparently, the two spent much time together while involved in state affairs. For instance, 
when the rebellion and revolution broke out in Moldavia and Wallachia, Fuad Effendi, 
who was not yet Pasha, was given exceptional powers and sent to Bucharest, and Cevdet 
accompanied him. Then, Fuad Pasha was sent to St. Petersburg to meet the Russian em-
peror. However, the coldness of Russia harmed Fuad Effendi’s health and he decided to 
go to the thermal springs of Bursa when he came back to İstanbul. Cevdet went with him 
to Bursa too (Tezakir I, 12; Tezakir IV, 42). Their alliance formed a harmony and when 
they were together in Bursa, they traveled around, worked, and made efficient use of their 
time. For instance, they wrote an Ottoman grammar book, Kavâ‘id-i Osmâniye (Ottoman 
Grammar) which was later published to be studied in junior high schools (Rüşdiye 
mektepleri). That is to say, their days were both pleasant and productive (Tezakir I, 12-
13; Tezakir IV, 44-45; Aykut 2018, 24).17 
 
In another instance the governor of Egypt, Abbas Pasha, let the British build a railway to 
Suez that made it easier for the British to travel to India, a situation that caused discomfort 
in Istanbul. To solve the problem, Fuad Effendi, as the grand vizier’s assistant secretary, 
went to Egypt with a special commission. Since it was necessary for a scholar to accom-
pany him, Cevdet came along (Tezakir IV, 59; Tezakir I, 13).  
 
Cevdet exhibits a clearly positive approach toward him in Maruzat as well. Cevdet states 
that “Fuad Pasha was a very tolerant person and he had a special love for me and cared 
about me” (Maruzat, 175). Cevdet also admits that he did not like Âli Pasha as much as 
he liked Fuad Pasha (Maruzat, 52). These lines can be read as a confession of why Cevdet 
                                               
17 For a quite detailed description of the time they spent in Bursa together, see: (Tezakir IV, 42-45). 
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is so favorable towards him, since he had a good personal relationship with Fuad Pasha. 
When Cevdet compares Fuad Pasha with Mahmud Nedim or Âli Pashas, the difference 
of his treatment toward them becomes apparent. 
 
For instance, he asserts that “Fuad Pasha progressed thanks to his intelligence and 
knowledge,” while Mahmud Nedim Bey, on the other hand, “did not have that ability and 
intelligence but had an irresolute and capricious personality” (Maruzat, 5). In another 
example he writes that Fuad Pasha was “tolerant" but Âli Pasha was a dissembler (içinden 
pazarlıklı) and intolerant (teng-dil) (Maruzat, 50). He also writes, “it was predicted that 
Fuad Pasha would get ahead of Âli Pasha with his impressive eloquence and perspicacity” 
(Tezakir II, 31). 
 
Cevdet also appreciates Fuad Pasha for his success in diplomatic relations. When Russia 
and Austria were about to go to war with the Ottoman Empire, Fuad Effendi was sent to 
St. Petersburg to meet with the Russian Emperor. There, he won the Russian emperor’s 
favor and the problem was gently fixed. This accomplishment brought Fuad Effendi into 
prominence in Europe (Tezakir IV, 29). Cevdet also praises Fuad Pasha for his success in 
fighting off the Greek bandits who occupied the borders while the state was involved in 
the Crimean War. Fuad Effendi was sent to this area with a special mission and com-
manded the soldiers. According to Cevdet, he was a great commander who “defused the 
bandits and saved the state from the Greeks.” Cevdet continues to exalt Fuad Pasha by 
asserting that, “Fuad Effendi had proved that his commandership was as powerful as his 
writing” (Tezakir IV, 67-68, 72).  
 
When it comes to his criticisms, both in Maruzat and Tezakir, Cevdet expresses his an-
noyance with Fuad Pasha’s family. For him, with the effect of the prodigality of the wives 
of the rulers of Egypt in İstanbul, the families of Fuad and Âli Pashas were acting extrav-
agantly. In Maruzat, Cevdet’s word choices are more conspicuous than Tezakir. For ex-
ample, Cevdet argues Fuad Pasha was so stolid that although he was aware, he ignored 
his family's improper attitudes. According to Cevdet, Fuad Pasha’s wife inherited her 
carelessness from her father since her father was Nusayri18 and Nusayris were careless 
                                               
18 Nusayri is a member of a minority sect of Shi’ite Muslims living chiefly in Syria. 
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when it comes to protecting their dignity. Not only her, but also her brother Kamil Pasha’s 
dishonorable actions were inherited from his father19 (Maruzat, 2). Moreover, Cevdet 
writes that Fuad Pasha’s family imitated madamas (referring to French-speaking women) 
and set a new fashion every month that dissuaded innocent Muslim women, and that Fuad 
Pasha was not able to control them (Maruzat, 12). 
 
Cevdet also seems bothered by the nonchalance of Fuad Pasha, writing that Fuad Pasha’s 
character was such that he did not occupy himself with any problem, and did not attach 
importance to anything (Maruzat, 2). Nonetheless, Cevdet cannot help defending Fuad 
Pasha and continues to state that the main reason for Fuad Pasha’s indifference was the 
heart disease he inherited from his father; because the best cure for heart diseases is not 
to take anything seriously, Fuad Pasha did not place any importance on anything (Maru-
zat, 2). In fact, Fuad Pasha’s nonchalance is also mentioned by İbnülemin Mahmud Ke-
mal İnal, who writes that Fuad Pasha did not care about the gossip that people could 
spread about him or what kind of bad thoughts they had about him, so Fuad Pasha said 
whatever he wanted to say or did whatever he wanted to do without any hesitation (İnal 
1955, 178). However, he does not link this situation with Fuad Pasha’s heart disease as 
Cevdet does. 
 
Another criticism of Cevdet against Fuad Pasha is about his economic actions. Cevdet 
argues that the treasury was driven into debt during Fuad Pasha’s time (Maruzat, 239). 
On different occasions, Cevdet talks about Fuad Pasha’s efforts to heal the state’s econ-
omy. According to Cevdet, Fuad Pasha thought that the amelioration of the economy was 
the state’s most important issue (Tezakir II, 227, 256-257). However, these were not ef-
fective. For example, Cevdet claims that when the state was dealing with the fiscal crisis, 
instead of paying attention to ways to save, Fuad Pasha supported investigating ways to 
borrow (Tezakir I, 21). According to Cevdet, although the Sultan was displeased with the 
idea of external debt (Tezakir I, 22; Tezakir II, 64), Fuad Pasha, one way or another, 
managed to borrow five million liras from Europe. Thus, gold prices began to decline. 
                                               
19 “Fuad Paşa, o rütbe kayıdsız idi ki, familyasının ırz u nâmûsunca lâübâliyâne harekâtını bildiği halde iğmâz eylerdi. 
Çünki zevcesi hânımın pederi Ahmed Efendi, Nusayrî taifesinden olup, Nusayrîlerde ise ırz u hamiyyet dâiyeleri olma-
dığından, hanımın mübâlâtsızlığı pederinden mevrûs olup, birâderi ma‘hûd Hâriciyye teşrifâtçısı Kâmil Bey’in ma‘lum 
olan hamiyyetsiliği de mîrâs-ı peder idi” (Maruzat, 2).   
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However, this led to more dissipation and indebtedness. Cevdet desperately wishes that 
he had not been successful in borrowing money (Tezakir II, 60-61). Although in other 
sources the economic actions of Fuad and Âli Pashas were more severely criticized (Pa-
kalın 1942, 72),20 Cevdet also seems to be uneasy about the economic damages brought 
about by Fuad Pasha’s policies. 
 
Another criticism of Cevdet is about Fuad Pasha’s efforts to flatter and please Âli Pasha. 
Cevdet claims that “Fuad Pasha did whatever Âli Pasha wanted” to get along with him, 
which led to nepotism in the appointments (Maruzat, 50). Cevdet records that, as he was 
annoyed with this situation, he told Fuad and Âli Pashas, “you are not able to achieve a 
great success like Sokollu and Köprülü because you are engaged in personal pursuits.” 
However, Cevdet still cannot help defending Fuad Pasha right after criticizing him. He 
adds, “upon my words, Fuad Pasha was not resentful, as he was gentle and sincere. How-
ever, since Âli Pasha was malevolent and troublesome, he was annoyed” (Maruzat, 49). 
Additionally, he also believes that when Fuad Pasha died of heart disease the state lost its 
balance, since Âli Pasha remained as the sole power in the administration (Tezakir IV, 
94). As İbnülemin (1955) also states, in these lines Cevdet’s personal views toward these 
two Pashas has an effect on his arguments (p. 181). Thus, while Fuad Pasha is defended, 
Âli Pasha is dispraised.  
 
 
1.3 Cevdet’s Contentious Collaborator: Âli Pasha 
 
 
Âli and Cevdet Pashas had something essential in common: they both received the pat-
ronage of Reşid Pasha (Tezakir I, 16). According to Cevdet, although Âli Pasha's passion 
for political authority caused their relationship to deteriorate (Tezakir IV, 61), Âli Pasha 
was the person to whom Reşid Pasha showed the most favor (Tezakir IV, 23). Reşid Pasha 
                                               
20 Pakalın quotes from an article published in the newspaper Hürriyet that claims that no one, including the officials of 
the finance ministry, knew where the millions of gold coins were spent during the times of Âli and Fuad Pashas. See: 
(Pakalın 1942, 72).  
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esteemed Cevdet very highly (Tezakir IV, 72-73)21 and protected both Âli and Cevdet 
Pashas. However, Reşid Pasha’s first encounter and relationship with Âli Pasha was much 
older. According to Öztuna (2006), Reşid Pasha met young Âli, who was then 18 years 
old, when Âli was appointed to the Council’s Translation Bureau (Tercüme Kalemi) in 
1833 (p. 30). He began to follow the professional progress of Âli with interest, and in 
1838 when Reşid Pasha was appointed ambassador to London, he took Âli with him as 
counselor, giving young Âli a crucial opportunity to have long discussions with Reşid 
Pasha on political issues. Reşid Pasha became not only young Âli's mentor but also a very 
close friend (Andıc 1996, 7). 
 
When it comes to Cevdet’s attitude toward Âli Pasha, it can be described as unsteady and 
ambivalent. On the one hand, Âli Pasha was “worthy” (değerli) (Tezakir IV, 38), a “skill-
ful” (mahir) diplomat who served as a crucial assistant to Reşid Pasha and who also had 
the potential to be successor of him (Tezakir I, 14). He was “prudent” (dûr-endîş) when 
it comes to politics (Tezakir III, 122), and his merit and expertise was known by everyone 
(Tezakir II, 86). “There was nobody who was deserving of the post of foreign ministry 
other than him and Fuad Pasha at the time” (Tezakir II, 22).22  
 
On the other hand, he was depicted as a “dissembler" (içinden pazarlıklı) and “intolerant" 
(teng-dil) (Maruzat, 50), “vindictive” (kindâr) (Maruzat, 36), nepotistic (Maruzat, 50), 
“prone to despotism” (istibdâda mâil), (Tezakir II, 21) and politically greedy (Tezakir II, 
265; Tezakir IV, 61; Maruzat, 202) which consequently made him the opponent of Reşid 
Pasha (Tezakir IV, 61). At some point, Cevdet considered him a maverick and audacious 
who did not think of consulting with others even if the issue concerned the entire nation 
(Tezakir II, 21).23 Moreover, he was an impudent person who intended to intimidate Sul-
tan Abdülaziz with the Europeans in order to take him under his control (Tezakir II, 150; 
Maruzat, 39). 
                                               
21 Reşid Pasha dignified Cevdet with the post of qadi of Mecca and membership on the Tanzimat council, and wanted 
to have Cevdet with him all day, particularly when he was dismissed from the grand vizierate. See: (Tezakir IV, 72-
73). Cevdet Pasha gives an account of how Reşid Pasha confided his secrets in him, which he did not even share with 
his confidant Besim Effendi. See: (Tezakir IV, 69-70) 
22 “Ol vakit ise Âli ve Fuad Paşa’lardan başka Hâriciye nezâretine şâyan zevat yok idi” (Tezakir II, 22).  
23 “Umur-ı mu’azzamada eşrâf-ı kavimden kimesne ile müzakereye tenzzül etmiyerek üç beş kişi ile hod be-hod böyle 
hukuk-ı milletten olan mevadd-ı cesîmeye karar vermek dahi pek yolsuz ve büyük cesaret idi” (Tezakir II, 21). 
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To get a better understanding of Cevdet's attitude toward him, it is important to consider 
the issue in more detail. From Cevdet’s accounts, it is easy to see that his relationship 
with Âli Pasha was not as close as his relationship with Reşid and Fuad Pashas. However, 
Âli Pasha was still one of his most important collaborators in the political affairs (Neu-
mann 2000, 43). On the one hand, Cevdet argues that “the state lost its balance when Fuad 
Pasha died of heart disease,” because Âli Pasha remained as the only influential power 
(Maruzat, 201-202). On the other, he writes that “the meaning of the grand vizierate was 
lost after the death of Âli Pasha.” According to him, after Âli Pasha’s death, no matter 
who occupied this position, they had to be dismissed within a short period of time owing 
to their “infamy” (Tezakir IV, 123). This confession might be related to the fact that 
Cevdet’s political influence gradually began to decline, especially after the death of Âli 
Pasha in 1871, since he remained as the only member from Reşid Pasha’s team (Neumann 
2009, 84). 
 
Cevdet’s relationship with Âli Pasha went through many ups and downs. At some points 
the reader gets a positive impression from Cevdet’s accounts. For instance, during his 
inspectorship in Bosnia, the Austrian embassy complained about some of Cevdet’s im-
plications to the Sublime Porte. Âli Pasha defended Cevdet Pasha against the embassy in 
a harsh manner. For this reason, Cevdet expresses his gratitude and lifelong thankfulness 
to Âli Pasha for his decisive manner in this case (Maruzat, 76). In addition to this, Cevdet 
admits in various parts that Âli Pasha showed respect to Cevdet’s status as an educator. 
Cevdet writes, “since I taught Âli Pasha logic and literature for a little time, he showed 
respect for me” (Maruzat, 35-36, 202; Tezakir IV, 94). 
 
Nonetheless, more often than not Cevdet severely criticizes Âli Pasha. In both of the 
sources, even if what he argues might be correct, the tone of his comments about the 
Pasha sound quite offensive. For instance, although other sources also mention that Âli 
Pasha had not attempted to cultivate any person to become his successor (Davison 1963, 
268; Abu-Manneh 2006, 332), Cevdet claims that Âli Pasha’s behavior originates from 
his strong sense of rivalry. For him, it is not only about the Pasha’s disincentive actions 
while training any novice for the benefit of the state (Maruzat, 1),24 but his fear that if 
                                               
24 “Âlî Paşa ise, “âdem yetişdirmek şöyle dursun, yetişecek âdemlerin yollarını uruyor” deyi beyne’n-nâs mat’ûn idi” 
(Maruzat, 1). 
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any competent person were to be trained in foreign affairs, they would become his rival 
(Maruzat, 2). 
 
Cevdet further claims that Âli Pasha even regarded Cevdet as his rival, writing, “I did not 
give any credit to the likelihood that Âli Pasha would regard me as a rival.” However, he 
continues that, as it was reported to him, “Âli Pasha saw Cevdet as his contender.” In fact, 
Cevdet’s argument that Cevdet never thought himself as rival to Âli Pasha becomes un-
convincing when Cevdet states that Cevdet was among the three of the candidates for the 
grand vizierate position when Âli Pasha died25 (Maruzat, 218). He describes the situation 
by unconvincingly claiming, “when it comes to me, I did not engage with people but paid 
attention to my duties” (Maruzat, 202). However, as understood from his words, Cevdet 
saw himself as a candidate for the grand vizierate position. These accounts suggest the 
possibility of Cevdet’s feelings of hidden rivalry toward Âli Pasha, since Cevdet seems 
to care about the issue of competition and tries to highlight his naiveté, which in fact 
generates suspicions toward him. 
 
One of the conspicuous criticisms Cevdet makes toward Âli Pasha regards his decisions 
when it comes to the appointments of officers to governmental offices. Cevdet argues that 
Âli Pasha favored those who obeyed him, thus disregarding whether a person was com-
petent or not when appointing him for a position (Maruzat, 50). In addition to this, he 
criticized Âli Pasha for the accreditation of Armenians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Cevdet writes that “essential affairs of the Ministry were handed over to the Armenians.” 
Not only that, but in accordance with the Islahat Edict Christians also had to be assigned 
to offices in political and foreign affairs. Cevdet expresses clear discontent about these 
implementations since, for him, it was better that these groups of people be assigned to 
financial fields rather than to positions regarding pivotal affairs (Maruzat, 1-2). 
 
Another striking point is that in both Tezakir and Maruzat, Cevdet insistently emphasizes 
the Sultan’s dislike of Âli Pasha; indeed, in different parts of both works he writes that 
Abdülaziz hated Âli Pasha. Just after these remarks, he does not neglect to mention the 
Sultan’s contentment with Fuad Pasha (Tezakir II, 265, 259; Maruzat, 51, 60). Following 
one of these accounts, Cevdet talks about a conversation between him and Mabeyn-i 
                                               
25 “Âli Paşa’nın vefatında üç kişi Sadâret’e namzed idik” (Maruzat, 218). 
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hümayun chief secretary Mustafa Effendi, in which Mustafa Effendi was complaining 
about Âli Pasha’s manners that created annoyance among the public. At this point, Cevdet 
manifests his feelings about Âli Pasha and begins his sentence, “Although I do not like 
Âli Pasha as much as I like Fuad Pasha…” (Maruzat, 52).  
 
Furthermore, he also talks about how Âli and grand vizier Kamil Pashas’ acceptance of 
the Sultan’s gift of two thousand purses of gold fed the Sultan’s hatred toward them. In 
this case, Cevdet asserts that although the Sultan himself bestowed the money, Âli Pasha 
failed by accepting it since the Sultan was only testing their tendency towards bribery 
(Tezakir II, 257-258; Maruzat, 52-53). İbnülemin (1955) quotes Ziya Pasha about the 
same issue. Ziya Pasha in Zafername Şerhi claims that Âli Pasha and other pashas ac-
cepted gifts from both Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz on different occasions (p. 36). How-
ever, the way Cevdet interprets the situation makes it seem more inexcusable than İbnüle-
min. 
 
Cevdet also seems irritated by the debauchery of Âli Pasha. He asserts that “owing to his 
fear of the reactions of foreigners, Âli Pasha tried to hide his pederasty” (Maruzat, 9). 
Moreover, while Cevdet was claiming that the “expenditure of Âli Pasha’s household 
exceeded three to four thousand gold per month,” he relates this situation with Âli Pasha’s 
love affair. Cevdet argues that since Âli Pasha was spending money on a boy named Ali, 
his grand vizierate salary was insufficient. (Maruzat, 7).  
 
As the last attention-grabbing point, when Cevdet talks about Âli Pasha’s funeral, the way 
he interprets the situation betrays another indication of Cevdet’s feelings about Âli Pasha. 
Allegedly, since the muezzins misunderstood each other a proper funeral prayer could not 
be performed, and nobody who attended the funeral commented on whether Âli Pasha 
was a good or bad person. There was a total disappointment of people in the funeral. 
Cevdet writes, “what a poor situation for a person’s relatives and friends that the person 
passes away when he was hated by his community” (Tezakir II, 44).26  
                                               
26 “Ba’dehû Âli Paşa vefat ettikte cenaze namazı Yeni-cami’de kılınıp Süleymaniye camii’nde defn olundu. Lâkin 
garibdir ki müezzinler birbirini yanlış anlamakla bir dürüst namaz kılınamadı… Yenikapı Mevlevihânesi şeyhi Osman 
Efendi üç def’a “Bu zâtı nasıl bilirsiniz” deyu sordu… Cümlesinin nutku tutuldu. Bir cevâb veremediler. Böyle te-
zkiyede sükût-i tâm ile mukabele olunduğunu görmedik ve hiçbir tarihte vuku’unu dahi işitmedik. Bir adamın beraber 
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İbnülemin (1955) believes that although Cevdet enjoyed the compliments and patronage 
of Âli Pasha, he did not refrain from commenting against him (p. 36). In particular, he 
claims that Cevdet misinterprets the situation of the funeral, arguing that when it is asked 
what people think of the deceased person in the funeral, even if the person was a bad 
person and even if there are people among the crowd who did not know the deceased, 
they all bear testimony to his goodness (İnal 1955, 26). Therefore, he believes that Cevdet 
is distorting the reality. 
 
In the Tanzimat period Reşid, Âli, and Fuad Pashas were the main figures and played the 
principal roles in state affairs. Until the last decade of the period Cevdet was not a person 
who could dream of serving in high ranking positions, since he met Reşid Pasha in 1846 
and was newly introduced to the political environment with no background in politics. 
However, according to Cavid Baysun, as the years passed and he gained experience in 
state affairs, the ambitions hidden in the heart of Cevdet came to the surface (Baysun 
2011, 217). 
 
For instance, on different occasions in Tezakir, Cevdet talks about rumors of the possi-
bility of his appointment to serve as shaykh al-islam (Tezakir II, 262-263; Tezakir III, 
105, 197-198). Although he tries to give the impression that he was satisfied with his 
existing position and was not keen on being shaykh al-islam (Tezakir II, 262-263), 
Baysun argues that Cevdet dreamed of that position and strove to occupy it with the help 
of Fuad Pasha. However, he encountered the opposition of Âli Pasha and some other 
influential people (Baysun 2011, 219). Indeed, Cevdet talks about how Âli Pasha was 
among those who believed that serving as shaykh al-islam was not right for Cevdet Pasha 
(Tezakir III, 105). At this point, the aforementioned possibility comes to our minds; 
Cevdet might feel a hidden rivalry toward Âli Pasha, which may explain his ambivalent 
attitude toward the Pasha. 
 
Fatih Şeker (2011) has a different opinion, as he argues that Cevdet’s position on the 
opposite side of Âli Pasha originates from a totally a personal reason (p. 128). According 
to him, Cevdet’s disagreement with Âli Pasha was the result of the difference between 
                                               
yaşadığı milleti içinde menfûr olarak âhırete gitmesi akraba ve ahbâbına ne mertebe müessir olacağı muhtâc-ı beyân 
değildir” (Tezakir II, 44). 
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their points of view in the last stage of their relationship. It is known that Âli Pasha pro-
posed the direct implementation of the French code of civil law (Kreiser 2008, 265). Şeker 
(2011) asserts that the Mecelle (Ottoman code of civil law prepared under the chairman-
ship of Cevdet) was a result of Cevdet’s reaction to Âli Pasha, who did not agree with 
Cevdet on the issue (p. 128).  
 
Cevdet records the opposition of some deputies and statesmen throughout the preparation 
process of the Mecelle (Maruzat, 201). However, as Ebul’ula Mardin (1996) states, 
Cevdet was seriously offended by Âli Pasha. The reason was his dismissal from the po-
sition of the presidency of the Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye. Although Cevdet believes that the 
dismissal originated from French ambassador Bourée’s propaganda, he was hurt and of-
fended by this situation, which lasted for a year and a half (pp. 88-89). Hence, Mardin 
(1996) attributes Cevdet’s remarks about the funeral of Âli Pasha to his deep heartbreak 
(p. 91). In spite of Cevdet’s awareness that the rumors reached the Sultan’s ears during 
the preparation of the Mecelle, Cevdet hoped that Âli Pasha would not be affected by all 
this hostility and opposition. However, the result was Cevdet’s resentment toward Âli 
Pasha and a total disappointment in him, since he fell victim to these propagandas (Ma-
ruzat, 201; Mardin 1996, 91).27  
 
All in all, these arguments with their different perspectives give us a clue about why 
Cevdet adopts an negative attitude toward Âli Pasha. First of all, although they were both 
guided by the same worthy mentor, Cevdet was not able to shine as much as Âli Pasha 
did. As mentioned, Cevdet had an ambitious personality (Baysun 2011, 217) and dreamed 
of reaching higher positions. However, at certain points Âli Pasha was one of those who 
interfered with Cevdet’s desires, which led Cevdet to resent him. Moreover, Âli Pasha’s 
disagreement with Cevdet about the preparation of the Mecelle was another point of con-
troversy. All these reasons may have led Cevdet to feel a hidden rivalry toward Âli Pasha, 
and brought about an aggressive attitude toward him. 
 
                                               
27 “Âlî Paşa ol vakit müteferrik ve müstakil bi’r-re’y olduğu cihetle ana bu makule esbâbın çendân te’sîri olmazdı. 
Fakat zîrde muharrer esbabdan dolayı o dahi böyle azlime bahâne olacak sözlere kulak asmağa başlamış idi” (Maruzat, 
201). 
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1.4 Cevdet’s Persistent Opponent: Mahmud Nedim Pasha 
 
 
Cevdet’s judgments are most severe when it comes to Mahmud Nedim Pasha. His state-
ments contain almost no favorable points about the Pasha but only rigid criticisms. More-
over, at some points he writes diatribes against the Pasha’s character that leave no chance 
to think anything positive about him. According to Cevdet he was egocentric and a “fair-
weather friend” (iyi gün dostu) who had not made any sacrifice for his master or friends. 
He was a “indecisive” (mütelevvin) and nobody trusted him. He had diabolical manners 
and deceived influential people through adulatory and hypocritical attitudes (Tezakir I, 
16-17). As well as being fickle he was quite “irresolute” (kararsız), and he ruined what 
he had done just the day before, causing disorder in the state affairs. He was “vindictive 
toward those by whom he was a little offended in the past.” He was thoroughly inept and 
“destroyed the basic and procedural principles of the state” (Maruzat, 210), and “he did 
not think of anything other than his personal interests” (Maruzat, 208). 
 
Cevdet’s only positive reference to Mahmud Pasha is about his services and efforts during 
the settlement of local people in Kolaşin after getting the attack of Montenegrins under 
control (Maruzat, 93). Apart from this, there is literally no positive reference to him or 
his actions, characteristics, or thoughts. Cevdet argues that “although Mahmud Nedim is 
a member of Reşid Pasha’s group, he watches for benefits from both sides and enjoys the 
advantages of the predominant side. He is not benevolent for any side but only interested 
in his own benefits” (Tezakir I, 16-17).28 For Cevdet, Mahmud Pasha’s hypocrisy was 
such that on the one hand, “he flattered British ambassador Stradford Canning due to his 
affiliation with Reşid Pasha,” while on the other, "he tried to win the French embassy’s 
favor.” However, he argues, “it was known through his conversations with his intimate 
                                               
28 “Amedci Mahmud Nedim Bey dahi Reşid Paşa’nın havass-ı mensubanından iken iki tarafı kollar ve kangı taraf 
galebe ederse andan istifadeye çalışır idi. Çünki mîr-i mumaileyh iyi gün dostu olup el için ağlayan göz kör olsun 
diyenlerden olmasıyle Efendisi yahud rufekası için değil menafi-i mahsusasını belki bir günlük eğlencesine bile feda 
edemediği cihetle şayan-ı vüsuk ve emniyet değil idi ve gayet mütelevvin ve tavr-u mişvarı garib ve herkes hakkında 
su-i zannı galib bir adem olarak kimesne hakkında anın dahi emniyeti yok idi” (Tezakir I, 16-17). 
 
 27 
friends that he was on the side of Russian politics ever since, as he believed that it was 
better to be buttressed by an adjacent neighbor than by distant ones” (Tezakir I, 26-27)29 
 
Christoph Neumann (2000) argues that one of the reasons for the disagreement between 
Cevdet and Mahmud Pasha was Mahmud Pasha’s political stance toward Russia. Neu-
mann states that in Cevdet Pasha’s history, Tarih-i Cevdet, Cevdet takes an anti-Russian 
position in which he describes Russians as insidious, hypocritical, untrustworthy, and 
swindlers. Reşid Pasha also had an anti-Russian attitude (pp. 43-44). However, Mahmud 
Pasha reversed the trend of the previous decade, in which British or French support was 
sought, since Mahmud Pasha was closer to the Russian ambassador Ignatiyef than any 
other diplomat (Davison 1963, 283). Thus, in both sources, one of Cevdet’s major criti-
cisms is of Mahmud Pasha’s pro-Russian stand. Cevdet argues that the authority of the 
Sublime Porte had been handed over to the Russian embassy, since Mahmud Pasha gave 
control to Ignatiyef during his grand vizierate (Tezakir IV, 146). 30  He claims that 
Mahmud Pasha acted on Ignatiyef’s advice in all respects, and thus state affairs developed 
in accordance with the wishes of this ambassador (Maruzat, 225).  
 
Although Mahmud Nedim joined Reşid Pasha’s group (Abu-Manneh 1990, 258), and was 
affiliated with Mustafa Reşid by working closely with him for twelve years, it is hard to 
regard him as Reşid Pasha’s protégé since he does not seem to have fallen under the 
influence of Reşid Pasha as did Âli and Fuad Pashas. It seems that Mahmud Pasha was 
not convinced that the new arrangements of the Tanzimat were good for the state (Abu-
Manneh 1990, 261-262). Hence, he took an antireformist and traditionalist position in 
state affairs (Somel 2010, 171) and the first thing he did when he came to power was to 
undo what had been applied during the Tanzimat period (Akyıldız 2003, 374). Therefore, 
it is quite clear that there was a huge difference between the views of Ahmed Cevdet, 
                                               
29 “Mahmud Nedim Bey Reşid Paşa’ya mensub olduğu cihetle Canning’e temellük etmekte olduğu halde Rıza ve 
Savfeti Paşa vasıtalarıyle Fransa Sefaretine dahi hoş görünmek isterdi. Halbuki bazı yaraniyle mahremane musahabeti 
esnasında “Uzak devletlere dayanmaktan ise câr-i mülâsık olan bir devlet ile her nasıl olursa olsun uyuşup da hoş 
geçinmek evladır” deyu daha ol vakit Rusya tarafdarı olduğu sıkadan mervidir” (Tezakir I, 26-27). 
30 “Bu defâki sadâretinde ise bütün bütün efkâr-ı umûmiyyeye karşı bir hâl ü harekette bulunmuştur ve: “Sakalını Rusya 
elçisi İgnatiyef’in eline verdi. Bâbıâlî’nin nüfuzu Rusya sefaretine geçti” deyu efkâr-ı umûmiyye anın aleyhine düştü” 
(Tezakir IV, 146). 
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who served the Tanzimat movement (Ortaylı 1983, 174), and Mahmud Pasha toward the 
state government. 
 
One damaging action of Mahmud Nedim was to repeatedly change the ministers and gov-
ernors. A few days after appointing someone to a position, he would appoint them to 
another, surprising both those who were appointed and those who were dismissed (Ma-
ruzat, 210). Mehmed Memduh (1990) interprets Mahmud Pasha’s attitude as such that 
since the Tanzimat-ı Hayriyye abolished execution and the seizure of property, Mahmud 
Pasha was exiling the ministers and officers randomly as a show of strength (p. 56). On 
the other hand, Cevdet associated these actions with Mahmud Pasha’s irresolute character 
(Maruzat, 210) and jealousy. In Maruzat, Cevdet argues that Mahmud Pasha exiled 
Cevdet to Maraş in 1872 because the Pasha was jealous of him (Maruzat, 211). In Tezakir, 
his exile to Maraş is explained as Mahmud Pasha’s reaction to Cevdet’s opposition. 
Cevdet argues that he disagreed with Mahmud Pasha’s unreasonable ideas and that his 
dissent led to Mahmud Pasha’s resentment and suspicion towards Cevdet. For him, 
Mahmud Pasha aimed to eliminate of those who directly opposed him and send them out 
of İstanbul. Consequently, Cevdet was appointed as the governor of district Maraş due to 
his opposition (Tezakir IV, 120). 
 
It seems that the struggle between these two pashas, and Cevdet’s opposition to Mahmud 
Pasha’s intentions and implementations, repeatedly cost Cevdet Pasha. As mentioned 
above, Cevdet was exiled to Maraş in March 1872. In March 1876, during his second 
grand vizierate, Mahmud Pasha sent Cevdet to Rumelia as an inspector after Cevdet op-
posed Mahmud Pasha’s idea to hand over to foreign investors the right to collect customs 
revenues (Tezakir IV, 148). When Cevdet came back from Rumelia he was still opposed 
Mahmud Pasha’s ideas about this economic issue, and this opposition led to Cevdet’s 
dismissal from the post of Justice Minister and his exile to Syria (Tezakir IV, 151; Maru-
zat, 226). 
 
One of Cevdet’s interesting criticisms of Mahmud Nedim is that he ascribed everything 
to the Sultan whether it was good or bad. According to Cevdet, it was a tradition that “the 
things that seemed pleasing in the eyes of the people were attributed to the Sultans and 
those which were disliked were associated with the ministers, particularly with the grand 
viziers. If anything created a stir among the public, a few changes in these posts were 
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made by the Council of Ministers” to appease the people (Maruzat, 226; Tezakir IV, 
151)31 
 
However, according to Cevdet’s argument, Mahmud Pasha attributed anything and eve-
rything to Sultan Abdülaziz. For Mahmud Pasha it did not matter whether what was at-
tributed was good or bad. Cevdet’s claim is that “Mahmud Pasha’s aim with this attitude 
was to enhance his own bad intentions. As a consequence, public opinion was tainted and 
most people dared to speak improperly against the Sultan.”32 
 
On the other hand, it is striking that Cevdet neither mentions anything about Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha’s actions to weaken the bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte and strengthen 
the authority of Sultan Abdülaziz (Somel 2010, 171), with which the Sultan was happy 
(Davison 1963, 280-281), nor how the Sultan himself lacked the ability and the tact to 
handle this problematic situation (Abu-Manneh 1990, 226). He only talks about how 
Mahmud Nedim encouraged people to speak out against the Sultan.  
 
In fact, Mahmud Nedim Pasha was unfortunate enough to be dismissed by the Sultan in 
order to exonerate the Sultan himself. According to Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1983), 
despite the fact that Abdülaziz was happy that his strengthened power as a result of 
Mahmud Nedim Pasha, he was afraid of the consequences of wanton exiles and other 
destructive acts. Moreover, Mahmud Pasha was accused of selling himself to the Rus-
sians. In addition to this, European public opinion about the Ottomans was in turmoil. For 
all these reasons, Abdülaziz temporarily sacrificed the grand vizier Mahmud Pasha and 
charged him with a number of events that had created disturbances in the eyes of the 
public and foreigners. In this way the Sultan aimed to placate the general discontent and 
to protect himself from the prospective hostility of influential figures such as Hüseyin 
                                               
31 “Çünki öteden beri bu Devlet-i aliyye’de hey’et-i vükelâ Mâbeyn-i hümâyûn ile efrâd-ı ahâlî beyninde bir perde idi. 
İcrâât-ı vâkı’adan enzâr-ı enâmda hoş görünen şeyler padişahlara ve nâsın beğenmediği işler vükelaya ve ale’l husûs 
sadrazamlara azv olunurdu; ve bir aralık efkâr-ı âmmede heyecan görülse hey’et-i vükelâca bir tebeddül icrâsiyle efkâra 
sükûnet geliverirdi” (Maruzat, 226; Tezakir IV, 151). 
32 “Mahmud Paşa ise nîk ü bed her ne olursa olsun hep Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretlerine atf eder ve ağrâz-ı zâtiyyesini 
tervîc için icrâ ettiği işleri dahi ana tahmîl eyler idi. Bu cihetle efkâr-ı âmme bozuldu. Ekser-i âs Zât-ı şâhâne aleyhinde 
nâbe-câ tefevvühâta cesâret eder oldu” (Tezakir IV, 151). 
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Avni Pasha (p. 47). That is to say, Cevdet seems to overlook the fact that the Sultan was 
content with the situation, and had secretly supported Mahmud Pasha.33 
 
Moreover, it seems that Cevdet Pasha is jealous and disgruntled about Mahmud Nedim 
Pasha occupying the post of grand vizierate instead of himself. Cevdet states that “when 
Âli Pasha died, Cevdet himself was among three of the candidates for the position. How-
ever, Mahmud Nedim Pasha got ahead of them and became grand vizier.” At this point, 
Cevdet begins to attack Mahmud Pasha, claiming that “the Pasha ruined the whole system 
of the state,” and that henceforward whoever would occupy this position would be dis-
missed shamefully (Maruzat, 217-218).34 These statements can be interpreted as a sign 
of his disappointment about his own hopes of being named grand vizier. 
 
In addition to this, he indirectly charges Mahmud Nedim Pasha with the dethronement of 
Abdülaziz, writing, “this case was the result of wrong implementations that continued to 
be practiced for many years,” and which were led by Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Maruzat, 
240).35 However, the increase in the animosity of pashas, such as Midhat and Hüseyin 
Avni Pashas, towards Abdülaziz also arose from Abdülaziz’s protectionist attitude toward 
Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Both sides, Mahmud Nedim Pasha and the other pashas, worked 
tirelessly to get rid of each other when they had power. However, everyone was aware of 
the fact that Abdülaziz supported Mahmud Nedim Pasha, which increased the hatred to-
wards the Sultan (Uzunçarşılı 2000, 13). That is to say, when Cevdet blames Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha for the Sultan’s dethronement, he totally ignores the role of Sultan 
Abdülaziz’s own actions.36  
                                               
33 Different sources agree on this concealed patronage by Sultan Abdülaziz of Mahmud Nedim Pasha. See: (İnal 1969, 
1177-1178); (Mahmud Celaleddin 1983, 47-48); (Mehmed Memduh 1990, 58); (Shaw 1977, 156); (Hanioğlu 2008, 
109). 
34 “Âlî Paşa’nın vefâtında üç kişi Sadâret’e namzet idik. Mahmud Paşa takaddüm edip Sadaret’e geçti. Lâkin devletin 
vaz’ını bozdu, tavrını değiştirdi. Devleti öyle bir yola götürdü ki, işin nereye varacağını bilmiyorum. Şu kadar ki, bu 
esnada her kim Sadâret’e gelürse karîbü’l-ahdde rezâlet ile azl olunacağını biliyorum” (Maruzat, 217-218). 
35 “El-hâsıl, Vak’a-i Azîziyye, sinîn-i adîdeden berü teselsül edip gelen esbâb u mübâdînin bir netice-i elîmesidir. Ve 
mütesebbibi Mahmud Paşa ise de bi’l-fi’l o cinayete mübâşeret eyleyenler Avni ve rüfekası olduğundan bu cinayet 
anlara isnad olunmak lâzım gelür” (Maruzat, 240).  
36 Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (1983) writes, “Sultan Abdülaziz's arrogance and selfishness had reached such a point 
that not only his intimate friends but his mother was not able to say a word about the lowdown on the goings-on. 
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1.5 Cevdet’s Adversary: Midhat Pasha 
 
 
As Cevdet himself indicates, he had a friendship with Midhat Pasha since their childhood 
(Tezakir IV, 84). Because young Cevdet’s grandfather was concerned with Cevdet’s ed-
ucation and encouraged him to pursue a career in the religious (ilmiye) ranks, Cevdet was 
introduced to the Islamic sciences at a very early are. In 1836 he became a student of Hacı 
Eşref Effendi, who was the deputy judge (hakim naibi) in Lofça (the present-day Lovec). 
Hacı Eşref Effendi had a son of the same age who was also his pupil (Chambers 1973, 
441) and who was later nicknamed Midhat (Midhat Paşa 1997, 19). Therefore, as Cham-
bers (1973) writes, “it was in Lofça when they were in their early teens that the paths of 
two of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire’s greatest men first crossed, for the two 
boys called Ahmed were to become famous as Cevdet Pasha and Midhat Pasha” (p. 441). 
 
Until a certain point in time, their relationship seems to have been good. In Tezakir, 
Cevdet talks about how Midhat Pasha, Sirvanizade Rüsdi Pasha, and himself were affili-
ated with Fuad Pasha and confidentially discussed most of the essential affairs of the state 
(Tezakir IV, 84). Moreover, soon after Cevdet was exiled to Maraş by Mahmud Nedim 
Pasha in 1872 Midhat Pasha became grand vizier for the first time, and helped bring 
Cevdet back to İstanbul (Tezakir IV, 120; Maruzat, 213). Neumann (2000) talks about 
Cevdet and Midhat Pashas’ friendly relationship in 1874, evidenced from letters they sent 
to each other in which they praise each other’s reforms in the provinces (pp. 46-47). 
 
However, regardless of their shared background, Cevdet and Midhat Pashas eventually 
became fierce opponents of each other. In the end their relationship was so unpleasant 
that Cevdet served Abdülhamid II during the Yıldız Trials37 against Midhat Pasha and 
explicitly requested the implementation of Midhat Pasha’s death sentence (Uzunçarşılı 
                                               
Nobody could take a risk of telling a bad word about him. He was bragging about his unlimited power. In his imagina-
tion, since he pleased the soldiers by endowing so many gifts and begs by improving their ranks, nobody could dare to 
attempt an action against him” (pp. 105-106). 
37 Upon the order of Abdülhamid II, the Yıldız Trials were held in the Yıldız Palace to judge the participants of the 
alleged “murder” of Sultan Abdülaziz. It began on June 27, 1881, lasted six sessions within three days and resulted in 
the punishment of the defendants including Midhat Pasha. 
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2000, 358). Indeed, in Maruzat it is not possible to find a single argument that is positive 
about Midhat Pasha. 
 
Although what Cevdet writes in Tezakir and Maruzat mostly overlap, in Maruzat there 
are some offensive expressions about Midhat Pasha. For instance, Cevdet claims that 
Midhat Pasha was a “bigmouth” (farfara) and a “careless” (savuruk) creature whose be-
haviors were harmful for the religion and the state, and who did not think of how things 
might end (Maruzat, 213).38 Additionally, Cevdet seems to be bothered by Midhat Pa-
sha’s bigheaded manners (Maruzat, 202) and be proud of his own attitude, which does 
not require Midhat Pasha’s favor for his own livelihood (Maruzat, 213).  
 
Uzunçarşılı (2000) argues that Cevdet was offended by Midhat Pasha, since he was dis-
missed from the post of Justice Minister during Midhat Pasha’s second grand vizierate 
and temporarily appointed to the Council of State. Just after that, Sakızlı Ethem Pasha, 
who was ambassador to Berlin, was appointed to replace Cevdet as the head of the Coun-
cil of State. Thus, Cevdet was out of work became resentful (p. 143). Furthermore, Cevdet 
himself writes that throughout the preparation process of the Constitution of 1876 
(Kanun-ı Esasi), a controversy emerged between him and Midhat Pasha about some of 
its articles. For that reason, according to Cevdet, Midhat Pasha felt offended by him. After 
that, when the constitution was being revised in the council of ministers, another dispute 
took place between them (Tezakir IV, 167-168). Although Cevdet does not describe the 
debate in detail, Mehmed Memduh Pasha (1911) mentions how Cevdet and Mahmud Pa-
shas attacked each other during the revision of the draft; upon an objection by Cevdet, 
Midhat Pasha derided Cevdet by saying, “your capacity is not enough to understand Eu-
ropean law,” to which Cevdet retorted angrily, “a shoe seller uses the French Language 
better then you do” (p. 7).39 
                                               
38 “Mahmud Nedim Paşa’nın evzâ’ı nâ-be-câsından küçük-büyük hep dilgîr ü müteneffir olmakla, Midhat Paşa’nın 
sadâreti, mûcib-i memnûniyyet-i umûmiyye olmuş ise de, o dahi bir şey’in sonunu saymaz, farfara ve savuruk ve tavr 
u mişvârı dîn ü devlete muzır bir mahlûk olduğundan makam-ı Sadâret’de çok duramayup evâsıt-ı Şa’bânda azl ile 
Mütercim Rüşdi Paşa sadr-ı a’zam oldu” (Maruzat, 213). 
39 “Kanun-ı Esasi’nin müsveddesi tedkik olunurken Adliye Nazırı Cevdet Paşa ibarede birkaç kelimeye muteriz olunca 
Midhat Paşa ‘Avrupa kanunlarına senin aklın ermez’ istihfafıyla zebandıraz oldukta Cevdet Paşa hiddetten ateş 
kesilerek ‘fazl u aklı temyiz idecek mikyasınız on-on beş Fransızca lugat bilmeye münhasırdır. Bir kunduracı Fransız 
lisanında senden dürüst tekellüme muktedirdir’ demesiyle meclise sıklet basdı” (Mehmed Memduh 1911, 7). 
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Although Neumann (2000) argues that it is not known when Cevdet and Midhat Pashas’ 
relationship began to deteriorate (p. 46), Ülken (2017) claims that the idea of a “code of 
civil law” was the point where the clash between them began (pp. 286-287). Cevdet was 
known to be an opponent of a constitutional regime (Findley 1980, 225),40  whereas 
Midhat Pasha was endeavoring to promulgate one (Berkes 1998, 226). Cevdet’s opposi-
tion to the constitution is not limited to the aforementioned squabble, as he reveals his 
annoyance by highlighting its uselessness (Tezakir IV, 168).41  
 
In both Maruzat and Tezakir, Cevdet accuses Midhat Pasha of making use of the state’s 
difficult situation for his personal interests. During the grand vizierate of Mahmud Pasha, 
it was decided to halve the interest on share prices as an attempt to resolve the financial 
difficulties. However, Cevdet writes, “the following day, Midhat Pasha contacted his ex-
change broker and sold an immense amount of notes from his own account before the 
decision was announced. Although he earned a large amount of profit by this means, the 
Pasha’s fame was tarnished” (Maruzat, 222-223; Tezakir IV, 146). On the other hand, 
İbnülemin (1955) does not believe Cevdet’s claim and asserts that a stealthy action of this 
kind was against Midhat Pasha’s character, as he was not able to conceal anything. He 
argues that if Midhat Pasha had earned such a large amount of money he would have 
revealed himself before anyone else did, or that there should be a note to prove such a 
claim (p. 397). 
 
İbnülemin (1955) criticizes Midhat Pasha for not considering the necessities or results of 
his actions carefully, and claims that he would do whatever he wanted (p. 395). He further 
argues that Cevdet’s claim about Midhat Pasha’s recklessness (Maruzat, 213) was cor-
rect, since Midhat Pasha did not think about the results of his actions or commands. On 
the other hand, he admits that Midhat Pasha was undeniably patriotic and diligent. By 
                                               
40 Findley describes Cevdet Pasha as anti-constitutionalist and states, “he could best be described as partisans of reform 
and legislation under the aegis of a sultanic enlightened despotism. See: (Findley 1980, 225).  
41 “Midhat Paşa ve taraf-gîrânı olan bir gürûh budala Kanûn-ı esâsî îlân olunduğu gibi âlemin muvâzenesi değişerek 
artık Rusya’nın etvâr-ı tahakküm-kârîsine mahâll kalmaz zann ederlerdi. Bu ise bir hayâl-i şâ’irâne olup bizim hükûme-
timizi hâl-i meşrûtiyyete koymamızın Rusya hakkında bir gûne te’sîri olmadığı cihetle Rusyalu tedârükât-ı harbiyyesini 
ikmâle bir mertebe daha ziyâde sa’y etmekte idi ve Kanûn-ı esâsî sâyesinde Midhat Paşa kendisini azilden masûn sanıp 
taraf-ı saltanat’a karşı pek ağır davranır oldu” (Tezakir IV, 168). 
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resisting all kinds of difficulties, he was able to develop the country, improve the admin-
istration, and create useful institutions (İnal 1955, 395-396). He also asserts that unlike 
his services as minister or grand vizier, Midhat Pasha was successful in his governorships 
(İnal 1955, 400). Midhat Pasha’s success in the provinces is discussed in depth in differ-
ent sources as well. For instance, his governorship in the Danube province was so suc-
cessful that within three years he suppressed uprisings, built bridges, and sparked political 
and economic development there (Şentürk 1992, 168- 181; Rızaj 1986, 60-61). Similarly, 
Midhat Pasha’s service in Bagdad was quite successful in terms of public works (Ceylan 
2011; 77; Yücel 1986, 175-183), and in Syria he was able to make effective financial and 
social reforms within 20 months (Saliba 1978, 310-317). 
 
However, Cevdet ignores all of these successful practices. He merely focuses on what he 
regards as defects and is not able to resist criticizing Midhat Pasha for his actions. For 
instance, Cevdet blames Midhat Pasha for the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877, writing that 
since the state possessed neither commanders to command a large army nor limitless cash 
to buy ammunition and weaponry it was not rational to go to war. Nevertheless, according 
to Cevdet, Midhat Pasha drummed up public opinion for the war (Tezakir IV, 170). To-
gether with Damad Mahmud and Redif Pashas, Midhat Pasha endangered the state by 
forcing the state to go to war (Tezakir IV, 175).  
 
Most of all, in both of the sources Cevdet describes in depth the dethronement of 
Abdülaziz,42 his death, and the court proceedings of the defendants.43 In his descriptions 
Cevdet reveals his reaction toward Midhat Pasha as well as the others who were involved 
in this planning, especially Hüseyin Avni and Rüşdi Pashas. Apart from his accounts in 
Tezakir and Maruzat, when this issue is examined in detail taking into account the actions 
of Cevdet, it is seen that Midhat Pasha’s arrest, interrogations, and trials for the murder 
                                               
42 Cevdet states that in the beginning he was unable to understand how Midhat and Avni Pashas suddenly began to get 
along with each other, especially when they had been enemies. He adds that the confidential communications between 
Nadir Pasha and various ministers were not understood by anyone. However, as seen later, the aim was to plan the 
dethronement of Abdülaziz. Then, Cevdet continues to talk about their confidential night meetings in mansions to 
discuss this issue and how they concealed this from Cevdet and other “loyal” people. He also talks about those pashas’ 
fickle manners toward each other when they sensed danger and how they betrayed each other throughout the process. 
For a detailed description see: (Maruzat, 216-217, 229-230; Tezakir IV, 123). 
43 See: (Tezakir IV, 209-214). 
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of Abdülaziz were the peak points of Cevdet’s hostile attitudes toward Midhat Pasha. For 
instance, Ebul’ula Mardin (1996) notes that in the official reports of the Mecelle Com-
munity (Mecelle Cemiyeti mazbatası), Cevdet slightly changed his original accounts per-
taining to the events of the day of Abdülaziz’s death. While the original statement implied 
a suicide, the altered version increased the likelihood of murder, which Mardin interprets 
an insincere alteration (pp. 258-259). As for the indictment process, in his memoirs 
Midhat Pasha (1997) writes, “this indictment is correct in just two places. One is the 
besmele (invocation) at the start and the other is the date at the end” (p. 211).44  
 
Furthermore, when Midhat Pasha took refuge in the French Consulate in İzmir just after 
his arrest warrant was issued, Cevdet Pasha, who was the Justice Minister at the time, 
telegraphed Midhat Pasha which, according to Uzunçarşılı (1946), had the effect of as-
suring Midhat Pasha of his safety (p. 19). Moreover, upon Midhat Pasha’s surrender, 
Cevdet gave a guarantee for fair treatment in another telegraph (Uzunçarşılı 1946, 27-
28). In addition to this, upon his arrival to the ferry to depart for İstanbul, Midhat Pasha 
informed his family about his trust in Cevdet Pasha’s justice (Uzunçarşılı 1946, 34). How-
ever, Cevdet’s response to Midhat Pasha’s trust was an explicit request for the execution 
of Midhat Pasha’s death sentence in the Yıldız trials, since Cevdet played his cards to 
organize the arrangements against Midhat Pasha and made preparations for the trials to-
gether with Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Uzunçarşılı 2000, 358) who was minister of internal 
affairs of the time. It is also interesting that these court proceedings at Yıldız Palace were 
perhaps the only situation in which Cevdet and Mahmud Nedim Pashas could cooperate. 
However, this cooperation is not mentioned in either of the sources by Cevdet.  
 
Additionally, Uzunçarşılı (2000) states that Abdülhamid II granted Cevdet Pasha a sea-
side residence in Bebek after the Yıldız trials which Uzunçarşılı regards Cevdet's ac-
ceptance as an improper act despite the fact that he was an erudite, virtuous, and merito-
rious person (p.358). Similarly, Tanpınar (1988) argues that the reason that Cevdet fell 
into such a bad position during the trial of Midhat Pasha might result from a deficiency 
in his personality (p. 167). On the other hand, Ortaylı (1986) argues that the reason for 
this clash of the two pashas was the rivalry which he sees as “the traditional illness of the 
Ottoman bureaucracy.” According to him, at that time the era of the Tanzimat’s executive 
                                               
44 “Bu ithamnamenin iki yeri doğrudur. Biri başındaki besmelesi, diğeri sonundaki tarihi” (Midhat Paşa 1997, 211). 
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and conciliatory grand viziers was gone. Consequently, when intelligent people lost the 
common ground to work with, they began to tear each other apart, leaving the field to 
those less talented (p. 76-77). 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
 
To sum up, although Cevdet did not have the chance to occupy the post of grand vizier, 
he played a pivotal role and was quite active in essential state affairs throughout the Tan-
zimat period and had close contact with the viziers. As a consequence, as can be seen in 
each part, Cevdet’s attitude toward the grand viziers of the era shows variation according 
to Cevdet’s personal relationship with them. While his main collaborators were the triad 
of Reşid, Fuad, and Âli Pashas, who were also the main leaders of the Sublime Porte, 
Cevdet felt the closest attachment to Reşid and Fuad Pashas. Thus, he refrains from any 
harsh expressions when it comes to describing their characters and actions. Particularly, 
since Reşid Pasha played the most important role in Cevdet’s life, Cevdet cannot help 
displaying a defensive attitude towards his actions. 
 
When it comes to Âli Pasha, Cevdet’s statements are quite unsteady, which may point to 
feelings of hidden rivalry. They were both protégés of Reşid Pasha, but Âli Pasha was 
ahead of Cevdet in state affairs. Moreover, at certain points, Âli Pasha interfered with 
Cevdet’s actions, which led to Cevdet’s resentment. The result was Cevdet’s ambivalent 
and sometimes critical attitude towards him.  
 
Regarding Mahmud Nedim and Midhat Pashas, almost all of Cevdet’s statements were 
negative and severe. Cevdet had a different political view than Mahmud Nedim Pasha, 
which led to their constant disputes. With regard to Midhat Pasha, Cevdet seems to have 
also disagreed with him about administrative issues. Moreover, Cevdet’s view of the po-
sition of the Sultanate differed from that of Midhat Pasha, who was among the partici-
pants in Abdülaziz’s dethronement. Cevdet never forgave Midhat Pasha for that, and he 
criticized him severely during the trails at Yıldız Palace. To conclude, what is crucial 
about all of Cevdet’s changing attitudes is to be aware of the fact that he was influenced 
by his personal experiences in his writings. Therefore, while approaching and analyzing 
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his sources, it is crucial to take Cevdet’s mentality and psychology into consideration to 
have a critical and more accurate perspective toward the Tanzimat era. 
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2. A CRITICAL APPROACH TOWARDS CEVDET PASHA’S ACCOUNTS 
OF THE SULTANS, PALACE, AND ECONOMY OF THE TANZIMAT ERA 
 
 
 
In Tezakir and Maruzat, there is a striking difference between Cevdet Pasha’s attitude 
towards the sultans and his attitude towards the grand viziers and other statesman of the 
period. Cevdet can be quite harsh and critical at some points when writing about various 
statesmen, who are mentioned in part while discussing the grand viziers. However, when 
it comes to the sultans, he seems to choose lenient expressions even when he has criti-
cisms about them in particular points. Conspicuously, if Cevdet has objections to any 
specific issue that appears to have originated from the sultan, he attributes it to the people 
around the monarch such as his ministers or his daughters and wives. 
 
Therefore, in this chapter Cevdet’s notion of “sultanate” will first be taken into consider-
ation to have a better understanding of the reasons behind this attitude. Secondly, since 
Cevdet attributes major importance to individual sultans, most of the issues he addresses 
will be analyzed in terms of the ruling periods of each monarch. Rather than locating “the 
palace and the economy” parts for each sultan under the first two parts, these themes are 
scrutinized under separate titles, because, when it comes to these two issues, Cevdet's 
attitude towards these two sultans differs conspicuously: he adopts a more critical ap-
proach towards the palace and the situation of the economy throughout Abdülmecid’s era, 
while retreating into silence about Abdülaziz’s period. Thus, this division is helpful to 
have a good grasp of the differences, which then enables us to discuss the possible under-
lying reasons and psychology behind these attitudes. 
 
Understand Cevdet’s mentality and motivations is important for an analytical approach 
to his writings since otherwise the researcher may risk missing the big picture of the pe-
riod. Hence the aim of this chapter is to present Cevdet’s standpoints vis-à-vis the sultans, 
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the palace, and the economy of the Tanzimat era, and his rationale, with a critical eye, 
and to compare these with the present-day evaluations of the period. 
 
 
2.1 The Concept of the “Sultanate” in Cevdet’s Writings 
 
 
Cevdet approvingly quotes from Fuad Pasha that “the Sublime Ottoman State is estab-
lished on four principles with which the state can be ruled and make progress as required. 
If any of them is missing, then the governance will not be possible. These four principles 
are: the millet (community) of Islam (millet-i İslâmiyye), the Turkish state (devlet-i Tü-
rkiyye), the Ottoman sultans (salâtîn-i Osmaniyye), and Istanbul as the capital city (pâ-
yıtahtı-ı İstanbul)” (Tezakir I, 85).45 As can be seen, the notion of the sultanate is one of 
the four conditions of the Ottoman State for Cevdet. 
 
Neumann (2000) mentions a written document presented to Sultan Abdulhamid II in 
1877/8 in which Cevdet argues that the ruler has legal immunity in all civilized societies. 
For him, this immunity should be particularly valid for a sultan who is at the same time 
unquestionably a caliph. Cevdet adopts the understanding that the ruler gains his legiti-
macy by being an undisputed monarch. Otherwise, the ruler would not be able to occupy 
his post (p. 126-127). 
 
According to Neumann, in Cevdet’s Tarih there is no trace of support for a constitutional 
arrangement that would limit the sultan's authority. On the contrary, he asserts the incon-
testable rights of the ruler. The most crucial point for Cevdet is obedience to the orders 
of the sultan in every corner of the country (Neumann 2000, 126). In other words, Cevdet 
has a firm understanding of “obedience to those charged with authority” (Ulü’l emre 
itaat), which comes from the Sunni Islamic understanding of politics (Alper 2001, 444). 
Moreover, Cevdet asserts that “fearing the sultan is a sign of wisdom” (Maruzat, 241).46 
                                               
45 “Devlet-i aliyye dört esas üzere müesses olup bunlar ile her nasıl istenilir ise idaresi ve ilerlemesi kabil olur ve 
bunlardan her kaygısı nakıs olur ise idâre kabil olmaz. Dört esas budur. Millet-i islâmiyye, devlet-i türkiyye, salâtîn-i 
osmaniyye, pâyıtahtı-ı İstanbul” (Tezakir I, 85).  
46 “Padişahdan korkmak hikmettir. Anadan babadan korkmak hikmettir. Büyüklerden vesâirinden korkmak hikmettir. 
Ve cümlesinin başı Allah korkusudur” (Maruzat, 241).  
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In his Tezakir and Maruzat, Cevdet never forgives those who harmed the Sultan’s dignity. 
Notably, the dethronement case of Sultan Abdülaziz is mentioned in a very particular 
way. Apparently, Cevdet cares greatly about the issue and, hence he reveals his stance 
and sharply criticizes those who planned and carried out the incident. He describes the 
environment of the time, “at the beginning, those who caused the Sultan to be dethroned 
seemed happy and to have a bright future. Those who did not take part in the case were 
jealous as if they were deprived of something perfect.” Cevdet qualifies their attitude as 
“foolish” because of their jealousy and sadness for not being able to play a role in the 
conspiracy. From this point, he relates the issue to the general functioning of the world 
and claims that “it has been experienced that the reputation and dignity of the ones who 
get involved in such events do not last much and their end is quite bad.” For him, this is 
how the world has been established and how divine justice has shown itself unchanged 
(Maruzat, 254). 
 
In addition to this, Cevdet discusses a practice that illustrates how the Ottomans protected 
the dignity of the sultan from any situation that would tarnish his image in the eyes of the 
public. In this practice, the ministers acted as a curtain between the office of the sultan 
and the people. Whenever something had to be done, the ministers took over those oper-
ations that could cause a negative reaction from the public, while operations that were 
pleasing in the eyes of the people were attributed to the sultans with complimentary ex-
pressions. In this respect the ministers and the grand viziers become the targets for the 
objections of the people, and nobody dared to speak out against the sultan (Maruzat, 226; 
Tezakir IV, 151).47 Hence, it is crucial to take this understanding into consideration while 
analyzing Cevdet’s accounts of the Tanzimat sultans. 
 
 
2.2 Main Themes in Abdülmecid’s Era 
 
 
                                               
47 “Çünki öteden beri bu Devlet-i aliyye’de hey’et-i vükelâ Mâbeyn-i hümâyûn ile efrâd-ı ahâlî beyninde bir perde idi. 
İcrâât-ı vâkı’adan enzâr-ı enâmda hoş görünen şeyler padişahlara ve nâsın beğenmediği işler vükelaya ve ale’l husûs 
sadrazamlara azv olunurdu; ve bir aralık efkâr-ı âmmede heyecan görülse hey’et-i vükelâca bir tebeddül icrâsiyle efkâra 
sükûnet geliverirdi” (Tezakir IV, 151). 
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First it is important to summarize Cevdet’s opinion of Sultan Abdülmecid. According to 
him, Abdülmecid was intelligent, perceptive (Tezakir II, 132; Tezakir I, 23), persevering, 
and even-tempered (Tezakir I, 23). He had a strong character, and was a fortunate and a 
compassionate sultan who appreciated merits and values (Maruzat, 32). He loathed 
bloodshed, and for that reason was not inclined toward capital punishment. Reşid Pasha 
and his protégés Âli and Fuad Pashas also tried to handle the hardships with the power of 
the pen (Tezakir I, 23; Fatma Aliye 1994, 121). 
 
Other sources corroborate Cevdet by describing Abdülmecid as gentle and merciful, and 
writing that he gained the love of Europe as well as the love of his peoples (Karal 2007, 
98). When he came to the throne, he was welcomed in the country and abroad thanks to 
his lenient and benevolent character (Engelhardt 1999,180-181). Ortaylı (2014) describes 
Abdülmecid as a wonderfully intelligent person who was able to appreciate the brilliant 
people around him, such as Reşid, Âli, Fuad, and Cevdet Pashas (pp. 48-49). On the other 
hand, his gentleness and mildness hindered him from getting everything under control 
and applying the reforms in a stable way (Koçu 2015, 423). He was also influenced by 
the people around him and acted according to the suggestions of his wives, daughters, 
and sons-in-law (Küçük 1998b, 261). Although Cevdet implies that this nature of the 
sultan led to discontent in the country (Tezakir II, 142),48 he prefers to attribute negative 
developments to his ministers, as will be elaborated below. 
 
According to Cevdet, in the first periods of Abdülmecid’s reign things went so well that 
“the Ottoman lands did develop and everyone felt safe and tranquil. Until the Crimean 
War, particularly between 1844 and 1854, Istanbul was like a part of heaven with inex-
pressible beauties. The result of the Crimean war was also a victory.” After that, for 
Cevdet, began the period in which the empire and the sultan got into trouble (Maruzat, 
32; Tezakir II, 142-143). From this point onwards, Cevdet first and foremost occupies 
himself with the worrisome situation of the economy. He begins with how Abdülmecid 
resisted borrowing until he could find no other solution, before describing the “detri-
mental” results of this borrowing. Next Cevdet deals with Abdülmecid’s weakness for his 
                                               
48 “Bu hâlât-ı mükeddirenin zuhuru Hâkaan-ı magfûrun meyl-i tabî’sinden ve ba’z-ı nisvâna mağlûbiyetinden münba’is 
ise de anı bu hâle düşüren dahi vükelâsı idi” (Tezakir II, 142). 
 42 
ladies and the harmful effects of this circumstance on both the sultan himself and the 
Ottoman state.  
 
 
2.2.1 External Borrowing 
 
The reign of Sultan Abdülmecid represents a significant point in terms of external bor-
rowing. Although the need for financial resources was acute, the Ottoman State did not 
lean towards the idea of borrowing immediately. For a while Abdülmecid was able to 
oppose the plan of a foreign loan, which was brought forward by the British ambassador 
Stratford Canning several times (Kıray 1995, 27). However, the Ottoman-Russian war, 
which started in 1854, worsened the state's already chaotic financial situation, and led to 
the need for an extraordinary budget for warfare. Since the situation was not conducive 
for finding new sources of income, borrowing became indispensable (Karal 2007, 210). 
In a real sense, the Ottoman Empire borrowed money for the first time from England in 
1854, which provided 2.5 million Ottoman gold pieces to the treasury. After just one year, 
in 1855, a second debt contract was signed in London, providing 5.65 million in Ottoman 
gold (Suvla 1999, 270). Then, the act of borrowing turned into a vicious circle for the 
empire (Kıray 1995, 27).  
 
These substantial developments in the economy caused significant social and political 
changes within the empire and became some of the main issues that preoccupied the 
agenda of statesmen. When Cevdet talks about Sultan Abdülmecid and his period in Te-
zakir and Maruzat, economic issues occupy a major place. However, what draws the at-
tention most in Cevdet’s statements is that, although there were other significant issues, 
Cevdet insistently focuses on palace expenditures and the rivalry among statesman as the 
main problems while ignoring other problems. Moreover, while targeting the palace and 
its expenses, Cevdet does not direct his criticisms about where the borrowed money was 
spent at the sultan, but rather at his ministers or the members of his household. 
 
First of all, Cevdet describes how the sultan rejected the idea of borrowing from foreign 
countries in the very beginning. Particularly, when Fuad Pasha was trying to convince the 
sultan of the necessity of acquiring gold from France, Abdülmecid’s companion Fethi 
Pasha reminded him that during the time of the sultan’s father, Mahmud II, “the empire 
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fought against Russia twice and had many adversaries, yet did not borrow a penny from 
outside.” Upon this warning the sultan became sad and ordered Fuad Pasha to annul the 
debt agreement with France. According to Cevdet’s statement, the sultan was motivated 
to leave the state to his successor in the same condition as he had taken it over from his 
predecessor. At that point, the sultan seemed quite determined that Fuad Pasha annul the 
agreement by paying the compensation fee (Tezakir I, 22; Fatma Aliye 1994, 105). 
 
In the following paragraph, Cevdet talks about how Abdülmecid showed a high sensitiv-
ity for the protection of the state treasury. To illustrate this sensitivity, he gives an exam-
ple in which a man was dismissed from his job in the palace and it was proposed that the 
man be paid 250 piasters salary from the state treasury. However, the sultan rejected the 
idea and ordered the man’s wage be paid from the Privy purse (hazine-i hassa), since the 
man had been in his service (Tezakir I, 22; Fatma Aliye 1994, 106). 
 
After being left with no choice but to borrow, Cevdet writes that Abdülmecid spoke about 
the issue and said, “I worked hard not to borrow. But the situation forced us to borrow. 
The payment of the debt is possible with the increase in income. The increase in income 
is possible with the development of the country by establishing railroads and enter-
prises… However, the increase in income should not lead to an increase in expenditures. 
Otherwise, there would be no benefit” (Maruzat, 7; Tezakir I, 47-48).49 Although the sul-
tan seemed determined to turn the situation to his favor in the very beginning, he was 
quickly overwhelmed with weariness. According to Cevdet, the sultan who resisted bor-
rowing became debilitated both psychically and morally, and thus began to neglect eve-
rything, becoming indifferent to the enormous increase of the public debt. However, for 
Cevdet, the main reason for this change of attitude was his ministers, who with their con-
stant quarrels sickened the sultan (Tezakir II, 24). 
 
 
2.2.2 The Palace Ladies and the Damads (Imperial Sons-in-Law) 
 
                                               
49 “İstikraz olunmamak için pek çok çalıştım. Lakin ahval bizi istikraza mecbur etti. Bunun te’diyesi varidatın art-
masiyle olur. Bu dahi imar-ı mülk ile yani her devlette olduğu gibi kumpanyalar teşkil ederek demiryolları yapılmakla 
olur. Artık kumpanyalara da muvafakat etmeliyiz. Garlar da yapılmalı. Fakat varidat arttı deyu masrafı da artırmamalı 
ve illa bir semere hasıl olmaz” (Tezakir I, 47-48). 
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Cevdet’s main criticism of Abdülmecid is that he was under the influence of the palace 
ladies (Küçük 1988b, 261). He talks about Abdülmecid’s fondness for women, which 
weakened his body day by day (Maruzat, 9). The sultan himself was also aware of this 
situation and said, “I have been devastated by my wives and my daughters” (Tezakir II, 
129).50 However, he was not able to do anything to prevent their “misbehaviors.” For 
instance, Serfiraz Hanım was known as the woman the sultan loved most and spoiled 
(Uluçay 2011, 213). According to Cevdet, the sultan was charmed by her (Tezakir II, 59; 
Tezakir II, 65; Tezakir II, 131) and was therefore incapable of punishing her for any of 
her misdeeds (Tezakir II, 65). Due to her influence over Abdülmecid, nobody was able to 
say anything to her, and she could roam wherever she wanted. Other women in the palace 
became jealous of her, and they also began travelling through public spaces and Beyoğlu. 
Furthermore, their daughters also imitated them. Since this situation violated the prestige 
of the sultanate, the sultan felt deep distress but was unable to prevent these misdeeds 
(Tezakir II, 131). 
 
An anecdote reported by Cevdet reveals the nature of the relationship between Abdül-
mecid with Serfiraz Hanım. One time the sultan went to Serfiraz Hanım’s room in the 
Imperial Harem, but she did not open the door. The sultan demanded that she open the 
door and asked why she was not opening it, to which she replied, “a man like Rıza Pasha 
has been assigned to teach us good manners, which means that we are indecent. If I am 
indecent, then I can misbehave like this.” Upon hearing this the sultan apologized to her 
and said, “I had to do this, but you should ignore him for a while” (Tezakir II, 59). 
 
Moreover, according to Cevdet, Abdülmecid’s attitude towards the palace ladies led to 
weak treatment of the damads (imperial sons-in-law) as well. Cevdet suggests a general 
annoyance stemming from this situation by quoting a statesman who wrote, “the sultan’s 
character is known. He cannot decide on anything” (Tezakir II, 63). During a visit to the 
Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âli) in 1858 Abdülmecid openly reprimanded the damads for doing 
nothing to prevent the excessive spending and public strolling of the princesses. The fol-
lowing day, the sultan dismissed all the damads from their official positions (Maruzat, 
13). However, he was unable to withstand his deeply upset sister Adile Sultan’s heart-
                                               
50 “Beni karılarım ile kızlarım bitirdi” (Tezakir II, 129). 
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breaking requests and reappointed her husband Damad Mehmed Ali Pasha as Chief Ad-
miral, even though he had rebuked and disgraced him many times in the past (Maruzat, 
15; Tezakir II, 63). Cevdet argues that in other cases like this, the sultan showed favor for 
other damad pashas and appointed them to different positions for the sake of his daughters 
(Tezakir II, 63). For Cevdet, this effectively meant the withdrawal of Abdülmecid from 
active engagement in economic reforms and policies to restrict spending money, and thus 
the situation soon reverted to the previous state of affairs (Maruzat, 15). 
 
 
2.3 Main Themes in the Era of Abdülaziz 
 
 
The scope of Cevdet’s accounts is quite limited in the era of Abdülaziz. His reports give 
no details about either the personality of the sultan or the fiscal situation of the time. 
Instead he focuses primarily on the dethronement of the sultan. First of all, Cevdet men-
tions the people’s enthusiasm which greeted Abdülaziz’s enthronement, writing, “since 
the situation of the empire at the end of the Abdülmecid’s reign led to despair and weari-
ness among people, Sultan Abdülaziz's ascension to the throne was welcomed with grat-
ification. People began to be hopeful about the state’s future and their own welfare” (Te-
zakir II, 143).51 In Maruzat, Cevdet relates this situation of despair to public discontent 
at the exorbitant expenses of the palace ladies. According to him, although the people in 
general loved Abdülmecid, some of them still wished for the accession of Abdülaziz 
Efendi’s to the throne due to the lavishness of palace spending (Maruzat, 27). 
 
On the other hand, Cevdet highlights that “Sultan Abdülaziz inherited an insolvent herit-
age” (Tezakir II, 143).52 He reports that at the time of Abdülaziz’s accession people faced 
                                               
51 “Bu kere cülûs-ı hümayûndan sonra sarayın bakıyye-i düyûnu dahi Mâliye hazînesine devr ü tahmîl edildi. Hazîne 
bir mertebe daha ağır yük altında kaldı. İşte Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretleri devleti bu hâlde buldu. Sanki bir müflis 
terekeye vaz’-ı yed eylemiş oldu… Saray-i hümâyûnun isrâfâtı Hazîneyi hâl-i iflasa götürdü. Bu hal ise cümleye ye’s 
ü fütûr verdi. Binâenaleyh Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretlerinin cülûsu âmmeye mûcib-i memnûniyyet oldu… 
Binâenalâ-zâlik devlet’in selâmeti ve milletin saâdeti emrinde halka yeniden ümit kapıları açıldı. Sunûf-ı tebe’anın 
kalbleri meserretle doldu. Ecnebiler bile memnûn ve mübtehic kaldı” (Tezakir II, 143). 
52 “İşte Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretleri devleti bu hâlde buldu. Sanki bir müflis terekeye vaz’-ı yed eylemiş oldu” 
(Tezakir II, 143). 
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major economic hardship because of the monetary depreciation. Cevdet quotes Fuad Pa-
sha’s statement to the sultan while working on new measures to take the existing fiscal 
situation under control, “our Lord, you are the heir of the sultanate. However, you are 
heir to a debtor Turkey” (Maruzat, 40).53 Cevdet stresses that the sultan was aware of the 
situation and writes that when Abdülaziz came to the throne, he said to Baş-mâbeynci 
(Chamberlain) Rıza Pasha, “I cannot mess around with women and boys like my brother 
(Sultan Abdülmecid). Make me accustomed to working. I want to be busy with munitions, 
ship equipment, and the organization of soldiers” (Tezakir II, 151). 
 
Interestingly, Cevdet does not provide details about the personality of Abdülaziz. In both 
of the sources, he retreats into silence and does not even relate details about the events 
during the reign of this monarch. One also realizes that he did not have judgments about 
this period. His only evident criticism towards Abdülaziz is about the sultan’s excessive 
attachment to military affairs. Cevdet criticizes Abdülaziz for not acting according to the 
immediate needs of the state. While civil and financial matters needed to be prioritized 
above other issues, Abdülaziz allocated an enormous amount of money to the needs of 
the land and naval forces. His particular interest in the construction of warships caused 
him to overlook the public expectations concerning the recovery of the state’s economic 
credibility. As a result, as Cevdet writes, “the people’s enthusiasm and hope that were 
seen during the enthronement of Abdülaziz turned into despair” (Tezakir II, 154-155).54  
 
In a different part of Tezakir, Cevdet criticizes the same issue (Tezakir II, 256) and talks 
about how the sultan was bothered about not being able to create a military power like 
that of Europe. However, according to Cevdet, “what the sultan wished depended on time 
and money. The rehabilitation should begin with civil affairs. The revenues of the treasury 
should be increased, and then the development of warfare items should be undertaken. 
                                               
53 “Efendimiz, vâris-i saltanatsınız. Lâkin bir medyûn Türkiyye'ye vâris oldunuz” (Maruzat, 40). 
54 “Padişâh’ın kuvve-i berriyye ve bahriyyeyi ikmâle hırs ü tehâlküü teşekkür olunacak mevaddan idi. Lâkin evvel 
umûr-ı mülkiye ve mâliyyeyi ıslah edip de hasıl olacak fazla-i vâridâtı buraya sarf etmek lâzım gelirken işin ortasıdan 
başlaması bâdî-i te’essüf olmuştur. Yüzlük altunun yüz seksen bir ve iki raddelerine dayanıp durması ise bâis-i hadşe 
ve endişe idi. Cülûs-ı hümâyunda görülen şevk ve ümmid-i umûmî üzerine umûr-ı mâliyyeye hasr-i nazar olunsaydı 
devletin îtibâr-i mâlîsi derhal avdet eylerdi. Çi fâide ki sû-i karîn belâsı olarak yanlış yola gidildi ve bu şevk-i umûmî 
mübeddel-i ye’s ü fütûr oldu. Altun yüz doksana çıktı. İşte devletin elden kaçırmış olduğu büyük fırsatlardan biri dahi 
budur” (Tezakir II, 154-155). 
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Otherwise, it is not logical to increase the number of battleships by borrowing” (Tezakir 
II, 257). 
 
 
2.3.1 The “Inexcusable Dethronement” and Death of Abdülaziz 
 
While not mentioning many of the events of the period, Cevdet allocates a great place to 
the dethronement of Abdülaziz. As mentioned above, Cevdet places a strong emphasis 
on obedience to those charged with authority, and therefore an attempt of this kind is an 
inexcusable act for him. Indeed, in his accounts he strictly reprimands those who were 
involved in the dethronement and takes sides against them. For instance, he describes 
Hüseyin Avni Pasha as “the head of conspiracy” (fesâd başı) (Tezakir IV, 130; Maruzat, 
218; Maruzat 221) and a “deadly enemy” (hasm-ı cânı) of the sultan (Maruzat, 218), and 
calls his whole group “traitors” (hâinler) (Tezakir IV, 157). 
 
Cevdet describes the dethronement process in depth and talks about his appointment to 
the province of Ioannina by Hüseyin Avni Pasha. At the time, Cevdet was not informed 
of the dethronement plans, and the reason he was dispatched from İstanbul was Avni 
Pasha’s mistrust towards him (Tezakir IV, 131). When the conspiracy took place and was 
widely known, Cevdet did not know about what was happening and thought that 
Abdülaziz was dead, though he later learned he had only been removed (Tezakir IV, 155; 
Maruzat, 232). Then he gives details about how badly Abdülaziz and his family were 
treated after his deposition (Tezakir IV, 156-158). 
 
Six days after the dethronement, the sultan was found dead in his room with cuts on the 
veins in his wrists (Tezakir IV, 157). Immediately after news of the event was spread, it 
became a matter of controversy how the sultan had actually died. Cevdet provides three 
different public opinions about the case: some people accepted the idea of suicide, others 
were convinced that the sultan had been mercilessly murdered, while some others were 
indecisive between these two positions (Tezakir IV, 156-157). Cevdet records that even 
at the funeral those who believed in the suicide were saying “May Allah forgive his sins,” 
while those who believed in the murder were saying "May Allah forgive him” (Tezakir 
IV, 213). 
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Upon the deposition of Abdülaziz Prince Murad succeeded to the throne, however prob-
lems in his mental health led to his dethronement after three months. When Abdülhamid 
II ascended to the throne as his heir, he was immediately faced with a political depression 
in terms of foreign policy. When this depression was alleviated after five years, he 
brought forward the issue of Abdülaziz’s death (Uzunçarşılı 2000, 124). Hence, in Te-
zakir, Cevdet states that in the middle of 1881 the situation remained vague and suspi-
cious (Tezakir IV, 213). In 1881, the case was opened and Abdulhamid placed major 
importance on the issue (Tezakir IV, 209-210). 
 
At the time, Cevdet was serving as Justice Minister and was given the role of making the 
necessary preparations for the trials of the suspects in the Yıldız trials (Uzunçarşılı 2000, 
358). In Tezakir he attaches a document that he wrote that had been published in the Vakit 
newspaper about these trials. Interestingly, in this document, which was written before 
the trials were convened, Cevdet has no doubts about how Abdülaziz died and declares, 
“it is clear that no doubts should be left about Sultan Abdülaziz’s brutal murder by means 
of the trials which will convene soon. Before the traitors serve their sentences, the sultan’s 
name will be engraved in the hearts of the people as a martyr” (Tezakir IV, 213).55 Alt-
hough Cevdet promised Midhat Pasha, who was one of the planners of the deposition, a 
fair treatment (Uzunçarşılı 1946, 27-28),56 he seems to have known the results of the in-
terrogations and the trials even before they took place. 
 
 
2.3.2 Cevdet's Agenda While Claiming Abdülaziz was Murdered 
 
At this point, an essential question emerges: did Cevdet believe that Abdülaziz was mur-
dered, or did he have an agenda when he claimed that? According to the findings of 
Ebul’ula Mardin (1996), the original report of the Mecelle Community (Mecelle Cemiyeti 
mazbatası), which was written by Cevdet, suggested that the sultan’s death was a suicide, 
                                               
55 “Karîben icrâ olunacak muhâkemât-ı aleniyyenin birinci faslında Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretlerinin sabren ve ga-
dren katl olunduğu kimesnenin tereddüt ve iştibâhı kalmayacak sûrette âşikâr olacağı cihetle hâinlerin icrây-i cezâların-
dan evvel elsine-i enâmda müşârün-ileyh hazretlerinin elkaabına şehîd unvânı ilâve olunacağı der-kârdır” (Tezakir IV, 
213). 
56 As quoted from Cevdet: “Kemal-i adaletle muamele olunacağından dolayı her veçhile emin olmaları umûr-ı tabiiy-
yeden ve adalet-i seniyye îcabat-ı âlisindendir” (Uzunçarşılı 1946, 27-28).  
 49 
but later Cevdet made slight changes to the report to suggest the probability of murder 
(pp. 258-259). Assuming that these findings are accurate, Cevdet was initially either 
among those who believed in the possibility of suicide, or at least was ambivalent about 
it.  
 
Cevdet was a bureaucratic man, and as Neumann rightly points out, he was very sensitive 
about protecting the dignity of the state administration against the public (Neumann 2000, 
201). At the top of this administration there was "the sultan who gains his legitimacy 
because he is the sultan unobjectionably” (Neumann 2000, 128). Therefore, the dignity 
of this position necessitates protection as well. Indeed, this is what Cevdet does while 
talking about both sultans in Tezakir and Maruzat, as he holds the ministers responsible 
for things going wrong. This is also why Cevdet criticizes Mahmud Nedim Pasha and 
regards him as a main actor in both the dethronement and death of Abdülaziz (Maruzat, 
240), since Mahmud Nedim Pasha as grand vizier did not take responsibility for the dif-
ficulties and failures that emerged, but put all the blame on the sultan (Tezakir IV, 151). 
  
In the document mentioned earlier published in the newspaper Vakit, it is clear from his 
expressions that Cevdet was concerned with defending the sultan’s name to the public, as 
he emphasized strongly that “the sultan’s name will be engraved in the hearts of the peo-
ple as a martyr” (Tezakir IV, 213). Whether Cevdet sincerely believed in the murder or 
not, he seems to dedicate himself to the protection of the dignity of the position of the 
sultanate in both his writings and practices throughout the Yıldız trials (Uzunçarşılı 2000, 
358). In the trials at Yıldız Palace it was decided that the sultan was murdered, which 
precluded the expression of an opposite opinion about the case until the second constitu-
tional period (Özcan 2013, 8).  
 
 
 2.4 The Palace and the Economy in Abdülmecid’s Era; Cevdet’s Main Concerns 
 
 
As mentioned above, in both sources the economic situation of the empire is one of the 
issues with which Cevdet is chiefly occupied. However, for the reign of Abdülmecid, his 
focus is mostly on his objections to the “terrible” extravagance of the palace, the palace 
ladies, and the construction of new buildings. Cevdet regards these points as the main 
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reasons for the economic deterioration. Therefore, in this part his accounts will first be 
identified and then analyzed under different subheadings to answer the question: Are 
Cevdet’s points the real reasons for the financial difficulties of the empire? If not, what 
were the real reasons for the problems of the economy of that period? 
 
 
2.4.1 “Horrible” Prodigality 
 
“For a long time, the expenses of the empire were in accordance with its rev-
enues. The officers received their salaries on time and spent them accordingly 
throughout a month. At the time, there were no western-style houses or sea-
side residences. The expenditures of the palace were modest. While the 
princes stayed in their flats, the women of the palace did not go outside. The 
cost of the palace stable consisted of only forage expenses such as hay, grass, 
and oats. Whenever a foreign visitor came and needed a horse for transporta-
tion, a few harnessed horses were borrowed from the ministers. Hence, there 
was no payment from the palace treasury for such things. However, … this 
situation made a bad impression on people. Therefore, ministers and high 
state officials bought phaetons and cars. Furthermore, necessary items and 
perfectly equipped carriages were purchased for the palace according to the 
needs of the time” (Maruzat, 6) (my own translation).  
 
Cevdet considered some changes to be a normal requirement of the time. However, after-
wards, the expenses did not remain limited to such needs, but prodigality and debauchery 
proliferated. Since the empire was accustomed to borrowing, it began to borrow for daily 
expenses as well (Maruzat, 7).  
 
Cevdet attaches major importance to the expenses of the palace and criticizes their lav-
ishness. He draws attention to the rise in the privy purse of the sultan and writes, “while 
12,500 purses of gold were allocated for the sultan’s private treasury per month, this year, 
the amount was increased to 20,000 purses of gold.” In a different part of Tezakir, he 
touches upon the same issue when he compares the current situation with the time of 
Mahmud II, in which the total expenditures of the palace did not exceed 1000 purses of 
gold in a month. However, a gradual increase in spending reached 20,000 purses of gold 
during the reign of Abdülmecid (Tezakir II, 8). For Cevdet, the sultan’s privy purse al-
ready had many debts and it was unclear how to pay that much back (Tezakir I, 47-48). 
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Şerif Mardin (1991), on the other hand, argues that the increase in the private treasury 
from 1000 to 20,000 purses of gold between the 1830s and 1850s cannot solely be related 
to “prodigality.” Instead it is more likely that the expenses of the Ottoman palace at the 
time of Mahmud II consisted of pre-capitalist items, which were less diverse or less 
costly. What necessitated the increase was modernization itself, and its consequent sys-
tem of consumption (p. 53). What Cevdet missed was the socio-economic change in the 
empire, which was conditioned by the modernization process. 
 
Another point is that Cevdet, with a conservative understanding, obviously regarded 
many of the palace expenses as extravagances, yet he still makes neither negative nor 
positive comments about the sultan’s attitudes. For instance, while on the one hand 
Abdülmecid says, “Beşiktaş (Dolmabahçe) Palace has become very burdensome and os-
tentatious, it could have been simpler” (Maruzat, 7; Tezakir I, 47-48), on the other he 
becomes quite annoyed when Âli and Fuad Pashas point out the pressing need for econ-
omizing when Abdülmecid wants Çırağan Palace to be demolished and rebuilt. These 
pashas’ remarks about the economic distress of the sultan’s privy purse immediately led 
to the dismissal of Âli Pasha and the resignation of Fuad Pasha (Tezakir II, 31). 
 
In another instance, a commission consisting of ministers sought to negotiate and restore 
the financial situation, and they prepared a report to present to the sultan. However, 
Abdülmecid became very uncomfortable with this bureaucratic initiative. Particularly 
when comments by Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha, who was the speaker of Tanzimat Assembly 
(Meclis-i Tanzimat), proposing the suspension of all construction projects related to the 
sultan’s household and the reduction of the costs of the palace, reached the sultan’s ears, 
Abdülmecid strongly resented him and said, “the pig should be exiled” (Tezakir II, 52; 
Maruzat, 11-12). In these and some other similar instances, Cevdet does not comment on 
them but contents himself with simply narrating. 
 
 
2.4.2 Palace Ladies; Leading to “Collapse” 
 
In his accounts, Cevdet constantly criticizes the ladies of the palace for their excessive 
expenses and accuses them of bankrupting not only the private treasury of the sultan but 
of the state’s treasury as well (Tezakir II, 132). According to him, the ladies who were 
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hidden in the palace during the reign of Mahmud II had acquired the opportunity to go 
out and promenade (Tezakir II, 3-4). Furthermore, during the reign of Abdülmecid, the 
family of the governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, came to İstanbul with large sums of 
money and spent them abundantly. For Cevdet, these were bad examples for both the 
ladies of the palace and the ladies of İstanbul (Tezakir I, 20). From Cevdet’s perspective 
these developments led to economic and moral corruption. 
 
Cevdet talks repeatedly about the attitudes of the palace ladies, in many instances refer-
ring to their “prodigality” and “debauchery.” In this respect, his longing for the old days 
is also felt throughout the texts. For instance, he writes:  
 
“The ladies of the palace began to spend unreasonable amounts of money that 
they could not manage with their salaries and got caught in a debt trap. For-
merly, they were away from everything in their part of the palace. But now, 
they keep up with the times, have begun to promenade in carriages and have 
sunk to prodigality and debauchery to be able to seem superior to their coun-
terparts in the city” (Maruzat, 7-8). 
 
As a result, they also borrowed money, and within three years the palace had accrued 3 
million purses of coin debt (Maruzat, 8). 
 
Cevdet also reveals his annoyance with Serfiraz Hanım, who was one of the wives of 
Abdülmecid. In different parts of the works Cevdet uses offensive expressions about her. 
He claims that the sultan was charmed by her, and that she was the main reason for all 
prodigality and debauchery (Tezakir II, 59). In a different part, Cevdet describes her as 
“enticing” and writes that she did as much harm as possible. According to him, “not only 
the private treasury of the sultan but the whole treasuries of the world would not be 
enough for her expenses” (Tezakir II, 65).57 She wandered around in the bazaars and got 
into debt. Within a year, the total amount borrowed by the ladies was 288,000 purses of 
gold, and 125,000 of them were borrowed by Serfiraz Hanım (Tezakir II, 3-4). 
 
                                               
57 “Zat-ı Şahane bu karıya pek ziyade meftun ve mecbur idi. Ol fettanenin dahi etmediği kalmadı. Masarifine Hazine-i 
hassa değil cihanın hazaini cem’ olunsa kifayet etmezdi” (Tezakir II, 65).  
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Abdülmecid, on the other hand, was not able to say anything to Serfiraz Hanım, or to his 
other ladies who led to the bankruptcy of the private treasury by “spending money lav-
ishly as if they were competing with each other” (Tezakir II, 65).58 Moreover, he even 
paved the way for further spending. For instance, he once obtained, with difficulty, 15,000 
purses of gold for the palace employees and gave 5000 purses of it to Serfiraz Hanım, 
and bestowed upon other women 500 purses each as hush money (Tezakir II, 65). Cevdet 
further claims, referring to Serfiraz Hanım, “the state was showing signs of collapse due 
to the eagerness of a woman” (Tezakir II, 66).59 
 
Another point that Cevdet criticizes is the excessive expenditures of the wedding cere-
monies of the palace. For instance, he complains that “the dowry of the daughters of the 
sultan was sent ostentatiously while the salaries of the soldiers who took the dowry away 
were not paid” (Tezakir II, 84-85). In another instance, in one of the ceremonies, “the 
expenses of the ladies reached 300.000 purses.” Another celebration lasted 12 days, and 
“the cost of this ostentation was not possible to count.” Cevdet notes that other ceremo-
nies would take place later, which would further increase the debts of the sultan’s treasury 
(Tezakir II, 23). 
 
 
2.4.3 Construction of New Buildings; a Reason for “Economic Depression” 
 
The last point that Cevdet criticizes and names as the reason for the economic distress is 
the constructions of new buildings. He claims that:  
 
“Although 20,000 purses were allocated for the expenses of the palace per 
month, 8,000 purses were earmarked for the constructions of the buildings. 
The rest was hardly enough for the debts, and there was nothing left to the 
palace. Before the completion of the Ihlamur mansions, Çırağan Palace was 
demolished and about to be rebuilt as masonry building. The Küçüksu pavil-
ion was completed a year before, and another one was built in Göksu. In 
Fındıklı, a house was being constructed for the wives and daughters of Edhem 
Pasha and Mahmud Pasha. The palace of Adile Sultan was being rebuilt in 
                                               
58 “Zat-ı Şahane kendisini bundan alamayıp bu cihetle sair kadınlar nazarında kendisini müttehim gibi add ederek anlara 
dahi bir şey diyemiyordu. Anlar dahi birbiriyle inadına yarışır gibi israfta düşüp Hazine-i hassayı iflasa çıkardılar” 
(Tezakir II, 65).  
59 “…Sefîne-i saltanat ise bir karının hevâsiyle batmak emarelerini göstermekte olduğuna te’essüf etmemek kabil değil 
idi. Allah ıslâh eyliye” (Tezakir II, 66). 
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Fındıklı, and a winter building was being built again for Fatıma Sultan. 
Burned neighborhoods in Babü’s-sade were rebuilt” (Tezakir II, 36) (my own 
translation). 
 
Just after these accounts, Cevdet exaggeratedly asserts, “it would not have been enough 
for the extraordinary expenses of the palace ladies if a state like this (the Ottoman Empire) 
would have existed” (Tezakir II, 36). In another part, when Cevdet talks about the loss of 
the state’s financial credibility and the signs of bankruptcy, he connects this to the same 
two issues which are the expenses of the ladies and the construction of twenty different 
new buildings for the palace (Tezakir II, 51). 
 
 
2.4.4 An Analysis of Cevdet’s Concerns 
 
Other primary sources in addition to Cevdet Pasha’s, such as the statements of Mahmud 
Celaleddin Pasha and Mehmed Memduh, mention how the extravagance of the palace led 
to economic distress. Celaleddin Pasha argues that borrowed money was not used for the 
interests of the country and the nation, but was utterly wasted. He points out that the costs 
of marriage and circumcision feasts, unbelievable improvidences, the debts that were 
transferred from the sultan’s harem to the state treasury, and endowments given to the 
ministers shook the state’s economy to its foundations (Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa 1983, 
35). Memduh also talks about how new constructions and decorations, and the costs of 
various unnecessary items led to economic troubles (Mehmed Memduh 1990, 37).  
 
At this point, it is necessary to ask if these reasons, such as extravagance of the palace, 
construction of new buildings, and so forth, were enough for the bankruptcy of such an 
empire? In other words, when looking back from the twenty-first century, do historians 
see the reign of Abdülmecid in the same way as Cevdet and his contemporaries describe? 
 
First of all, while evaluating the Tanzimat economy and the primary sources about it, it 
should be noted that neither Cevdet Pasha nor the other prominent people of the time 
were economists. While observing the main issues of the country, they mentioned the 
economic situation in a general framework (Önsoy 1994, 257). Moreover, at the time, the 
importance of “economics” and the relation between economics and political-administra-
tive power were not yet realized (Önsoy 1994, 258-259; Okyar 1994, 250). Okyar (1994) 
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indicates that even the Tanzimat leaders were not aware of the economic doctrines, such 
as free trade or protectionism, which were in the foreground of public opinion in Europe 
in the nineteenth century. Hence, the idea that occupied the minds of Tanzimat leaders 
was to strengthen the Ottoman Empire politically and administratively and to provide 
resources for this purpose, rather than economics and economic development (p. 250). 
Secondly, “the Tanzimat era followed the economic and fiscal crisis of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries” (Quataert, 1992, 211). The state went through a series of 
wars and internal rebellions between 1760 and 1840 and lost some territories in the Bal-
kans. These long-lasting wars and rebellions depleted both the empire’s monetary and 
human resources. On the other hand, the increasing costs of the army, the expenses of the 
bureaucrats who had begun to form a crowded class since the middle of the 19th century, 
and the reform movements introduced additional taxes on the public (Önsoy 1994, 261). 
There were also international developments such as the capitalist and industrial revolu-
tions of the West, which also affected the Ottoman economy (Quataert, 1992, 212). 
 
Thirdly, the empire became indebted under unfavorable conditions, since a large amount 
of money was borrowed with much higher interest rates than other countries. A large part 
of these funds was used not only for the construction of palaces but also for recurring 
expenditures, the payment of the salaries of the bureaucracy, and the establishment of a 
large navy. Almost no sources were allocated for investments that would invigorate the 
economy and increase fiscal revenues (Pamuk 2007, 230-231). On the other hand, it 
should also be noted that government spending policies were unsystematic. Moreover, 
the state had difficulty finding resources for its defense and carrying out the moderniza-
tion process. Thus, the leaders unavoidably tended towards borrowing, without which the 
modernization process, keeping up the Crimean War, and the suppression of internal re-
bellions would not have been possible (Okyar 1994, 251-252). 
 
As Neumann (2000) rightly points out, when looking back from the perspective of Te-
zakir and Maruzat, the situation of the empire seems quite gloomy. Cevdet regards the 
existing situation as a constant decline. However, he mainly pays attention to scarcity in 
the state, lavishness, and the inadequacy of bureaucracy, rather than any other issues 
(p.28). He also mentions that statesmen blame each other for the situation. According to 
him, bureaucrats found the sultan and the people of the palace guilty because of their 
expenses. On the other hand, those who opposed the bureaucrats claimed that those who 
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ruled the government, primarily referring to Âli and Fuad Pashas, were not different from 
those in the palaces (Maruzat, 11). Cevdet himself held the ministers who did not prevent 
what was going on responsible (Tezakir II, 142-143). 
 
However, Okyar (1994) looks at the situation from a different perspective. What he indi-
cates is that when looking at the changes in the nineteenth century Ottoman economy, the 
reason was not incorrect policies implemented by the statesmen of the time, but the pro-
cess of modernization that the empire was going through (p.254). Indeed, although the 
state economy ended in bankruptcy, what needed attention most were the significant so-
cioeconomic and structural changes experienced in the Tanzimat period (Findley 2008, 
33). 
 
According to Mardin (1991), Cevdet Pasha draws attention to the “horrible” expenditures 
of the Tanzimat era due to his point of view, as he was not accustomed to individual 
lavishness (p.25). While the founders of the Tanzimat, such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha, 
adopted the military and administrative structure of the West, Western everday culture 
was also actively embraced in the empire. Clothing, household goods, the use of money, 
the style of houses, and interpersonal relations had started to resemble the European style. 
Conservative Cevdet Pasha, on the other hand, referred to these lifestyle changes as a 
hindrance of the old Ottoman values (Mardin 1991, 13). 
 
A similar approach can be found in Ortaylı’s accounts. While discussing whether or not 
the construction of Dolmabahçe Palace at the time was a waste of resources, Ortaylı 
(2014) argues that there was prodigality in the period of Abdülmecid, but this can be 
called prodigality according to the understanding of that time because, at the time, Turk-
ish society had a quite modest lifestyle. From today’s perspective, he as well sees these 
developments as an outcome of the modernization process. For instance, he claims that it 
is not possible to consider some of the expenditures of the palace, particularly the con-
struction of the new palaces, as a luxury, and he stresses that before the construction of 
Dolmabahçe the palace of the sultan was not able to meet the needs of the protocol of a 
modern state (pp. 49-50). 
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For more sound evaluations of the Tanzimat period, Ortaylı (2014) highlights the need to 
keep a distance from accounts that describe the era as full of prodigality and moral cor-
ruption (p. 50). Indeed, this warning is quite meaningful while examining Cevdet’s ac-
counts. If Cevdet’s statements in Tezakir and Maruzat are believed without a critical ap-
proach, the state entered into a fiscal and economic crisis mainly because of the prodigal-
ity of the palace and also of the rivalry among the statesmen and ministers. However, this 
kind of evaluation would discredit the Ottoman Empire and would result in overlooking 
the modernization process and structural change experienced throughout the era. 
 
 
2.4.5 Main Problems of the Tanzimat Economy from the Perspective of the 21st 
Century 
 
If Cevdet’s points need to be questioned, it is significant to ask why did the economy of 
the empire have difficulties throughout the Tanzimat era? Quataert (2004) divides the 
whole Ottoman Economy into four phases, the first of which lasted until 1826. In this 
period the state applied protectionist policies including monopolies and the use of domes-
tic raw materials. The second phase lasted from 1826 to 1860. In this phase the Ottoman 
market opened to the outside, and domestic markets were liberated to a degree. In the 
third phase, from 1860 to 1908, customs were increased and local manufacturers were 
patronized. The last phase began with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and continued 
through World War I, in which the struggle between supporters of a protectionist “na-
tional economy” and free trade continued (p. 888). What is important here is that these 
processes reflect the long-lasting change in the Ottoman economic mentality. It is clear 
that the classic mentality gradually began to erode, especially when the empire partially 
accepted liberalism from the 1830s to 1860s (Quataert 2004, 889). 
 
Throughout the Tanzimat era, which is primarily related to the second phase, the condi-
tions of society and economy began to change with the effect of modernization, and the 
first signs of economic growth began to be seen (Okyar 1994, 254). Despite the difficul-
ties experienced by the state, trade increased and agriculture improved. In this era the 
value of export and import products expanded roughly five times. Furthermore, although 
imported industrial products had a harmful effect on the guilds, Ottoman production kept 
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up with developments (Findley 2008, 33). Despite its ephemerality there was an explo-
sion in the manufacturing industry such as silk weaving in Bursa, Konya, Diyarbakir, 
Damascus, and Halep; carpet weaving in Izmir and Konya; candle, glass, paper, and 
canned food in Istanbul; cotton weaving in Adana; and rug weaving in Bursa, Kastamonu, 
Damascus, Vidin, Bosnia, Thessaloniki, Aydin, Sivas, and Silistre (Kıray 1995, 157). 
 
When it comes to the specific economic problems of the Tanzimat period, Quataert (1992) 
elaborates eight points. First, “the shortage of labor for both agriculture and industry” was 
a crucial problem. Second, the state suffered from territorial losses, since almost all the 
lands that “were lost were the most densely populated regions and contained the best 
agricultural lands and the strongest concentrations of industry.” Third, the economic 
zones in which all kinds of commercial materials flowed freely were lost owing to terri-
torial losses, destroying the trading network. Fourth, “the shortage of skilled labor famil-
iar with mechanized industrial technology and with agricultural improvements remained 
a serious difficulty.” Fifth, the immigration of people from the lost Ottoman territories 
and Muslim refugees from Russia led to economic instability. Sixth, “unstable currency 
mocked efforts to build the economy. The issuance of paper money failed to resolve the 
problem in the 1840s and during the next decade.” Seventh, “investment capital remained 
dispersed and generally unavailable for agricultural and industrial development 
schemes.” Lastly, Quataert sees the growth of the state as a significant problem. The bu-
reaucracy and military grew tremendously, which had different social and economic re-
sults. They were now a salaried group of people and “cost a great deal, draining away 
vast sums potentially available for agriculture and industrial development (pp. 216-218) 
As can be seen, the Tanzimat economy had more important difficulties than the prodigal-
ity of the palace ladies or expenses related to the construction of new buildings and pal-
aces. 
 
 
2.5 The Palace and the Economy in Abdülaziz’s Era; Cevdet’s Silence 
 
 
When it comes to the period of Abdülaziz, Cevdet does not mention anything about prod-
igality or about loans. As stated above, the only criticism directed against Abdülaziz re-
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lated to his allocation of a large amount of money to the military forces, such as the con-
struction of warships (Tezakir II, 154-155; Tezakir II, 256). Even in this criticism Cevdet 
does not miss the chance to hold other people responsible, just as he does when criticizing 
Abdülmecid, and argues that “the new members of the sultan’s assembly encouraged the 
sultan’s great expenses that the treasury could not bear.” Those members justified bor-
rowing by pointing to the period of Abdülmecid, as for them “the profligacy of the ladies 
during the reign of Abdülmecid led to borrowings.” Hence, it was more necessary to bor-
row for weapons and to supply other needs of the state that were necessary for the salva-
tion and the security of the empire (Maruzat, 54). 
 
Abdülaziz’s reign lasted for fifteen years, and those issues that were criticized by Cevdet 
in the period of Abdülmecid continued to exist throughout the reign of Abdülaziz. 
Abdülaziz was not as fond of women as his brother Abdülmecid (Uluçay 2011, 232). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that there would be no situation like the prominence of the 
palace ladies to bother Cevdet. However, the “prodigality” that Cevdet frequently referred 
to during the reign of Abdülmecid was not over in this period (Şehsuvaroğlu 1949, 334-
335), and the construction of new buildings and palaces continued (Karal 2003, 347). As 
mentioned in the related chapter, Abdülmecid wished Çırağan Palace to be demolished 
and rebuilt as masonry building (Tezakir II, 36). The construction of the new palace, 
which was completely demolished during the reign of Abdülmecid, was postponed due 
to his death. Its construction began and was completed during the reign of Abdülaziz with 
a cost of almost 5 million Ottoman gold (Kalfazade 1993, 304-305). Beylerbeyi Palace, 
and the Çekmece and İzmit hunting mansions were also built in this period. The Valide 
Pertevniyal Sultan Mosque in Aksaray was completed in 1871 by Abdülaziz's mother, 
Pertevniyal Vâlide Sultan, and the Câmi-i Kebîr mosque in Kasımpaşa was rebuilt by 
Abdülaziz after being destroyed in a fire (Küçük 1998a, 182). However, none of these are 
mentioned by Cevdet even though he criticizes new construction as a reason for economic 
distress when describing the reign of Abdülmecid (Tezakir II, 36). 
 
Moreover, the state increasingly continued to borrow from Galata bankers (Karta 2013, 
100)60 and Europe, which finally resulted in the announcement of the bankruptcy of the 
                                               
60 “The government which was in financial trouble decided not to borrow any more from the Galata Bankers after the 
foundation of the Ottoman Bank. However, it maintained its borrowing habits” (Karta 2013, 100). 
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Ottoman Treasury in 1875 (Çakır 2012, 73). From 1854 until the end of Abdülaziz’s 
reign, in which the bankruptcy announcement was declared, external borrowing agree-
ments took place fifteen times. Only four of them were during the reign of Abdülmecid 
with a total amount of 15 million pounds sterling. The remaining eleven agreements were 
made during the reign of Abdülaziz with a total amount of 207 million pounds sterling 
(Kıray 1995, 205-211). Interestingly, however, Cevdet does not mention these borrow-
ings or their amounts and results. 
 
Additionally, an essential result of the borrowings was that they became a significant 
determinant in international political relations. In other words, they resulted in the reali-
zation of the wishes of the great powers to bring the Ottoman Empire under their influence 
both economically and politically (Çakır 2012, 72). But, Cevdet also seems to ignore the 
influence that was gained by the foreign powers over the empire. That being the case, it 
is crucial to ask: What might explain Cevdet’s silence when it comes to the period of 
Abdülaziz? 
 
 
2.5.1 An Analysis of Cevdet’s Silence for the Reign of Abdülaziz 
 
First of all, Cevdet’s manner has to do not only with his accounts of the reign of 
Abdülaziz, but also with his general approach toward power and the concept of sultanate. 
Neumann precisely points out that one of the gaps in Cevdet’s writings is his lack of 
interest in the criticism of power. For instance, Neumann states that Cevdet’s ignorance 
of the increasing influence of foreign powers over the Ottoman Empire was due to his 
concern about consolidating the power of his state (Neumann 2009, 87). 
 
Secondly, if it is paid attention, Cevdet does not criticize the structural transformation of 
the state during the reign of Abdülmecid, but seems to be bothered by the reflections of 
Westernization on the social level, particularly in court life. As exemplified in the related 
part, Cevdet criticizes the women of the palace for their freer manners compared to pre-
vious times, and the abandonment of the empire’s modest lifestyle (Maruzat, 8-7). How-
ever, this point alone does not fully explain Cevdet’s different attitudes towards Abdül-
mecid and Abdülaziz, since the traditional modest lifestyle was also abandoned during 
the reign of Abdülaziz. 
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Together with the Westernization of court life, the image of Abdülmecid as “European-
ized” (alafranga) can be taken into consideration, since Abdülmecid is known to be the 
first sultan of the Ottoman Empire who was exposed to European culture in his youth to 
a certain extent. He enjoyed Western music and was able to speak French. There were 
music masters from Italy, and a small theater and operetta organization in his palace 
(Kocatürk 1962, 329). However, his admiration for Western civilization led to a reaction 
against him by conservatives (Koçu 2015, 431), and thus Abdülaziz, who presented an 
image of not liking European traditions, was regarded as a savior of the empire and as the 
one who would avoid imitating the West (Küçük 1988a, 179). In this sense, Abdülaziz’s 
more “native” image might be one of the reasons why Cevdet refrains from directing 
criticisms against him, since Cevdet may have felt closer to Abdülaziz himself.  
 
Thirdly, when Âli Pasha died, Cevdet remained as the last living member of Reşid Pasha’s 
team, which meant that Cevdet lost his collaborators in the political arena. This circum-
stance led him to protect his position through good relations with the palace of Abdülaziz 
(Neumann 2000, 47). He already had a close relationship with the palace, and he repeat-
edly mentions Abdülaziz’s compliments and favor for himself and expresses his gratitude 
towards the sultan (Maruzat, 176; Tezakir IV, 83; Tezakir IV, 122.).61  Furthermore, 
Cevdet’s close contact with Abdülaziz’s mother Pertevniyal Valide Sultan can easily be 
seen in different parts of the biographical volume of the Tezakir in which Cevdet attaches 
various letters he wrote to her,62 which indicate their good relationship.  
                                               
61 “Sultan Abdülaziz Han hazretleri ol gün sabahleyin kendüsüne giymek içün hazırlanmış olan elbisesini gönderdi, 
giydim. Huzûr-ı hümâyûn’a girdim. Fevka’l-âde iltifât u taltîf-i hümâyûn’a mazhar oldum”(Maruzat, 176); “Sultan 
Abdelaziz Han hazretleri huzûr-ı hümâyûnlarına celb ile fevka’l-âde taltîf buyurdu ve bir murassa’ mahfaza verdi 
…Me’mûriyet-i cedideye devâm etmekte iken hâiz olduğumuz kazaskerlik rütbesi bâ-irâde-i kat’iyye rütbe-i vezârete 
tahvîl buyuruldu (Tezakir IV, 83); “Li-ecli’t teşekkür Mâbeyn-i hümâyûn’a gidip huzûr-ı hümâyûna çıktığımda Sultan 
Abdülaziz Han hazretleri fevka’l-âde eser-i teveccüh ve iltifât gösterdi ve muhasses olan şehrî otuz bin kuruş ma’âşıma 
on bin kuruş zamm u ilâve buyurdu” (Tezakir IV, 122). 
62 See: (Tezakir IV, 91-93, 120-123, 132-133, 152).  
“Ol esnâda Vâlide Sultan tarafından hüsn-i teveccüh eseri görmüş olduğum cihetle…” (Tezakir IV, 91); “Hâlbuki ben 
o fikirde bulunsam anın aleyhinde Vâlide Sultan vâsıtasiyle yâhud diğer ba’z-ı vesâit ila ba’z-ı ilkaâta yol bulabilirdim” 
(Tezakir IV, 123); “…Suriye vâliliğinden sahîhen memnûn olarak li-ecli’t-teşekkür Mâbeyn-i hümâyûn’a gittim 
ve…bu tebeddülden hâsıl olan memnûniyetimi lisân-ı şükrâniyyet ile Hünkâr’a arz ettirdim… Ba’dehû Valide dâiresine 
gidip burasını bi’l-vâsıta Vâlide Sultan hazretlerine dahi tebliğ eyledim ve hemen yol tedârükâtına kıyâm ettim” (Te-
zakir IV, 152). 
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Additionally, he was among the figureheads involved in several of the more significant 
attempts at transforming the state during the later Tanzimat period (Neumann 2005, 118). 
Hence, although his career began to rise during the reign of Abdülmecid, his most active 
involvement in political affairs coincides with the reign of Abdülaziz. For instance, he 
repressed the rebellion in Shkodra within two months, and was given the rank of qadi’as-
ker (chief military judge) of Anatolia. He made reforms in Bosnia within a year and a 
half. Moreover, his achievements led him to earn the rank of the “Ottoman order” (nişân-
ı Osmânî) of the second degree. He worked as a governor of Aleppo and Ioannina and 
served as Minister of Justice, Minister of Pious Foundations, and Minister of Education 
(Halaçoğlu and Aydın 1993, 444). In short, it is also possible that he was satisfied with 
his closeness with the palace, his participation in government, and the advancement of 
his career, which resulted in his different attitude towards Abdülaziz and his era. 
 
Lastly, the late Tanzimat period, beginning in 1867, experienced the emergence of a 
group of intellectuals called the Young Ottomans who “represented a form of political 
protest for which there had been no precedent in the Ottoman Empire.” For the first time, 
an organized group of the Turkish intelligentsia, who were concerned about the dismem-
berment of the empire, was voicing extremely articulate criticisms of the government 
through media of mass communication (Mardin 2000, 3-4). Although the Young Otto-
mans were far from being in opposition to the monarchy, they saw Abdülaziz as an im-
mature ruler who was intimidated by Âli Pasha. Hence, they were in contact with the 
nephew of Abdülaziz, heir Prince Murad, and hoped for his enthronement (Mardin 2000, 
13-14). 
 
Cevdet, on the other hand, had a strong understanding of obedience to the sultan. Thus, 
for him the most crucial point was the observance of the orders of the sultan throughout 
the country (Neumann 2000, 126). To someone with such a mentality, the formation of a 
group of people who voice their criticisms of the government could not be acceptable. 
Cevdet considered the Young Ottomans to be the cause of unrest (Maruzat, 196-197) and 
harmful to the state, and believed that the state’s essential positions should be protected 
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against their occupation (Maruzat, 52).63 Thus, finally, it is also possible that the emer-
gence this oppositional group may have caused Cevdet to avoid any criticism against 
Sultan Abdülaziz and his era. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
As mentioned in the first part of the chapter, for Cevdet the sultan was one of the four 
principles on which the Sublime Ottoman Empire was based. Cevdet held a firm belief in 
obedience to the sultan and his orders all around the country, and saw this obedience as a 
sing of wisdom. This way of thinking led him to consciously protect the dignity of the 
sultan. Therefore, in his accounts he refrains from directing criticisms against either sul-
tan, instead blaming the people around them, such as their ministers, other statesmen, or 
palace ladies, and never forgives those who act in opposition to the sultan. For Cevdet, 
this was a long-lasting tradition of the empire that should not be abandoned. This mental-
ity also manifests itself when Cevdet elaborates on Abdülaziz’s dethronement and death 
as well. For him, the removal of the sultan was an indefensible act carried out by “trai-
tors," and his suspicious death necessitated the vindication of the name and dignity of the 
sultan. 
 
When it comes to the Tanzimat period as a whole, Cevdet is primarily concerned with the 
situation of the economy. However, as seen above, he focuses his attention substantially 
on the “prodigality” of the palace and palace ladies, and the construction of new palaces 
and buildings. Cevdet regards these overemphasized points as the sole reasons for the 
dismaying fiscal situation of the empire. However, it has been shown that there were more 
significant causes of the economic problems which led the empire to crisis throughout the 
Tanzimat era, such as ongoing structural changes and a modernization process that 
brought about particular financial difficulties. On the other hand, interestingly, Cevdet 
rarely mentions the situation of the economy during the reign of Abdülaziz. Although the 
expenses Cevdet describes as prodigality continued to increase during this era as well, he 
                                               
63 “…bundan dolayı zuhûr edecek keşâ-keşler ile azl ü nas bir kerri sökün ederse, umûr-ı nâzüke ve mesâlih-i mühimme 
Jön Türkîler ellerine geçip, bu ise, menâfi’-i devlete muvâfık düşmeyeceğinden…” (Maruzat, 52).  
 64 
retreats into silence, further emphasizing that Cevdet’s accounts need to be approached 
with a critical eye that considers the possible psychology behind them. 
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3. OUTSIDE THE RULING CIRCLE: CEVDET’S ACCOUNTS OF THE 
REACTIONS TO THE REFORM MEASURES 
 
 
 
The main goal of the Tanzimat and Islahat edicts was to reform the administration and 
rearrange the Empire with the purpose of sustaining its existence. The reform program of 
1839 promulgated a series of measures, according to which laws and regulations would 
cover the safety of the life, property, and honor of all subjects of the sultan, tax farming 
would be abolished and a taxation system in harmony with income would be imple-
mented, and military service would be fixed to a predetermined period (Lewis 2010, 150). 
In other words, the idea of “equality” for all subjects was put on the agenda of the empire.  
 
However, problems with the implementation of the reforms led to discontent among the 
subjects and a wide range of reactions within the empire. For instance, the decision con-
cerning the abolition of tax farming dragged the state finances into anarchy due to the 
lack of new organization and qualified personnel. New tax policies led to provocations 
by dissatisfied privileged groups like Christian çorbacıs (provincial Christian notables), 
ulemas, and Muslim agas, which resulted in uprisings of Christian peasants in Rumelia 
and various types of resistance in Anatolia (İnalcık 2006, 130). 
 
Following the Crimean War, the Reform Edict (Islahat Fermanı) was proclaimed in 1856, 
representing a new phase of the Tanzimat period and guaranteeing the full equality of all 
Ottoman subjects regardless of their religion (Berkes 1998, 152). The edict accepted the 
principle that non-Muslims were legally equal with Muslims. It substituted the bedelat-i 
askeriye, which was a tax in lieu military service, for the cizye, from which the Christians 
were exempted, and non-Muslims obtained the right of employment in the government. 
As a consequence, numerous non-Muslims, particularly Armenians and Greeks, attained 
ministerial posts (Karpat 2001, 77). 
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In other words, this edict completely changed the hitherto prevalent status of non-Mus-
lims in Ottoman society and made fundamental changes in their legal status, and religious 
and social life, treating Muslims and non-Muslims totally equally (Gülsoy 1991, 445). 
Therefore, the declaration produced resentment among the Muslim community and reac-
tions throughout the country.  
 
In this chapter, several of these reactions that are mentioned in Tezakir and Maruzat will 
be examined by taking Cevdet’s perspective into consideration. The aim of this chapter 
is to reveal Cevdet’s statist attitude toward the opposition directed at the state or the sul-
tan. Rather than the details of the events, it is significant to see how any opposition is 
described as “mischief” (fitne) from a state-centered view. Thus, firstly, the reactions of 
Muslims and non-Muslims about the Reform Edict of 1856 will be taken into account. 
Then the Mecca rebellion, the Kuleli incident, and the Syrian uprisings will be analyzed 
in chronological order. 
 
 
3.1 Reactions by Muslims and Non-Muslims to the Islahat Edict 
 
 
The principle that guaranteed the full equality of all Ottoman subjects led to great worry 
among Muslims. Many people thought that this was a conscious deviation from the rules 
of Islam. Even the committed reformist Reşid Pasha, who was considered the architect of 
the Tanzimat reforms, regarded the edict as a violation of the Ottoman Islamic principles 
of government (Karpat 2001, 77).  
 
According to Cevdet, in general the edict aroused more opposition than enthusiasm. On 
the one hand, the emphasis on the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims offended the 
Muslim population (Tezakir I, 67). Many of the Muslims complained, “Today, we lost 
our sacred communal rights which were acquired by the blood of our ancestors. While 
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the millet of Islam was the supreme nation, now we are deprived of such sacred right. 
This is a day to weep and mourn for Muslims” (Tezakir I, 68).64 
 
On the other hand, although other non-Muslims were happy to gain equality with the 
other subjects, this situation led to discontent among Greeks as well. Previously a hierar-
chy had existed among the religious communities in the empire, with Greeks just below 
Muslims, making them superior to the Armenians and Jews. Therefore, this edict also 
displeased the Greeks, and some of them expressed their feelings by saying, “the state 
has made us equal with the Jews. We were satisfied with the superiority of the Muslims” 
(Tezakir I, 68). 
 
Furthermore, Cevdet claims that the public loathed Âli Pasha, because Christians occu-
pied positions in political and foreign affairs in accordance with the Islahat Edict. In fact, 
it seems that Cevdet was more uneasy with this situation, since he asserts that employing 
Christians in the financial fields would be better rather than employing them in critical 
positions of the state (Maruzat, 2).65  
 
Cevdet himself also seems to have shared the same worries with other Muslims about the 
edict. As mentioned in the related chapter, Cevdet believed that the Ottoman state was 
based on four foundational pillars, i.e. “the community of Islam (millet-i İslâmiyye), the 
Turkish state (devlet-i Türkiyye), the Ottoman sultans (salâtîn-i Osmaniyye), and Istanbul 
as the capital city (pâyıtahtı-ı İstanbul) (Tezakir I, 85).”66 However, according to him, 
one of the four pillars, “the millet of Islam,” was ruined when the edict debased Muslims 
                                               
64 “Ehl-i islâmdan birçoğu “Âbâ ve ecdadımızın kaniyle kazanılmış olan hukuk-ı mukaddese-i milliyemizi bugün gaib 
ettik. Millet-i islâmiyye millet-i hâkime iken böyle bir mukaddes haktan mahrum kaldı. Ehl-i islâma bu bir ağlayacak 
ve matem edecek gündür” deyu söylenmeğe başladılar” (Tezakir I, 68). 
65 “… Islahat Fermân-ı âlîsi iktizâsınca, hıristiyanların da devlet me’mûriyetlerinde istihdâmları lâzıme-i hâlden olmuş 
idi. Lâkin anları, devletin rûhu mesâbesinde olan umûr-ı politikiyye ve hâriciyyede istihdâm etmekden ise, öteden beri 
me’lûf oldukları umûr-ı mâliyyede istihdâm etmek çok ehven ü evlâ olurdu. İşte millet-i İslâmiyyenin Âli Paşa 
hakkında buğz u adâvetlerine başlıca bir sebep budur” (Maruzat, 2). 
66 “Devlet-i aliyye dört esas üzere müesses olup bunlar ile her nasıl istenilir ise idaresi ve ilerlemesi kabil olur ve 
bunlardan her kaygısı nakıs olur ise idâre kabil olmaz. Dört esas budur. Millet-i islâmiyye, devlet-i türkiyye, salâtîn-i 
osmaniyye, pâyıtahtı-ı İstanbul” (Tezakir I, 85).  
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into the level of non-Muslims. Hence, he asserts that this stipulation of equality shook the 
state to its foundations (Tezakir I, 85).67 
 
On the other hand, it is also interesting to see that while there is no trace of Cevdet’s 
support of the Islahat reforms, and while he believes in its harms to the state, he does not 
excuse those who rebelled against the state owing to their displeasure with the edict. This 
is because he has a strong belief in “obedience” to the monarch and a statist view which 
leads him to regard any insubordinate attempt by the subjects towards both the sultan and 
the state as “mischief” (fesad). This attitude can be notably observed in cases like the 
Mecca Rebellion, the Kuleli incident, and the Syrian Uprising, all of which constituted 
reactions to the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms. 
 
 
3.2 The Mecca Rebellion of 1855 
 
 
The Mecca rebellion was an opposition movement of the Meccan ulama against the center 
due to the implementation of the order to ban the slave trade as part of the reforms. Ac-
cording to Toledano (1994), public displeasure about the European presence in the trade 
life of Jeddah already existed, and when news of the measures taken by the government 
against the enslavement and trade of Circassians and Georgians reached the Hejaz, it 
evoked the feeling that the prohibition of the African slave trade was inevitable, since 
there were already restrictions on the African trade (p. 110-111). 
 
In the Hejaz region, the slave trade was a profitable business. Moreover, since Islam per-
mitted slavery, an initiative for its prohibition could have an inflammatory effect. People 
already attributed the reform movements to the pressure of European powers and blamed 
the government for the British and French presence in Jeddah (Toledano 1994, 113). 
Thus, such an atmosphere gave rise to the easy provocation of the people after a rumor 
of an impending ban. In Tezakir Cevdet elaborates on this movement, which he describes 
                                               
67 “Fakat bu kadar yüzyıllardan beri millet-i hâkime olan ehl-i islâm teba’a-i gayr-i müslime ile müsavat-ı tamme hâline 
tenezzül ettikte acebâ dört esastan biri hedm edilmiş olmadı mı” (Tezakir I, 85). 
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as “sedition” (fitne) (Tezakir I, 102), in such great detail that it takes up fifty pages.68 
Therefore, the case will briefly be summarized as Cevdet narrates, and then Cevdet’s 
state-centered attitude toward it will be elaborated. 
 
According to Cevdet, “in order to get along with the European states who considered it 
necessary to ban the slave trade, the Ottoman state decided to ban the black slave trade” 
(Tezakir I, 102). The state gave an order to the governors and mutasarrıfs about the issue, 
upon which a group of the leading merchants in Jeddah wrote a letter to the Meccan ulama 
in 1855, referring to the impropriety of this ban. These merchants complained about the 
decision to implement the articles of the Tanzimat Edict and mentioned that according to 
these articles the slave trade would no longer be possible, while “infidels” could marry 
Muslim women, women could wear any kind of attire they wished, and no one could 
interfere with their choices. They claimed that these and a few other similar allegations 
were against Islam, and that for this reason they aimed to reach the imam to call for re-
consideration (Tezakir I, 102-103). 
 
When the letter reached Mecca, the Emir of Mecca, Abdulmuttalib Effendi, the ulama, 
and other notables resorted to rebellion. To Cevdet, this was the point where sedition 
began. Abdulmuttalib met Sheikh Cemâl Effendi, who was the leader of the Meccan 
ulama, and told him that the Turks were apostates but were disguising it for the time 
being. He added that his group would seize the government, which was their right, by 
using the prohibition of the slave trade as an excuse (Tezakir I, 103). Thereafter, Ab-
dulmuttalib and his group secretly planned the rebellion (Tezakir I, 104). 
 
The rebellion began when Cemâl Effendi issued a fatwa accusing the Turks of apostasy 
due to the aforementioned articles of the edict. He argued that these articles were against 
Shari’a, and thus that it was halal to kill the Turks and enslave their children. It was also 
necessary to fight against them and their followers as they were deserving of hell (Tezakir 
I, 112). After this fatwa clashes and attacks broke out, resulting in hundreds of deaths. 
This situation could only be soothed through the efforts of Şerif Mansur Effendi, who 
                                               
68 In the entire Tezkire No.12, Cevdet discusses the Mecca Rebellion in depth. According to Toledano (1994) Cevdet 
Pasha gives the most detailed account of this case (p. 110). 
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was one of the relatives of Abdulmuttalib and loyal to the Ottoman state (Tezakir I, 112-
118.). 
Cevdet’s narrative of the rebellion is significant in the sense that it again confirms his 
statist approach and his reaction towards any revolts against the state. Cevdet calls this 
opposition movement as fitne. To him, before being involved in this opposition Sheikh 
Cemâl Effendi was “the leader of the ulema” (reis’ül ulema), however after taking part 
in it he became “the leader of the people of sedition and mischief” (reis-i ehl-i fitne ve 
fesad) (Tezakir I, 111). 
 
Cevdet deemed it necessary to share the official letter send by Shaykh al-islam Arif Ef-
fendi to the qadı, mufti, and scholars of Mecca in order to respond to the rebels. In the 
letter, Arif Effendi quotes various verses from the Quran and hadiths, and claims that the 
sultan is the imam of all Muslims (Tezakir I, 136-137), and thus Muslims are obliged to 
obey the sultan. Because of this, to rise against the sultan and the Ottoman state amounts 
to sedition and mischief (Tezakir I, 136-138). This letter also vocalizes Cevdet’s point of 
view about the case. 
 
Another striking point is Cevdet’s stress on the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. While 
concluding the event at the end, he notes that: 
 
“In this century, the Ottoman state remains as the sole protector of the religion 
of Islam on the globe. The Abbasid caliph also handed over the caliphate to 
Yavuz Sultan Selim and his grandchildren in the presence of numerous Mus-
lims. Therefore, there is no doubt that those who oppose the legitimate cali-
phate of the Ottoman dynasty are rebellious (âsi) and abominable (bâğî)” (Te-
zakir I, 149).69  
 
In Cevdet’s mind, there was no other choice but to call the opponents rebellious and 
abominable. Additionally, the emphasis on the inheritance of the caliphate from the Ab-
basids discloses Cevdet’s concern, confirming Toledano’s (1994) claim that “in order to 
remain the heir of the Sunni state and the caliphate, the control of the Hejaz was vital to 
                                               
69 “Bu asırda ise küre-i arz üzerinde din-i islâmın hâmîsi olan yalnız bir Devlet-i Osmaniyye kalmıştır. Halife-i Abbasî 
dahi nice müslimin mahzarında Yavuz Sultan Selim’e ve a’kaabı’na emanet-i hilâfeti terk ve teslim etmişidi. 
Binâenaleyh hanedan-ı Osmanî’nin hilâfetleri meşru’ olarak muhalefet edenlerin âsi ve bâğî olduğunda şüphe yoktur” 
(Tezakir I, 149). 
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the empire” (p. 110). As a discerning statesman Cevdet was certainly aware of this vital-
ity. Indeed, when the Ottoman government abolished the African slave trade in general, 
the Hejaz province was initially excluded because the center was aware of the sensitivity 
of the region to the issue after the rebellion of 1855 (Erdem 1996, 86). 
 
 
3.3 The Kuleli Incident of 1859 
 
 
Cevdet very briefly talks about the Kuleli incident, which was a conspiracy in 1859 
caused by extensive discontent with and objection to both the proclamation of the Islahat 
Edict of 1856 and the various diplomatic concessions made to the Western powers. The 
moving spirit was Sheikh Süleymaniyeli Ahmad Effendi (Tezakir II, 82), who was a ma-
drasah teacher. Sheikh Ahmad highlighted that he considered the Reform Edicts of 1839 
and 1856 as a breach of Muslim law, since these documents acknowledged equal rights 
to Muslims and non-Muslims (Davison 1963, 101). Numerous ulema, madrasah students, 
intellectuals, army officers (Berkes 2017, 272), and low-ranking bureaucrats were in-
volved in this conspiracy with the aim of getting rid of Abdülmecid and his ministers 
(Hanioğlu 2008, 110). However, the conspiracy was revealed to the government by an 
army officer, and subsequently the conspirators were arrested (Tezakir II, 83). Cevdet 
exhibits a statist approach towards this case as well and calls this group of conspirators 
“a society of mischief” (cem’iyyet-i fesâdiyye) (Tezakir II, 83). His manner towards the 
conspirators implies that to him, there can be no excuse for getting involved in a rebellion 
against the state or any attempt that would harm the sultan’s dignity.  
 
Cevdet also notes an interesting event, which implies that he may have regretted the im-
possibility of sentencing the conspirators to death by law. He states that when it came to 
punishing the conspirators, there was no article in the penal code regarding the punish-
ments of those who assassinate the sultan, so their penalty was limited to confinement in 
a fortress or forced labor. When Âli and Fuad Pashas asked Cevdet if there was an article 
to execute the conspirators, Cevdet reminded them of an earlier conversation between 
himself and Şevket Pasha,70 which had taken place during the preparation of the penal 
                                               
70 Şevket Pasha was a member of Tanzimat Assembly (Meclis-i Tanzimat).  
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code (Tezakir II, 83). Cevdet noted that French penal codes do sentence those culprits 
who attempt to assassinate a sovereign with capital punishment, and that the project of 
the Ottoman penal code was in fact planned in line with the French code. However, when 
Cevdet had read the draft law to the committee, Şevket Pasha had opposed it by arguing, 
“No one should imagine the possibility of the assassination of the sultan. It would not be 
appropriate to write it in the code and declare it.”71 Cevdet continues that due to Şevket 
Pasha’s objection, articles related to the sultan were excluded, which following the Kuleli 
incident led to the regret of Âli and Fuad Pashas, who had been present in the committee, 
for having listened to Şevket Pasha (Tezakir II, 83).  
 
When Cevdet mentions Âli and Fuad Pashas’ regret, he in fact implies that Şevket Pasha 
had been wrong for objecting to including such an article in the code. As can be seen, 
instead of trying to understand the psychology and motivation behind the reaction of the 
conspirators who were uneasy about the social effects of the reform movement, Cevdet’s 
statist view leads him to adopt a merciless attitude towards them. As might be expected, 
this kind of an attitude was not unique to this case. Neumann (2000) states that in his 
Tarih-i Cevdet as well it is not possible to come across any passages in which Cevdet 
shows tolerance toward those who protest against policies implemented by the sultan. He 
never approves the active participation in a rebellion against the center (p. 97). 
 
As another point, according to Mardin (2017), this event preoccupied the minds of the 
Ottoman reformists for a long time (p. 100). However, Cevdet seems to be engaged only 
in the issue of their punishment and disregards the motivation and ideology of such a 
mixed group, which included the generation of young intellectuals (Berkes 2017, 273). 
Most probably, the swift suppression of the event caused no concern for Cevdet and led 
him to occupied with their penalty. 
 
 
3.4 The Syrian Uprising of 1860 
 
                                               
71 “Bu bahsi okuduğumda Meclis-i Tanzimat ezâsından merhum Şevket Paşa “Padişah hakkında sû’-i kasd kimsenin 
hatırına gelmemelidir. Bunu kanuna yazıp ilân etmek münâsib olmaz” demekle kanunda hükümdârâna mahsus olan 
maddeler tayy-ettirilmiş idi” (Tezakir II, 83). 
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The steps taken toward administrative modernization and centralization to ensure a last-
ing stability for the empire could not prevent its progressive disintegration after 1856. 
Although several regions, provinces, and principalities stayed within the borders of the 
Ottoman state, they gradually loosened their connections with the center. Uprisings in 
Lebanon and Damascus were among the cases that indicated this gradual dissolution by 
paving the way for foreign intervention (Hanioğlu 2008, 85). In Mount Lebanon, skir-
mishes between the Druze and Maronites were followed by attacks on Christians in Da-
mascus (Akarlı 1993, 30), resulting in more than five thousand casualties among the 
Christians (Zürcher 2003, 86). 
 
Lebanon had a religiously mixed population and experienced the emergence of one of the 
most urgent crises of the early Tanzimat era. The first severe conflict between Christian 
Maronites and the Druze72 happened in 1841 following the evacuation of the Egyptian 
troops. The promises of the Tanzimat edict about the official impartiality toward Muslims 
and non-Muslims were perceived by Europeans as a right to intervene on behalf of the 
Christians, who revolted against their Druze overlords. In 1842 the French, British, Rus-
sian, Austrian, and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul met with the Ottoman foreign min-
ister to find an acceptable remedy to the problems of Mount Lebanon. The decision of 
the parties involved was on the separation of the “Christian” and “Druze” districts as 
north and south due to the irreconcilability of the Druze and Maronite positions (Akarlı 
1993, 27-28).  
 
However, this arrangement proved an ineffective solution for the mountain’s problems. 
The communal separation created a new kind of consciousness among the subjects and 
resulted in new rebellions (Akarlı 1993, 28-29). In 1859, villagers from the Maronite 
northern area, stressing their understanding of the Tanzimat, demanded “equality and the 
abolition of elite privilege” vis-á-vis the Druze. The uprising spread to the other districts 
and the conflict turned into a full-scale communal war, which created new animosities. 
                                               
72 “Maronite Christians, a historical Eastern church long united with Rome, were especially numerous in the northern 
part of the Lebanon range and also lived in the Druze-controlled south. The Druzes, by origin an Islamic splinter sect, 
were found in the southern part of the Lebanon range and other parts of southwestern Syria” (Findley 2010, 79). 
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In 1860, the Druze won a victory, even murdering Muslim elites who collaborated with 
Christian rebels (Findley 2010, 79-80). 
 
In 1860, news of the events and a stream of rumors spread to Damascus (Fawaz 1994, 
78) and led to a deterioration of relations between Damascene Muslims and Christians. 
Due to the effects of reforms and the socioeconomic changes of various communities, the 
atmosphere in Damascus as well was already ripe for a possible clash. As Leila Fawaz 
(1994) states, the declaration of equality among all subjects, the imposition of conscrip-
tion on Muslims and the remission of non-Muslims from it, and the expanding gap in 
wealth between the Christians, who were growing rich, and the Muslims, had built up 
tension among the religious communities in Damascus (p. 100).  
 
The spread and distortion of the news of the war in Lebanon in every quarter and corner 
of the city increased the violence, and people became worried that there would be trouble 
in Damascus as well (Fawaz 1994, 81). According to Fawaz (1994), many people tried to 
take measures to neutralize the hostilities. For instance, Emir Abd al-Qadir (1808-1883), 
who was the Algerian hero who had put up a resistance to the French conquest of Algeria 
between 1830 and 1847, made the rounds of the ulema, Muslim notables, and the leaders 
of different quarters to be able to preclude violence. He also tried every diplomatic means 
to get the situation under control. However, the governor Ahmed Pasha was the one indi-
vidual who had the power to change the course of events but, he took only a few preven-
tive measures. Moreover, not only him, but other officers in charge failed to realize the 
“ugly mood” in Damascus on the eve of the riots (pp. 82-83).  
 
Although Cevdet does not give details about the conflict between Maronites and Druze, 
he talks about the uprising that broke out in Damascus. However, what he mentions is not 
the background of the case, but how it was suppressed by Fuad Pasha. According to 
Cevdet, “due to the Islahat edict the Syrian Christians became spoiled, leading to the 
enmity between them and the Muslim people” (Maruzat, 22-23).73 When Fuad Pasha was 
assigned to get the conflict between Maronites and Druze under control, and hence went 
                                               
73 “Islâhat Fermânı hükmünce Suriye Hristiyanları şımarıp ehl-i islâm ile aralarında zuhûr eden husûmetden nâşî…” 
(Maruzat 22-23). 
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to Syria,74 a rebellion broke out in Damascus. Muslims attacked Christians, killing them 
and plundering their neighborhoods. Therefore, Fuad Pasha had to proceed to Damascus 
to suppress the uprising. However, the situation was critical and Fuad Pasha found him-
self in a position to order his Muslim troops to attack local Muslim people. Thus, before 
heading to Damascus, Fuad Pasha gave a speech to his army in order to have their 
thoughts and actions under control: 
 
“Friends, the inhabitants (ahali) of these regions have contradicted the sul-
tan’s will by causing sedition (fitne) and massacres. I have been appointed by 
our sultan to be a commander with you to bring peace and security to this area 
and to punish the sins of the group because of their cruel acts… A soldier is 
the hand of the sultan. The sultan’s hand is justice. He strikes at the oppressor. 
He cares for the oppressed. Let us consider all our citizens to be the same and 
demonstrate our sultan’s justice and the worth and value of his soldier to eve-
rybody.” (Tezakir II, 110)75 
 
After giving this speech, Fuad Pasha reached Damascus with the available soldiers and 
entered the city by force. He executed several hundred Muslims, including the governor 
of Damascus Ahmed Pasha, and exiled many of the notables (Tezakir II, 110; Maruzat, 
23). 
 
Cevdet’s state-centered approach to this event reveals itself in a different way from the 
previous cases. For such an issue, that ended quite severely, he does not question the 
genuine reasons behind, or the brutal results of Fuad Pasha’s actions. According to Us-
sama Makdisi (2000), Cevdet is among those historians who glosses over “the problem-
atic nature of Ottoman rule in the periphery of the empire” when it comes to the Syrian 
issue. Moreover, he is also among those who “justifies Fuad Pasha’s brutal restoration of 
order in Syria” (p. 168).  
 
                                               
74 At the time, Syria was the name of the region including today’s Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
75 “Arkadaşlar; Buraların ahâlisi Pâdişâh’ımızın rızâsının hilafına olarak bi fitne çıkarıp cidâl ü kıtâle sebeb olmuş ve 
bir takım harekât-ı gaddârâneye cesâret etmiş olduklarından kabahatlileri te’dib etmek ve memleketin âsâyiş ve 
istirâhatini yerine getirmek için Padişah’ımız Efendimiz sizinle berâber beni memur eyledi… Asker Padişah’ın elidir. 
Padişah’ın eli adâlettir. Zâlimi vurur. Mazlûmu tutar. Hep vatandaşlarımızı bir bilip Padişah’ımızın adâleti ve askerinin 
kadr ü kıymetini ne olduğunu herkese gösterelim” (Tezakir II, 110).  
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Indeed, Cevdet declares that Fuad Pasha “disciplined” the leading soldiers who failed to 
fulfill their task. Together with them, governor Ahmed Pasha was also executed by shoot-
ing (Tezakir II, 111). Instead of pitying him, Cevdet even implies that Ahmed Pasha re-
ceived his due with this execution (Tezakir II, 112). It is quite likely that Cevdet was 
aware of the fact that Fuad Pasha did not only “discipline” those who were put to death, 
but also the masses of Syria in order to reaffirm the absolute sovereignty of the sultan in 
the Ottoman periphery (Makdisi 2000, 147). 
 
 
3.5 An Analysis of Cevdet’s Statist Attitude 
 
 
Cevdet was a bureaucratic statesman whose concern was to protect and promote the sur-
vival of his state and the sultan. Therefore, he cared greatly about the security of the 
empire in all three cases examined in this chapter. One of the results of this stance was to 
see, interpret, and record the events from a state-centered angle. While dealing with these 
three cases, Cevdet makes the reader feel this statist attitude very strongly. He gives the 
impression that he looks down on the people from the center. Therefore, to him, people 
are not reliable subjects, and it is not legitimate for them to voice their opinions. This 
point also explains why Cevdet was against a constitutional regime and the Young Otto-
mans, who represented a form of political protest by voicing articulate criticisms of the 
government, since Cevdet was against the participation of the subjects in politics. Because 
of this, he did not hesitate to label their actions “mischief” and “sedition” without consid-
ering their background motivations.  
 
At this point, Cevdet cannot be dissociated from the state ideology. Since the official 
ideology of the empire will be examined in detail in the fifth chapter of the thesis, it will 
be very briefly mentioned here to be able give meaning to Cevdet’s attitudes. As İnalcık 
(1978) states, in the eyes of the Ottoman statesmen the values that needed to be protected 
by the monarch were social order and security under justice (p. 43). “Justice” was a key 
concept in the way they viewed society, since this notion represented stability and har-
mony more than anything else, which was achieved only by statecraft which kept every 
community and individual in society in his realm (within his borders), without intruding 
on the others’ rights (İnalcık 1978, 42) From this point of view, any change in the social 
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order had unfavorable implications. Therefore, Ottoman writers immediately labeled any 
social or religious opposition fitne (Zürcher 2003, 29).  
 
It is clear that Cevdet’s attitude toward the reactions to reform measures justified this 
understanding. Cevdet adopts a conservative and traditional political outlook and de-
scribes the Mecca Rebellion and the Kuleli incident as fitne without any hesitation. To 
him, those who planned an opposition movement or were involved in it were nothing else 
but “rebellious” or “abominable,” without any exception. Although Cevdet did not label 
the inhabitants of Syria as such immediately, Fuad Pasha does not omit to define their 
movement as fitne. At this point, Cevdet served the state ideology in a different way; by 
justifying Fuad Pasha’s brutal actions. 
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4. CEVDET’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TANZIMAT-ERA OTTOMAN 
SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF REFORMS 
 
 
 
Throughout the Tanzimat era, reforms in almost all units of the state brought about a 
change in social life. Despite the fact that Cevdet was one of the prominent figures who 
assisted the state in the application of the reforms, he criticized the social effects of this 
process. However, while criticizing, his main focus mostly pertained to the Westerniza-
tion of lifestyles and the increase in “extravagance” which could be observed in the big 
cities such as İstanbul and İzmir. Since Cevdet had spent most of his life in İstanbul, his 
accounts of Tanzimat society in Tezakir and Maruzat are mostly about İstanbul society.  
 
When Cevdet was sent to Bosnia and Çukurova as a state official, he had a chance to get 
into contact with different strata of the local society. Both of Cevdet’s missions were part 
of the state’s centralization policies in accordance with the reform movements. In Bosnia, 
Cevdet aimed to rehabilitate the relationship between the state and the Bosnians (Gölen 
2013, 202). In the Çukurova region, the comprehensive program that was followed 
throughout the operations was designed to strengthen the ties between the state and the 
nomadic tribes of the region (Kasaba 2012, 20). From the perspective of the central gov-
ernment, strong ties with the periphery meant the solution of the existing problems. 
 
Cevdet, with a state-centered view toward society, had taken the responsibility to fulfill 
the demands of the center in both of these missions. Since the demand was to see more 
obedient subjects, Cevdet got in contacted with the leaders and the local people in these 
regions. However, there seems to be a difference in Cevdet’s attitude toward the people 
of these two separate regions, as Cevdet tends to be more conciliatory in Bosnia when 
compared with his manners in Çukurova.  
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In this chapter, first Cevdet’s points about Istanbul society will be taken into considera-
tion. Then, his attitude toward the society of Bosnia and Çukurova will be examined and 
compared. It is also important to state that Cevdet’s Bosnia and Kozan missions are wide-
ranging enough to be the topic of a separate thesis. However, since the aim of this chapter 
is to analyze how Cevdet saw and interpreted the society of the Tanzimat era in the con-
text of reforms, the focus will be limited to a few points regarding these regions. 
 
 
4.1 The Social Situation in İstanbul 
 
 
Although there had already been consumption of Western goods in Ottoman Istanbul in 
the previous centuries, its volume was limited. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
especially after the introduction of free trade in 1838 and the reduction of import tariffs, 
the economy of the empire was exposed to a fast expansion of European imports (Exert-
zoglou 2003, 79-80). Moreover, the advent of steamships during the same century facili-
tated the arrival of these imports to Ottoman port cities (Gökçek 1996, 40). Together with 
these developments, the increasing influence of the West in political, economic, and so-
cial terms resulted in the extensive use of Western commodities. Consequently, the con-
sumption habits of the society in port cities such as Beirut (Issawi 1988, 164-165), İstan-
bul, and İzmir were reshaped, and a new pattern of lifestyles emerged (Exertzoglou 2003, 
79-80). 
 
However, the development of new lifestyles and consumption patterns led to the harsh 
reactions of various groups (Exertzoglou 2003, 82). In many of the existing literature of 
the Tanzimat era, these changes are called “alafrangalaşmak” (Westernization), and are 
regarded as “moral corruption.” For Cevdet as well, the Westernization of social life rep-
resents immorality. What Cevdet opposes is essentially the adaptation of Western ways 
of life and its resultant effect on consumption, which Cevdet calls “lavishness.” 
 
For this reason, when talking about social life in İstanbul, Cevdet is mostly critical about 
the economic and moral transformations, with a focus on the rise of “horrible extrava-
gance” and the abandonment of old socio-economic habits. Interestingly, he attempts to 
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explain these changes by merely concentrating on how the arrival of Europeans and Egyp-
tians to İstanbul “negatively” influenced the society. First of all, it is important to look at 
Cevdet’s descriptions in Tezakir: 
 
“Shopping in Istanbul increased, and shopkeepers became rich. Many pashas, 
gentlemen, and ladies from the Mehmed Ali Pasha dynasty came to Istanbul 
and spent a lot of money. In this way, they became a model for profligate 
people in Istanbul… The Egyptian ladies were interested in European-style 
(alafranga) dresses and expensive jewelry. The women of İstanbul, including 
the palace ladies, imitated them. Most Egyptians bought houses, waterside 
residences, and various properties for high prices. Therefore, real estate prices 
have increased in İstanbul. A deceptive fortune has emerged… However, the 
import-export balance was broken. Large amounts of money went to Europe 
continuously. But the officers did not consider the end of this situation, be-
cause they were already getting their salaries at the beginning of the month. 
Tradesmen and merchants also gained high amounts due to the high number 
of purchases. In summer evenings, the Bosphorus and recreation areas was 
completely full of people. Everyone stayed away from grief and sadness. Is-
tanbul was like heaven. Especially when the Şirket-i Hayriyye ferries started 
to work throughout the Bosphorus, the value of the seaside residences re-
markably increased” (Tezakir I, 20-21) (my own translation). 
 
Cevdet mentions the same issue in Maruzat as well and argues that those who came from 
Egypt debased the morality of the inhabitants of İstanbul and caused great damage to the 
state and the community (Maruzat, 7-8). Additionally, he talks about the effect of Euro-
pean soldiers in İstanbul: 
 
“When the French and British soldiers came to İstanbul during the Crimean 
War, they spent money like water. Hence, shopkeepers in İstanbul made a 
pile of money. At the time, the wedding and circumcision ceremonies of the 
palace also helped storekeepers and jewelers earn extraordinary amounts of 
money. As a result, these classes of people also got used to living their lives 
like dignitaries and began to rent seaside residences throughout the Bospho-
rus… Therefore, it was almost impossible to find a place to rent in the Bos-
phorus” (Maruzat, 8) (my own translation). 
 
Furthermore, the rising popularity of Western products of clothing created new fashions 
in textiles, which led some tailors to follow the European dressmakers (Exertzoglou 2003, 
80). Cevdet’s daughter Fatma Aliye (1994) mentions that the interest in Western-style 
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attire created new trends that affected women, including the palace ladies (p. 101). To-
gether with this trend, women began to wear silk feraces76 and transparent veils. Accord-
ing to Cevdet, this situation was a “moral corruption” and a “violation of Islamic values” 
that caused discomfort among the Muslim population. He asserts that this annoyance 
reached such a point that Âli Pasha had to make a declaration to warn the women to dress 
properly (Tezakir II, 87). 
 
Moreover, Cevdet is also critical of the adoption of European-style home furnishings. In 
this period, people from the upper classes began to import furniture from France. Shortly 
afterwards, furniture craftsmen in İstanbul began to produce Western style furniture, such 
as chairs and tables, to meet this demand (Faroqhi 2005, 288). However, Cevdet believes 
that these furnishings are costly. Formerly, Ottomans had used cushions, which were easy 
for carrying. However, according to Cevdet, when people began to use sofas and chairs 
like Westerners the costs increased, since those sofas and chairs were easily broken when 
people moved them to their winter or summer houses, necessitating costly repairs. An-
other example is about dining sets. Cevdet notes that embracing Western-style dining sets 
did not result in the disuse of old ones, and thus he believes that trying to attain both kinds 
of sets also increased expenses (Maruzat, 10). 
 
 
4.1.1 An Analysis of Cevdet’s Limited Focus 
 
Considering these depictions, it is significant to analyze Cevdet’s point of view when he 
looks at the society. First of all, what is noteworthy is that when Cevdet talks about Is-
tanbul society, it is difficult to come across issues related to ordinary people’s lives in his 
accounts. The picture he depicts is mostly related to the Istanbul elite, of which he is also 
a member. Considering the growth of İstanbul's population from 400,000 in 1840 to 
around 900,000 in 1890 (Findley 2008, 35), the question of “how many of these people 
could experience the life that Cevdet depicts” comes to mind.  
 
                                               
76 Ferace is a long, full coat worn by Turkish women at the time. 
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Secondly, as mentioned above, these kinds of criticisms and reactions were not unique to 
Cevdet. Şerif Mardin (1991) asserts that in many traditional sources written in the Tan-
zimat era, it is common to regard “consumption” as immorality (p. 48). For instance, 
Ahmed Midhat Efendi’s novel, Felâtun Bey ile Râkım Efendi, written in 1876, is regarded 
as the first novel that deals with the problematic “alafranga” type. According to Berna 
Moran (1998), the main contrast in the novel is built on frugality and diligence versus 
prodigality and laziness (p. 28). Therefore, Cevdet’s descriptions related to İstanbul so-
ciety shows how the first appearance of Western lifestyles and their consequential con-
sumption in the empire shocked many Ottomans (Mardin 1991, 49). 
 
Lastly, it is a fact that, throughout the Tanzimat era, the adoption of the military and 
administrative structure of the West brought about a change in social terms, in that people 
from the upper and middle classes began to embrace the daily culture of the West in the 
big cities. European styles of clothing, imported household goods, the spending of major 
sums, and Western-style houses (Mardin 1991, 15) transformed the traditional habits of 
society. However, social transformation was not limited to these. As İlber Ortaylı (1983) 
rightly points out, the new life-style that began in İstanbul and in the large port cities 
cannot be reduced only to the adaptation of European-style furniture and table manners 
or to the change in consumption habits (pp. 179-181). Intellectuals of the time believed 
that Western civilization was not only advanced in industry and technique, but also in 
education and literature (Moran 1998, 6). 
 
Thus, educational reforms were implemented and the rate of literacy increased. While the 
madrasas continued to produce the old type of intellectuals, the state opened new educa-
tional institutions. Except for the Council’s Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası), up until 
the 1830s all educational institutions established by the state were only military schools 
(Somel 2015, 43). Starting from 1839, the government began to establish the first civilian 
public schools to be able to train a cadre of civil servants for the new administrative struc-
ture which was being formed at the time (Somel 2015, 35). 
 
After 1856, which represented a turning point in the history of education in the empire, a 
series of educational reforms were carried out. For instance, the Ministry of Education 
was established (Somel 2015, 66) as a bureaucratic institution independent from the 
ulama (Somel 2015, 71). In 1859, the Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şâhâne (Faculty of Political 
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Science) was opened to educate young officers in various fields such as law, economics, 
history, statistics, etc. The Mekteb-i Sultânî (the present-day Galatasaray High School) 
was opened in 1868 for Muslim and non-Muslim students to study together (Somel 2015, 
77-78). In 1869, the Ministry of Education decided to establish the rüşdiyes (junior high 
school) for girls in İstanbul. In 1870, the Darülmuallimat (Women Teachers' Training 
School) was opened to meet the need for women teachers for the girls’ rüşdiyes (Somel 
2015, 84-85). These institutions offered secular education, and thus raised a new type of 
intellectual. 
 
Communication opportunities had increased and the modernist intelligentsia had the 
chance to be heard through the emerging print media (Findley 2008, 35). Novels, as a 
new genre, entered Ottoman literature as translations and imitations of Western novels 
(Moran 1998, 6). Muslim women also experienced similar changes as young women and 
girls began to access secular public education thanks to the aforementioned girls’ rüşdiyes 
and Darülmuallimat. Women from modest backgrounds were increasingly learning 
Western languages (Akşit 2013, 136). 
 
Upper class women began to be more visible in public space (Ortaylı 1983, 179). In fact, 
Cevdet’s well-educated daughters Fatma Aliye and Emine Semiye were concrete exam-
ples of this. His older daughter Fatma Aliye (1862-1924) was an intellectual who won 
fame as writer and poet77 (Aykut 2018, 183-187; Cihan 2007, 45). She was in touch with 
the intellectuals of the time, and hosted eminent foreign ladies who came to visit İstanbul 
and the wives of ambassadors in her house (Ortaylı 1983, 174). Emine Semiye (1864-
1944) was a teacher who wrote various articles and books on education and women (Ci-
han 2007, 45). 
 
Cevdet, on the other hand, related the visibility of women in social life solely to the de-
crease of pederasty in society and the increase in the number of womanizers and romantic 
affections between people of the opposite sex (Maruzat, 9).78 However, the integration of 
women into social life had a much more significant outcome. The socio-cultural change 
                                               
77 For details of Fatma Aliye’s works, consult to: (Aykut 2018, 182-187). 
78 “Zen-dostlar çoğalup mahbûblar azaldı… Sultan Ahmed-i Sâlis zamânından berü mu’tâd olan Kâğıdhâne seyri 
ziyâde rağbet buldu. Gerek orada gerek Bâyezid meydânında arabalara işâretlerle mu’âşaka usûlü hayli meydân aldı” 
(Maruzat, 9).  
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brought by the Tanzimat era was a golden period that prepared new roles for women, at 
least for the upper and middle classes (Ortaylı 1983, 182). In other words, the changes in 
social life led by modernization were not merely about the issues that Cevdet points out, 
but had more complex results for society.  
 
 
4.2 Cevdet’s Inspectorship in Bosnia 
 
 
As a result of the conquests of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, a major part of the 
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina became Muslims, and played the role of a strategic 
fulcrum of the Ottoman regime in the Balkans. (Gölen 2010, 43). Being a border region, 
the state attached importance to Bosnia, which resulted in the increasing power and in-
fluence of these local Muslims in the region. In particular, the need to defend the frontiers 
led to the establishment of military farms called kapudanlık and the increasing influence 
of the local Muslim begs. These begs formed a new noble class by capturing the land 
around them with the military power they held. (Gölen 2010, 53). 
 
Furthermore, other Muslims of different ethnicities had come to Bosnia as janissaries, 
civil servants, or refugees from the Hungarian territories which were lost to Habsburg 
control. Because many of them, especially the janissaries, were trained warriors, the cen-
tral government experienced great trouble in imposing its requests on the provincial gov-
ernment. In the eighteenth century, Bosnian military elements often came into conflict 
with the central government. This situation was to go on until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Despite the presence of Muslim control over Bosnia, the Sublime Porte could 
not trust the region for support against the neighboring Christian powers (Jelavich 1995, 
348).  
 
When Mahmud II decided to abolish the Janissary corps, the resistance of the Bosnians 
was harsh, since this was contrary to the privileged status of the local ayans and endan-
gered the position of the Bosnian military class. The Muslim landholders and the military 
united and resisted Ottoman central, which led to uprisings (Turhan 2013, 105-114). Fur-
thermore, when the Tanzimat edict reached Bosnia, Bosnian Muslims began to oppose 
the state, since implementation of the edict meant they would lose their privileges vis-à-
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vis the non-Muslims, and Muslim domination over the Christian Serbs and Croats would 
terminate. In particular, the articles about the, military service, and, most importantly, the 
equality of all subjects disturbed them considerably. In other words, the proclamation of 
the edict escalated tensions between the state and the Bosnians (Gölen 2009, 465). 
 
The local Muslim leaders opposed the above-mentioned centralizing measures and the 
wishes of the central government for the full application of the Tanzimat reforms in Bos-
nia, which led to a major rebellion against the center in 1849 that lasted for three years. 
(Jelavich 1995, 349). To suppress the rebellion, the Ottoman government sent one of its 
most efficient governors, Ömer Pasha Latas, to Bosnia. Within a year, in 1851, Ömer 
Pasha thoroughly crushed the rebellion and sent many of the begs into exile in Anatolia 
(Noel 1996, 124). These Muslim begs were defeated in such a way that they could never 
regain their former strength (Gölen 2009, 479). 
 
In 1863, the state appointed Cevdet to Bosnia as an inspector with broad authority to 
eliminate a series of problems and rehabilitate the relationship between the center and the 
Bosnians. One of his main tasks was to solve the recruitment (Maruzat, 80). Although 
there are various issues concerning Cevdet’s inspectorship in Bosnia, in the scope of this 
chapter the focus will be on his attitude toward the local society while he was trying to 
solve the problem of recruitment. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Resolution of the Recruitment Problem thanks to Cevdet’s Social 
Analyses 
 
Sultan Mahmud II had abolished the janissary corps, which was heavily politicized in 
time, with a decree on 17 June 1826, and a new military organization, the Asâkir-i Man-
sûre-i Muhammediye (the Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad), was established (Heinzel-
mann 2009, 39). Two months afterwards, separate edicts were sent to Bosnia for the abo-
lition of the jannisaries and the establishment of the Asâkir-i Mansure there. However, 
this situation caused uprisings that spread throughout the province, because the Bosnians 
did not want the application of these edicts. They rejected the decree completely and de-
clared that they did not want to do military service outside the borders of Bosnia and 
would not wear new uniforms (Gölen 2010, 61-62). 
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Although the rebellions were suppressed, the issue of recruiting soldiers continued to be 
a problem for the state up until Cevdet Pasha's inspectorship, because this was one of the 
main reasons for the revolts of Muslim begs in Bosnia (Gölen 2010, 117). For this reason, 
one of the center’s expectations from Cevdet’s Bosnian inspectorship was to solve this 
problem (Maruzat, 80). 
 
In Sarajevo, Cevdet took a close interest in this issue. He noticed that the state had run 
around in circles for many years in Bosnia, because to him the government officers who 
were in charge of the region had not analyzed the actual reasons behind the problem of 
recruitment. Thus, to solve the problem thoroughly, he observed society very closely and 
tried to understand the roots of this situation. For example, he aimed to figure out the 
reasons why Bosnians were afraid of military service. He discovered that since they had 
never left their hometown, they were anxious to be sent to distant regions such as Arabia 
or Kurdistan (Maruzat, 81). 
 
Furthermore, he understood that the first thing to do was to convince the notables of the 
provinces in Bosnia, because the Bosnians held them in high esteem. Then, he noticed 
that religious leaders and hodjas also had a strong influence on the people. Moreover, he 
noticed that boys who were to perform their military duty were influenced by their girl-
friends (Maruzat, 81-84). 
 
Cevdet’s close observations of Bosnian society enabled him to solve the problem in a 
short time. For instance, he encouraged the imams to preach sermons about the signifi-
cance of fighters in Islam (Maruzat, 85).79 As an incentive, had the uniforms of the sol-
diers designed in green, as he noticed that the Bosnians were fond of that color. The peo-
ple, especially young girls, liked these green uniforms very much and they wanted to see 
their boyfriends in them. In addition to this, he ordered that green gowns be given as 
presents to the imams and hodjas of the Hüsrev Bey Mosque, which is the foremost 
                                               
79 “Hüsrev Bey Câmi’-i şerîfinde va’z eden ve tefsir okutan hoca efendiler, mücâhidîn ve mürâbıtînin fezâiline dâir 
halka va’z u nasîhat eyleyerek “Şüphesiz ki Allah, kendi yolunda, birbirine kenetlenmiş bir bina gibi, saf bağlayarak 
çarpışanları sever” âyet-i kesmesini tefsîr ile Boşnakları askerliğe teşvîk ve ta’lîmin fezâilini beyân etmekde oldukları 
hâlde…” (Maruzat, 85).  
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mosque in Sarajevo (Maruzat, 85-86). All of these things played a role in encouraging 
boys to serve in the army. 
 
Furthermore, Cevdet met with Bosnian notables and they exchanged ideas. As a result of 
these twenty-four-day negotiations, they made decisions by paying attention to the local 
people’s sensitive expectations. Consequently, this problem, which the state had not been 
able to solve for forty years, was solved (Tezakir III, 38-39; Maruzat 84-91). 
 
Although the problem was solved and a committee was created to determine how many 
soldiers would be recruited to the army from Sarajevo, Cevdet admitted that he was afraid 
that there might still be a rebellion when it came time to implement it. To guard against 
this possibility, he encouraged the Bosnians by giving speeches. In one speech, for in-
stance, Cevdet talked about the history of the Bosnians, their untainted moral values, and 
their positive features. He also stressed that he was upset because although many great 
personalities had emerged among the Bosnians in the past, they had fallen behind in re-
cent times (Maruzat, 95-96). Two days later, in another speech, Cevdet said to people, “I 
do not need to talk about the courage and heroism of the Bosnians. History is the witness 
of it. This is something known and accepted by all. Their missing side is only in drills” 
(Maruzat, 97).80 As Cevdet reports, the Bosnians became enthusiastic about recruitment 
after listening to these speeches and they volunteered willingly to enroll in the military 
(Maruzat, 98).  
 
Although other actions of this kind by Cevdet can be enumerated, the above-mentioned 
example is enough to understand his attitude toward Bosnian society. As can be seen, 
Cevdet displayed a tendency to be conciliatory toward society to be able to solve the 
recruitment problem. He appears to have handled the problems of Bosnians tactfully by 
observing their sensitivities. This point is significant when compared with Cevdet’s atti-
tude toward the people in the Çukurova region. Therefore, it is useful to examine Cevdet’s 
Çukurova mission and then compare the similarities and differences of his attitude toward 
the societies of these two separate geographies. 
 
                                               
80 “Boşnakların şecâatlerinden bahse hâcet göremem, târihler buna şâhiddir. Ve her yerde ma’lûm u müsellem olan 
mevâddandır. Anların noksânı, yalnız ta’lîmdedir” (Maruzat, 97).  
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4.3 Cevdet’s Mission to the Çukurova Region 
 
 
In the middle of the nineteenth century the central government was unable to control the 
Çukurova region and the surrounding mountains. The nomads and the highlanders of the 
region neither paid their taxes nor served in the Ottoman army. It was reported that since 
the state was not able to collect taxes, the Adana Province owed ten million piasters to 
the state treasury in 1852. In the entire region, banditry was widespread. When the Turk-
men tribes moved between the coastal plains and the summer pastures of Uzunyayla, 
which were in fact located in the southern parts of Sivas Province, they took everything 
they could seize by force along the way. Armed gangs occupied strategic points on the 
road so that when passengers were travelling to Mecca for the pilgrimage, they were 
robbed in Payas (in present-day Hatay), at the pass of Mount Gavur. To put it simply, the 
entire region was in turmoil and anarchy (Dumont 1981, 370). 
 
In 1865, the government took action for the pacification and sedentarization of Çukurova. 
For this, a very large task force with a military unit under the command of Derviş and 
Cevdet Pashas was assembled and sent to Çukurova. (Orhonlu 1978, 115). According to 
Hakan Erdem (2017), it is not surprising that this expedition was related to the debate 
concerning those who were eligible to be recruited for military service. As Cevdet reports 
that although the Islahat Edict required the recruitment of non-Muslims to the army, the 
implementation process of this provision had not been entirely decided and hence had not 
yet been put into practice. As the number of young people in the military had decreased 
and the government had fallen short of finding people to recruit, this issue came up again 
in the council of ministers (havass-ı vükelâ) under the chairmanship of Fuad Pasha (Ma-
ruzat, 113).  
 
When Cevdet was asked about his ideas in the council, he listed many objections to the 
idea of mixing Muslims and non-Muslims within the same military unit.81 Instead, he 
offered a different solution to overcome the deficit of soldiers. This was to take the Kozan, 
Mount Gavur (the present-day Amanos Mountains), Mount Kürd, Mount Akça, and Der-
sim regions under military control to be able to recruit soldiers and to unburden those 
                                               
81 For details of his objections, see: (Maruzat, 113-115). 
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who were obedient to the state. Cevdet gave the example of Bosnia, where he had been 
able to form two regiments in his previous task (Maruzat, 115). As a result, in the council, 
it was decided to send Cevdet to the Kozan region, for which a special fighting force 
called the Fırka-i Islâhiyye (Division of Reform) was formed (Maruzat, 116). In other 
words, the main aim of Cevdet’s mission was the pacification of the Çukurova region to 
be able to recruit soldiers. In the second place, the goal was to collect taxes regularly, to 
end banditry in order to secure local transportation, and to settle the nomadic tribes in the 
region (Dumont 1981, 370-371). In particular for Cevdet, the goal was to delay the par-
ticipation of non-Muslims in military service as long as possible (Erdem 2017). 
 
Just as in his mission in Bosnia, Cevdet had a chance to make contact with local people 
and observe their lifestyles and social habits closely. However, it can be said that Cevdet’s 
statist attitude toward the local people of this region resulted in the adoption of a harsher 
attitude. In particular, when compared with his Bosnia inspectorship, Cevdet’s reconcil-
iatory manners were felt less in the Çukurova region.  
 
 
4.3.1 Cevdet’s Attitude Toward the Nomadic People of Çukurova 
 
The Fırka-i Islahiye reached İskenderun in 1865 and started sedentarization and reform 
projects in Mounts Gavur and Kurd (Halaçoğlu 1973, 8). Large part of the tribes in these 
regions were settled in newly established towns and villages. Then the Fırka went to the 
Kozan and Çukurova regions (Halaçoğlu 1973, 11-12), and followed the same path in 
operations. According to Yusuf Halaçoğlu (1973), the rise in the level of living standards 
of the settled tribes encouraged the other nomadic tribes to settle. Nevertheless, some 
tribes left the region due to the mistakes made by the Fırka-i Islahiye during this reform 
operation (Halaçoğlu 1973, 3). Although Halaçoğlu implies that there were mistakes, he 
does not mention what they were.  
 
When Cevdet’s state-centered view of these nomadic people is taken into consideration, 
one might get the sense of what was wrong about the way the operations were carried out. 
For instance, it can be said that if the matter was about benefits for the state, Cevdet was 
not concerned about which practices would be painful for the local society. Cevdet men-
tions that all of the tribes were forbidden to go to the highlands in Kozan, since they were 
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destroying places on the migration routes and plundering people’s properties. (Maruzat, 
147). When the leader of a tribe, Kara Kahya, set out to go to the Uzunyayla plateau with 
his tribe in the summer period, he was ordered to be shot by a battalion. His tribe was sent 
back and a large number of their animals were confiscated (Maruzat, 148). 
 
Although the tribes were allocated land for cultivation (Halaçoğlu 1996, 36), the abrupt 
settlement project was a bitter experience for them. As Sina Akşin (1997) points out, 
although Cevdet describes the sudden ban of summer and winter migrations of those 
tribes as a practice without any drawbacks, from the perspective of those people it was 
quite painful. They had been migrating because they were occupied with animal hus-
bandry, and therefore they did not know how to cultivate and irrigate the land. This sud-
den ban of migration led these nomadic tribes to suffer and made it difficult for them to 
adapt a new life (pp. 119-120). 
 
Looking at Cevdet’s arguments, he puts forward some reasons to justify these brutal op-
erations in Tezakir, listing some of the “defects” of the Kozanoğulları family. For in-
stance, he argues that: 
 
“The rule of the Kozanoğulları was an absolute and a tyrannical one and was 
not bound by any condition. The aghas did whatever they wanted. They exe-
cuted those men with whom they were angry… Although the people of Kozan 
are religious and good people, they have remained quite ignorant… The 
Kozanoğulları were getting married to more than four women. For example, 
Ömer Agha-zade Ahmed Agha married nine women…” (Tezakir III, 112).82 
 
As this quotation indicates, Cevdet’s emphasis on the “uncivilized” condition of the no-
madic tribes can be felt throughout his accounts. For instance, in a few parts Cevdet men-
tions that the people of the tribes did not know what money was83 or how to sell their 
products.84 Cevdet appears to be proud of have taught them about money and how to sell 
                                               
82 “Kozan-oğullarının hükûmet-i mutlaka-i mütegallibe olup hiç bir şart u kayd ile mukayyed değil idi. Ağalar akıllarına 
geleni yaparlar idi ve ziyâde gazap-nâk oldukları âdemi îdâm ediverirler idi… Kozan ahâlîsi mütedeyyin ve sâlih âdem-
ler ise de pek ziyade cehâlet içinde kalmış idiler… Kozanoğulları dörtten ziyâde karı alıp hattâ Ömer Ağa-zâde Ahmed 
Ağa dokuza kadar karı tezevvüc etmiş idi” (Tezakir III, 112). 
83 See: (Maruzat, 149, 154); (Tezakir III, 161). 
84 See: (Maruzat, 144); (Tezakir III, 154-155, 160). 
 91 
their products. He writes, “even the children who had not seen money realized the worth 
of it” (Maruzat, 149). 
 
Another point that reveals Cevdet’s state-centered manner concerns Yusuf Agha, who 
was one of the aghas in eastern Kozan. Cevdet describes this man as an “intriguer” (des-
sâs) who was the head of multiple armed tribes (Maruzat, 157). This man surrendered to 
the army (Maruzat, 162). Since one of the ways to ensure the permanence ofthe operation 
was to transfer the tribal leaders out of their regions and to put them on monthly salaries 
(Halaçoğlu 1996, 35), after his surrender Yusuf Agha and his family were transferred to 
Sivas at his request (Maruzat, 164). However, according to Cevdet’s reports, Yusuf Agha 
was still connected to the vagrants of Kozan, and during an outbreak of cholera he began 
to rebel. Not long after that, he was arrested (Maruzat, 168-169). After his arrest he tried 
to escape but he was shot and killed by sentries. What is striking is that Cevdet writes of 
his death that “he got what he deserved” (Maruzat, 171).85 
 
This kind of remark reveals Cevdet’s standpoint vis-à-vis the people of Kozan. Since 
Cevdet’s mission was to discipline the region for the sake of the state, he was not hesitant 
to take harsh measures even if they were painful for the local people. That is to say, while 
working on the solution to the recruitment problem in Bosna and Kozan, although both 
missions were for the sake of the state, Cevdet’s attitude toward these two separate soci-
eties is different. At this point, it is important to examine the possible reasons behind 
Cevdet’s differing attitudes. 
 
 
4.4 A Comparison of Cevdet’s Attitudes toward the Society of Bosnia and 
Çukurova 
 
 
Cevdet was sent to Bosnia on an official mission that gave him the authority to change 
the course of events. His aim was to repair the relationship between the Bosnians and the 
                                               
85 “Müte’âkıben Yusuf Ağa, yine geceleyin firâr sadedinde bulunduğu cihetle, karagol tarafından kurşun ile urulup 
i’dâm edilmiş olduğu haberi geldi. Müstahakkını bulmuş olduğu cihetle, “ne olmuş, nasıl urulmuş” deyu tafsîlâtını 
soran olmadı” (Maruzat, 171). 
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state (Gölen 2013, 202). Therefore, what was significant for Cevdet was to understand 
the reasons behind the resistance of the Bosnians to military conscription. To accomplish 
his mission successfully, he took a close look at the society and observed the social factors 
that created disturbances for the state. In other words, he followed a path that would lead 
him to reconcile with the local people. All these reasons might have helped him to exhibit 
a broader approach toward the Bosnians. 
 
Moreover, Cevdet was aware of the geo-strategic significance of Bosnia. From his notes, 
it is clear that a special importance was attached to the border regions. As it was reported 
to Cevdet, some of the Austrian officers along the border of the sanjak of Bihke (the 
present-day Bihać, Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina) were trying to dissuade Bosnian 
soldiers from accepting military service by arguing, “you assent to enroll in the military. 
However, the Ottoman State is in financial difficulty and cannot give you your stipends.” 
The Bosnian soldiers responded to such arguments that “serving for money is not proper 
according to our religion. We perform our duty for our religion and state. Our leaders in 
the province approve of our military service. The muftis of the four districts have deliv-
ered a fatwa. We cannot go back.” After citing these reports, Cevdet notes that the military 
arrangement on the borderlines was the most critical issue. Hence, when he received word 
of this conversation between Bosnian and Austrian soldiers, he trusted that other Bosnians 
would not show any hesitation if the soldiers on the border zones were indeed so deter-
mined (Maruzat, 94). 
 
If this reported conversation was indeed true, this would be another indication of the ac-
curacy of Cevdet’s observations. As Cevdet reports, the notables and the spiritual leaders 
of the Bosnian districts were influential on the local people. Thus, as mentioned, the first 
thing Cevdet did was to convince the notables, and then to encourage the hodjas and 
imams to help solve the problem, since he realized that the Bosnians displayed an utmost 
loyalty to religion (Maruzat, 84).86 
 
When it comes to Çukurova, the significance of the region was different in the sense that 
it was located geographically at the center of the empire and did not form an international 
                                               
86 “Boşnakların ahvâlini nazar-ı teftîşden geçirdiğimde gördüm ki, mütedeyyin âdemler oldukları cihetle ulemânın 
nesâyihi anlara te’sîr ediyor” (Maruzat, 84). 
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border like Bosnia. If the state could not control the region, it would not lead to an inter-
vention of foreign powers as easily as in Bosnia, but would remain mainly an internal 
problem. This is probably one of the main reasons for Cevdet’s harsher policies in Çuku-
rova. If he had not adopted a conciliatory attitude in Bosnia, the results would have been 
more serious and detrimental for the sovereignty of the state, but this risk was not as high 
in Çukurova. 
 
Furthermore, Cevdet was originally from Lofça (the present-day Lovec), Bulgaria. There-
fore, he was probably familiar with the socio-cultural understandings of Balkan culture 
and geography. On the other hand, he was a stranger to the Çukurova region, in particular 
to the nomadic lifestyle of the Turkomans. Therefore, his implication of the “uncivilized” 
situation of the unsettled people is felt throughout his accounts regarding Çukurova. Alt-
hough Cevdet regards the Bosnians as people who needed to be “educated” and “disci-
plined” (Maruzat, 84),87 from his perspective, this “education” seemed even more neces-
sary for the nomads of Çukurova. 
 
Finally, the state’s bad relationship with the nomads for the previous one and a half cen-
turies may have had an influence on Cevdet. Although in earlier periods the state had not 
undertaken an extensive policy of sedentarization (Kasaba 2009, 29), by the end of the 
seventeenth century achieving a more settled rural life had become a concern for the gov-
ernment to increase and exercise its authority (Faroqhi 2005, 15; Kasaba 2009, 54) Thus 
comprehensive orders to settle the nomads were issued at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. However, tribal members always opposed registration and settlement, as these 
were mostly followed by further pressure to pay taxes and do military service. Since that 
time their resistance had turned into the frequent organization of movements to fight 
against the Ottoman forces (Kasaba 2009, 79-80) Consequently, the nomads had long 
posed a problem for the central government, a fact that may have had an unfavorable 
effect on Cevdet’s attitudes towards them. 
 
 
                                               
87 “…Boşnakları oldukca terbiye ve hâllerini ıslâh ve Memâlik-i mahrûse’nin bir güzel bahçesi olan Bosna kıtasını 
i’mâr etmek emeline düşmüş idim” (Maruzat, 82).  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
 
To sum up, although Cevdet was one of the main actors of the Tanzimat era and served 
the state while applying reform projects, he did not welcome the social effects of the 
process. Therefore, for İstanbul society, Cevdet’s accounts are limited to his criticisms 
about the social effects of the Westernization process and its resultant influence on con-
sumption habits. When it comes to his Bosnia and Çukurova missions, he dealt with each 
society with a statist understanding. Although his aim was not different in its essence for 
both tasks, his attitude towards the two societies differs. It can be said that the center’s 
traditionally lenient approach to the Bosnians due to the geo-strategic importance of the 
region can also be seen in Cevdet’s manners, in that Cevdet tried to act according to the 
sensitive expectations of the Bosnians. Similarly, his harsher attitude toward the nomads 
of Çukurova may also be related to the influence of the state’s unfavorable relationship 
with the nomads. 
 95 
 
 
 
 
5. CEVDET PASHA IN THE BIG PICTURE OF THE OTTOMAN POLITI-
CAL THOUGHT 
 
 
 
“Fearing the sultan is a sign of wisdom (hikmet). Fearing the mother and fa-
ther is a sign of wisdom. Fearing the elders and so on is a sign of wisdom. 
Above all, there is fear of God (Maruzat, 241).”88 
 
 
The above-mentioned quotation could be considered as a quintessence of Cevdet Pasha’s 
ideological standing. This strong patriarchal understanding is felt throughout Tezakir and 
Maruzat while dealing with Cevdet’s attitude towards the sultans and society. In this re-
spect, Cevdet’s statements cannot be considered separate from the official ideology of the 
Ottoman Empire. In his famous Ahlâk-ı Alâî (“Sublime Ethics”), Ottoman scholar 
Kınalızade Ali Efendi (d. 1572) argues that it is the need of every human being to be 
tutored and shown the right path so that he may not go astray. Within the framework of 
the household, the father as the leader of communal life has to organize the affairs of the 
household and lead them through affection and rigidness, promise and threat, clemency 
and severity in order that everyone precludes depravity and struggles for virtues (Kurz 
2012, 107). 
 
When it came to the governmental level, for Kınalızade Ali Efendi and his contemporar-
ies, “sultanate” was the only from of government to meet the need for social organization 
to avert the chaos. Functioning as religious and military leader, the sultan was the corner-
stone of the entire Ottoman system and saw himself as the leader who guides his herd on 
the “straight path” (Yılmaz 2018, 152). Performing his will, his servants, played the piv-
otal role to provide welfare for even the lowliest subjects through protection and justice. 
                                               
88 “Padişahdan korkmak hikmettir. Anadan babadan korkmak hikmettir. Büyüklerden vesâirinden korkmak hikmettir. 
Ve cümlesinin başı Allah korkusudur” (Maruzat, 241). 
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Until the age of the nationalism in the nineteenth century, the empire maintained the le-
gitimate government of all its subjects consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims (Kunt 
1995, 27). 
 
In this very brief chapter, the roots of Cevdet’s notion of the “state,” “sultan,” and “sub-
jects,” as analyzed in the previous chapters, will tried to be understood by considering the 
prevailing state ideology from the beginning of the formation of the Ottoman Empire. 
Since, this issue is wide enough to be a topic of a separate thesis and necessitates a much 
more elaborate research on Cevdet’s sources as well as his Tezakir and Maruzat, it would 
not be possible to mention all aspects of the roots of Cevdet’s point of view towards these 
concepts or of the formation of the Ottoman state ideology. Therefore, firstly the devel-
opment of the state ideology will concisely be mentioned and then, Cevdet’s outlook will 
briefly be analyzed with regard to this ideology. Then, the caliphate as a means of legiti-
mization of the state power from Cevdet’s perspective will be taken into account. As the 
last point, contemporary discussions and developments in the Ottoman political thought 
will be examined by taking the Young Ottoman movement into consideration to be able 
to see the counter positions to Cevdet's authoritarian understanding. 
 
 
5.1 Development of the Ottoman State Ideology 
 
 
The emirates, emerging after the disintegration of the Seljuks in Anatolia, were under the 
cultural and political influence of both Iran and the Mamluk lands of Egypt and Syria. 
Invasion of the Timurids enlarged the range of this cultural exchange by adding it the 
Timurid Empire and many Central Asian cities (Sariyannis 2019, 44). Hence, the Otto-
man Principality as one of these emirates, was not born into a cultural vacuum. The con-
cept of state and the logic that formed the actions of the Ottoman rulers was to a great 
degree effected by ancient Turkish traditions of the state and Indo-Persian theories of rule 
and administration (Kurz 2012, 99). 
 
During the foundation period, statesman and ulama from neighboring emirates began to 
enter Ottoman intellectual life and had an effect on the ongoing transformation of the 
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Ottoman court from a tribal emirate to a kingdom. For their understanding of “govern-
ment,” which is inherited and used by the Ottomans, there were two basic models. One 
was described in Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyâsetnâme (Book of Government) which concen-
trates on practical aspects of kingship, the administration of the army, tax collection, and 
so on, with special stress on the significance of “justice” (Sariyannis 2019, 44-45)  
 
The other one was the works of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), in particular his Ihyâ al- ‘ulûm (The 
revival of knowledge) which presents a more Islamic understanding of kingship. Al-
Ghazali also highlighted “justice” as the fundamental kingly virtue, but also stressed the 
necessity of “obedience” of the subjects that “even an oppressive ruler must be obeyed 
for the sake of avoiding civil strife” (Sariyannis 2019, 45-46) In fact, most Muslim jurists 
and theologians believed that the responsibility of an Islamic ruler was to exercise power 
to protect security and peace within his empire. In return, he was owed “unconditional 
obedience” which has its roots in Sunni İslam. Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) who was the leader of 
one of the four Sunni Law Schools, for instance, asserted the duty of absolute obedience 
unless the ruler was apostate. For Ibn Hanbal, even the rule of a tyrant is valid if he is 
successful and he must be obeyed (Black 2011, 84). 
 
When it comes to the concept of “justice,” although, its place within the political thought 
gradually waned during the eighteenth century (Sariyannis 2019, 441), for the majority 
of the Ottoman centuries, it was regarded as the key aspect of the rulership. The monar-
chical domination was regarded as the guard of justice (Black 2011, 204) and repeated by 
many Ottoman scholars in different centuries. According to Tursun Beg, who was the 
Ottoman statesmen and historian of the late fifteenth century and whose viewpoints also 
formed the essence of the Ottoman political philosophy, every society has to have a sov-
ereign with absolute power. This sovereign must have the authority of issuing ordinances 
and laws other than religious law to maintain the social order and security under justice 
(İnalcık 1978, 43). 
 
Despite varying definitions of the notion of “justice,” from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
century, its prevailing meaning was to put things in the places where they belong. This 
concept represented stability and harmony more than anything else (İnalcık 1978, 42) and 
was a must for what was conceived of as “world order.” For realization of this, every 
“class” or “estate” should be maintained in its place and know its limit (hadd) (Sariyannis 
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2019, 449) since, the harmony and unity in a state was achieved solely by maintenance 
of a hierarchical society and art of governing through keeping each person in his/her 
proper place as determined by his/her skills (İnalcık 1978, 42). 
 
Since the guard of justice necessitated monarchical domination, this theoretical absolut-
ism turned into a reality by founding a sort of administration that concentrated the power 
in the sultan’s person (İnalcık 1978, 43). In fact, the Ottoman state was a clan dynasty in 
the beginning, by the mid-fifteenth century, the dynastic regime gradually transformed 
into a “patrimonial” state and hence, the relationship between the lord and vassal evolved 
into a patriarchal one between master (sultan) and slave (kul) (Tezcan 2012, 82). In this 
process, tribal characteristics paved the way for the equalization of state and ruler, and 
the power became the personal property of the ruling sultan. The sultan’s authority was 
based on the prevalent conviction that “the only way to realise [justice] was ... by means 
of an omnipotent ruler independent from all external influences, deciding and acting in 
absolute freedom, responsible only before God for his actions” (Black 2011, 204). 
 
In the writings of various Ottoman scholars on the Ottoman kingship, there was no ques-
tion whether or not the reigning sultan was deserving his position by virtue. Although 
they enumerated the virtues of individual Ottoman rulers, they did not consider them as 
necessity for rulership. Since the sultanate was seen as a grace from God, personal merit 
was not regarded as a condition for legitimacy. According to Kınalızade, for example, the 
“rulership” was a gift from God (Yılmaz 2018, 164). 
 
 
5.2 Cevdet’s Traditional Outlook 
 
 
When Cevdet’s approach in Tezakir and Maruzat is closely analyzed, the effects of this 
traditional understanding of the long-lived Ottoman state can easily be seen on his inter-
pretations and descriptions. Cevdet was in fact a scholar who got madrasah education, 
but also a high-level administrator and politician in modern sense owing to his experi-
ences in the state affairs (Neumann 2000, 37). In Chambers’ (1973) words, he was “the 
only man to have made the move from the rank of kazasker (military judge) to the rank 
 99 
of vezir” in the history of the Ottoman Empire and remained fundamentally the “transi-
tional figure” who had studied in both the madrasah and the circle of Reşid Pasha (p. 
464). Consequently, Cevdet represents an interesting case that according to Neumann 
(2009), he was both the heir of the concept of much older rulership and a member of the 
authoritarian and pragmatic Sublime Porte (p. 87) which performed as the real center of 
the government throughout the Tanzimat period. This is may be why it was possible for 
a personality like that of Cevdet to fall victim to political polarization in the early repub-
lican periods of Turkey (Neumann 2000, 10) and to be described as “a curious mixture of 
the progressive and the conservative” (Bowen 1986, 286). 
 
Throughout the thesis, it was seen that Cevdet sustains the above-mentioned traditional 
view of the Ottoman Empire towards the rulership. According to him, the ruler has legal 
immunity in all civilized societies. In particular, for a monarch who is at the same time a 
caliph, this immunity should be unquestionable. For him, the ruler gains his legitimacy 
by being an uncontested monarch. Otherwise, he would not be able to occupy his post 
(Neumann 2000, 126-127). Cevdet was loyal to traditional absolutist place of the sultan 
in the government. Thus, he approves neither of a constitutional arrangement that would 
limit the monarch’s authority nor any opposition against the sultan. According to him, 
each individual should know his limit (hadd) and obey to his leader unconditionally. To 
repeat, for Cevdet, fearing the sultan, parents, and elders was a sign of wisdom.   
 
 
5.3 Caliphate as a Tool for Legitimization of Power 
 
 
According to Cevdet, the greatness of the Ottoman Empire comes from its unification of 
the caliphate and the sultanate (Tarih-i Cevdet I, 29; Kuran 1986, 9). His stress on the 
immunity of particularly a sultan-caliph is also mentioned above. Cevdet lays an empha-
sis on the “caliphate” as an element for legitimization of the Ottoman monarch. If 
Cevdet’s remarks is remembered when he was talking about the Mecca rebellion of 1855, 
he was asserting that: 
 
“In this century, the Ottoman state remains as the sole protector of the religion 
of Islam on the globe. The Abbasid caliph also handed over the caliphate to 
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Yavuz Sultan Selim and his grandchildren in the presence of numerous Mus-
lims. Therefore, there is no doubt that those who oppose the legitimate cali-
phate of the Ottoman dynasty are rebellious (âsi) and abominable (bâğî)” (Te-
zakir I, 149).89 
 
İnalcık (2016) on the other hand, states that the issue of caliphate was in fact a compli-
cated issue, since, upon Selim I’s conquest of Egypt in 1517, Abbasid Caliph al-Muta-
wakkil did not officially hand over the caliphate to Selim I with a ceremony in the pres-
ence of people. In reality, there is no contemporary report of Selim I’s obtaining or as-
serting to obtain the caliphate from al-Mutawakkil. Instead, Selim I created a new legiti-
mizing title for himself: “servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries” Mecca and Madina (p. 
203-204). Although the Ottoman sultans was seen as the most legitimate heirs to the ca-
liphate when the Abbasid caliphate gradually disappeared (Aydın 2017, 24), according to 
İnalcık, the legend was created much later in the eighteenth century in order to support 
weakening political power (İnalcık 2016, 203).  
 
İnalcık’s argument means that when the power of the rulership was declining toward the 
nineteenth century because of internal and external reasons, the “caliphate” became a tool 
to sustain the sultan’s place in the center of the government. What attracts the attention is 
that Cevdet also uses it as an instrument when necessary for the maintenance of the tra-
ditional view of the rulership. When “incontestability” of the monarch is at stake, he puts 
an emphasis on the sultan’s title of the “caliph” to legitimize his reign and also to point 
out the necessity of obedience, since from his perspective as well, any disobedience of 
the subjects would destroy the social order and endanger the states continuity. 
 
 
5.4 Contemporary Counter Positions to Cevdet’s Authoritarian Understanding 
 
 
To position Cevdet’s ideology, statism, and patriarchal notion of authority, it is essential 
to consider the contemporary discussions and counter position to Cevdet’s authoritarian 
                                               
89 “Bu asırda ise küre-i arz üzerinde din-i islâmın hâmîsi olan yalnız bir Devlet-i Osmaniyye kalmıştır. Halife-i Abbasî 
dahi nice müslimin mahzarında Yavuz Sultan Selim’e ve a’kaabı’na emanet-i hilâfeti terk ve teslim etmişidi. 
Binâenaleyh hanedan-ı Osmanî’nin hilâfetleri meşru’ olarak muhalefet edenlerin âsi ve bâğî olduğunda şüphe yoktur” 
(Tezakir I, 149). 
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understanding in the Ottoman Empire. This is important because after the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the traditional perspective toward the authority began to be chal-
lenged. As mentioned above, the traditional outlook never accepted displacement of the 
monarch or disobedience of the subjects, and aimed to protect and promote the “obedi-
ence.” As seen in this study, Cevdet adopted a similar traditional understanding toward 
the authority. However, during Cevdet’s period, together with the modernization process, 
the understanding and the patterns of “authority” and “opposition” was changing in par-
allel with the quest for new political systems (Kara 2017, 187). 
 
During the late Tanzimat period, in the years 1867-1878, a group of Turkish intellectuals 
came into prominence (Mardin 2000, 3). This group, namely Young Ottomans, united 
owing to their common knowledge of European civilization and had concerns at the dis-
memberment of the empire. They decided to make a move against what they regarded to 
be catastrophic policies followed by the Ottoman Government (Mardin 2000, 10-11). 
They represented “a form of political protest for which there had been no precedent in the 
Ottoman Empire” through voicing their criticisms by making use of the media of mass 
communication (Mardin 2000, 4).  
 
The Young Ottomans explicated their political ideas through their writings. They relied 
on the vocabulary of Islamic political theory to a great degree and based their demands 
on the Shariah (Türköne 1994, 114). They used the words “justice” (adalet), “contract of 
investiture” (biat), “consensus of the community” (icma‘-ı ümmet), and “consultation” 
(meşveret)  (Mardin 2000, 81). However, although these concepts belong to classical Is-
lamic terminology, the Young Ottomans used them with new meanings by synthesizing 
them with modern political understanding (Türköne 1994, 102). According to İsmail Kara 
(2017), for instance, in the Islamic thought these concepts did not refer to political sys-
tems but were used for the discussions of morality. However, the Young Ottomans strove 
to derive political meanings from these concepts. They used consultation, contract of in-
vestiture or council (şûra) to refer to the concepts such as national assembly, checks and 
balances, and limiting the sultan's authority (p. 39). 
 
This group also began to challenge the understanding of “obedience to almost any au-
thority” which has its roots in Sunni Islam. Ali Suavi, for example, defended the right of 
“civil disobedience” and called the people for action. Contrary to the Sunni tradition, he 
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defended the right to rebel against the “tyrant" (Türköne 1994, 124). However, Ali Suavi, 
Namık Kemal, and their collaborators’ criticisms to the “tyranny” were rarely directed at 
the sultan’s person and never against the institution of the monarchy (Mardin 2000, 108) 
because of the unsuitability of the Sunni and Ottoman political traditions (Türköne 1994, 
124) Hence, their target became the Porte, particularly Âli and Fuad Pashas (Mardin 2000, 
108).  
 
The Young Ottomans believed in the necessity of a constitutional and representative gov-
ernment (Mardin 2000, 80) with a goal to put an end to the preponderant impact of the 
Sublime Porte (Mardin 2000, 13). In their writings in Muhbir newspaper, that was the 
first official media organ of the Young Ottomans in Europe, the Young Ottomans explic-
itly demanded an assembly (Türköne 1994, 107) since, they believed in the necessity of 
the “people's sovereignty.” As quoted by Türköne (1994), Namık Kemal states in one of 
his writings in Hürriyet newspaper that “just as the individual possesses his own power 
(iktidar) naturally, when they come together… the public has the right of their sovereignty 
in every community (ümmet)”90 (p. 116). 
 
What was also new was that the Young Ottomans created an environment wherein dis-
cussions revolved around notions such as “liberty” and “fatherland” which became prev-
alent and increased momentum during the Hamidian period despite heavy censorship. 
Through their courageous nature, their actions represented an example (Mardin 2000, 80) 
and paved the way for subsequent intellectual and political oppositions to Abdülhamid II, 
such as the opposition of the Young Turks, by providing them an ideological basis (Ülken 
2017, 119). 
 
In such an atmosphere, Cevdet’s outlook was quite conservative91 and strictly loyal to the 
traditional understanding of the authority. Therefore, he considered the Young Ottomans, 
whose thoughts represented the genesis of most of the modern concepts in the Ottoman 
context (Kara 2017, 24), as the cause of unrest (Maruzat, 196-197). Cevdet believed that 
                                               
90 “Ferdin kendi iktidarına tasarruf-ı tabiiyesi gibi kuvve-i müctemiî dahi bittabi efradın mecmuuna ait olduğu için her 
ümmette hakk-ı hakimiyet umumundur” (Türköne 1994, 116). 
91 For a detailed discussion of Cevdet’s conservatism, consult to: (Noyan 2018). 
 
 103 
they were harmful to the state and hence, the state’s significant positions should be pro-
tected against their occupation (Maruzat, 52).92 However, what Cevdet was advocating 
was no longer be on the agenda of the political actors coming after Cevdet. Within almost 
thirty years after Cevdet’s death, there was left neither the sultanate nor   the caliphate. 
The entire political system of the empire was changed and Turkish Republic was founded 
in 1923. 
 
To sum up, as seen in this study, although Cevdet served the state throughout its transfor-
mation period and was actively involved in the implementation of numerous reforms, he 
maintained the traditional official understanding of authority which in fact was on the 
wane throughout the nineteenth century. In this respect, he displayed a conservative 
stance and positioned himself against those who questioned or took reactions to the tra-
ditional understanding such as the Young Ottomans, or those who rebelled against the 
state and sultan because of their discontent with the developments. In this sense, Cevdet 
represented an interesting case by being the heir of the concept of much older authority 
which in fact began to be challenged during his time. 
                                               
92 “…bundan dolayı zuhûr edecek keşâ-keşler ile azl ü nas bir kerri sökün ederse, umûr-ı nâzüke ve mesâlih-i mühimme 
Jön Türkîler ellerine geçip, bu ise, menâfi’-i devlete muvâfık düşmeyeceğinden…” (Maruzat, 52).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
After the 1940s, an interest in Cevdet, whose identity did not attract much attention im-
mediately after his death, increased among the conservatives of the time. Since the ten-
dency was to regard the nineteenth century intellectuals in a partisan manner during these 
years, Cevdet became a symbol for conservatives and was represented as “defender of 
islam” or “faithful but also progressive.” Although academically more reliable works 
have been conducted in the following decades, and Cevdet considered from different per-
spectives, there has been a common understanding of “incontestability” of Cevdet’s ac-
counts. Only a few of the recent works, such as Neumann’s studies, could go beyond this 
understanding. However, as this study aimed to illustrate, Cevdet’s sources need to be 
studied with a critical eye to be able to produce academically more reliable studies.  
 
This study is a modest attempt to go beyond the understanding of Cevdet’s “incontesta-
bility” and challenge the repeated “reliability” and “impartiality” of his works to be able 
to reassess their dependability as primary sources of the Tanzimat era. For this, Tezakir 
and Maruzat were taken into account through questioning Cevdet’s purpose of writing 
these sources, the influence of his personal relationships on his accounts, his perspective 
while interpreting the events, and the themes he was often dealing with. Thematic focus 
of this research has been on Cevdet’s attitude toward the Tanzimat era’s grand viziers, 
sultans, palace, economy, and society as well as people’s reactions to reform movements. 
 
Cevdet was a highly complex statesman, and played a crucial role in the application of 
reforms in the administrative, judiciary, intellectual, and educational spheres. His politi-
cal outlook was centered on “the state.” Therefore, his point of view was shaped by a 
pragmatist statist understanding for reinforcing the power and continuity of the empire. 
Moreover, he regarded the notion of “sultan” as a pivotal factor of the Ottoman state, and 
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supported reforms under the protection of the sultan. That’s why, he had a strong under-
standing of “obedience to monarch” and never approved the participation of “the sub-
jects” in politics. According to him, any opposition against the state or the sultan was 
“mischief” (fitne) and those who opposed any of the two were rebellious (âsi) and abom-
inable (bâğî). 
 
Cevdet’s monarchist and state-centered outlook is felt throughout both of the sources 
when he describes and interprets the events. Therefore, in the study, this point is paid a 
special attention in order to illustrate its influence on Cevdet’s accounts with concrete 
examples. As another point, since Cevdet was writing about a period in which he was 
actively involved, his personal relationship with the people had an effect on his writings. 
This situation resulted in open partiality of his accounts. While trying to justify or excuse 
the acts of the ones he was attached, he did not hesitate to use harsh expressions about 
whom he had conflict of interests or personal disputes.  
 
While composing both sources, the intend of Cevdet was not their publication. Tezakir 
was a compilation of his notes that he took while serving as chronicler. He reconsidered 
the events of his time according to his personal outlook, and compiled these notes to be 
sent to his successor Lütfi Effendi. Maruzat was written upon the direct order of Abdülha-
mid II to inform him about the periods of the sultan’s father Abdülmecid and uncle 
Abdülaziz. Therefore, at some points, there was a difference between the language used 
in the sources. For instance, when Cevdet was talking about the statesmen of the time, 
sultans or palace, he was more careful about his word choices in Maruzat. Depending on 
the sources, the emphasis on some specific issues were also different. For example, 
Abdülaziz’s dethronement and death was mentioned in a more detailed way in Maruzat. 
These kinds of differences were paid attention throughout the thesis to be able to under-
stand Cevdet’s agenda. 
 
In the first chapter, Cevdet’s accounts about the five most mentioned grand viziers—
Reşid, Fuad, Âli, Mahmud Nedim, and Midhat Pashas— were tackled to reveal Cevdet’s 
partiality. It was seen that there is an obvious variation in Cevdet’s attitudes toward each 
of these grand viziers, since Cevdet was affected by his personal relationship with them. 
While Cevdet’s main collaborators were the triad of Reşid, Fuad, and Âli Pashas, Cevdet 
felt the closest attachment to Reşid and Fuad Pashas. This situation led Cevdet to adopt a 
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lenient attitude toward Reşid and Fuad Pashas while displaying ambivalent and some-
times critical manners toward Âli Pasha. When it came to Mahmud Nedim and Midhat 
Pashas, almost all of Cevdet’s statements were negative and severe. The chapter aimed 
to figure out the possible reasons behind Cevdet’s changing attitudes toward each of these 
grand viziers and illustrate the subjectivity of Cevdet’s accounts. 
 
In the second chapter, Cevdet’s attitude toward the two sultans of the era—Abdülmecid 
and Abdülaziz—and the situation of the palace and economy during their reigns has been 
scrutinized. The objective of the chapter was to understand Cevdet’s notion of “sultanate” 
in order to contextualize Cevdet’s accounts of these sultans and their reigns. Since, 
Cevdet firmly believed that “sultan” was one of the four foundational pillars of the Otto-
man state, he refrained from criticizing the sultans to protect their dignity. This was also 
why he elaborated on Abdülaziz’s dethronement and death, as he aimed to vindicate the 
name and dignity of the sultan. In the second place, Cevdet’s primary concerns about the 
situation of the economy of the Tanzimat era were considered. During Abdülmecid’s pe-
riod, Cevdet’s main focus was on the “extravagance” of the palace and palace ladies 
which he saw as the main reason for the deterioration of the economy. The study has 
indicated that there were more significant reasons to worsen the economic situation and 
lead the empire to crisis than what Cevdet stressed. On the other hand, although the ex-
penses Cevdet defines as “prodigality” continued to increase during Abdülaziz’s era, 
Cevdet did not mention them and retreated into silence about the period. In the chapter, 
the possible reasons behind Cevdet’s changing attitude toward the two sultans have been 
also analyzed. 
 
The third chapter aimed to illustrate Cevdet’s state-centered view while describing and 
interpreting the oppositional movements of the people of different strata and diverse re-
gions of the empire. Tanzimat reforms brought about rapid changes in almost all spheres 
of life which often resulted in discontent of the people and led to uprisings. As the chapter 
reveals, Cevdet on the other hand, adopted a conservative and traditional political stand, 
and never approved of any opposition against the state or sultan. Therefore, he labeled 
these kinds of oppositions “mischief” (fitne). To reveal Cevdet’s attitude, this chapter 
firstly examined reactions by Muslims and non-Muslims to the Islahat edict. Secondly, 
his harsh manner towards the ones who got involved in the Mecca rebellion of 1855, 
which was caused due to the prohibition of the slave trade, was considered. In the third 
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place, his accounts of the Kuleli incident, which was a conspiracy caused by extensive 
discontent with the proclamation and the consequences of the Islahat Edict, have been 
analyzed. Lastly, Cevdet’s descriptions of the Syrian uprising, which was severely sup-
pressed by the state, were taken into consideration to be able to indicate how Cevdet tried 
to protect the state’s dignity.  
 
The fourth chapter tackled with Cevdet’s manner toward the society of the Tanzimat pe-
riod. In this context, his reports about İstanbul society, in which he had spent most of his 
life, and societies of Bosnia and the Çukurova region, to where he was sent as a state 
official, were analyzed. For İstanbul society, although there were more significant 
changes in people’s lives led by modernization, Cevdet only focused on the rise of “hor-
rible lavishness” and the abandonment of old socio-economic habits. This chapter also 
reveals that although Cevdet’s main purpose was not different when it came to his mis-
sions in Bosnia and Çukurova, his attitude towards the two societies differed from each 
other. Cevdet’s responsibility was to rehabilitate the relationship with the local people 
and central government to be able to solve the existing problems. However, Cevdet 
adopted a lenient approach to the Bosnians and a harsher one to nomads of Çukurova. 
The chapter attempted to figure out the possible reasons behind Cevdet’s changing atti-
tudes towards the people of these two regions. 
 
The last chapter briefly examined the Ottoman political thought to understand Cevdet’s 
traditional and conservative outlook on rulership. The chapter illustrated that Cevdet's 
advocacy of the patrimonial absolute monarchy was in fact the state’s official ideology 
that was maintained strictly until the eighteenth century. In this regard, Cevdet was an 
interesting case for representing the transitional period in his personality; On the one 
hand, he played a crucial role throughout the Tanzimat period while implementing the 
reform projects of the government, but on the other, he was striving to protect the much 
older notions of authority which were fading gradually away since the eighteenth century.
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